Project: connectors (ellmos-connectors) Ecosystem: ellmos-ai Umbrella: open-bricks Last Updated: 2026-09-14

If you discover a security vulnerability in this project, please do not open a public GitHub issue.

1. GitHub Security Advisory (Recommended / Empfohlen): Open a private advisory via GitHub Security Advisories.
2. Direct Maintainer Contact: Reach out via dedicated security contact emails: security@open-bricks.org, security@ellmos.ai, lukas@open-bricks.org, or maintainer email support@lukasgeiger.com.

Please include as much detail as possible:

• Type of vulnerability (e.g., credential exposure, SSRF, command injection, path traversal)
• Affected connector module (telegram_connector.py, discord_connector.py, signal_connector.py, slack_connector.py, imessage_connector.py, etc.)
• Step-by-step reproduction instructions and minimal proof-of-concept
• Potential impact and threat model
• Suggested mitigation or patch (if available)

• Acknowledgment: Within 48 hours (Empfangsbestätigung innerhalb von 48 Stunden)
• Initial Assessment & Triage: Within 5 business days (Ersteinschätzung innerhalb von 5 Werktagen)
• Fix & Advisory Release: Coordinated disclosure following verified resolution

1. Zero Runtime Secret Persistence: connectors never writes API tokens, bot credentials, or session data to disk or persistent state stores.
2. Repr & Log Leak Prevention: ConnectorConfig.auth_config is defined with field(repr=False). All connector classes ensure their __repr__() implementations mask secrets and only expose identifier and status metadata.
3. Pluggable Secret Resolution: Secrets can be resolved via environment variables (os.environ), .env files, or through the decoupled SecretAdapter interface for external key vaults.
4. Injection Safety: Process invocations in SignalConnector and iMessageConnector strictly pass arguments as structured arrays to subprocess.run (without shell=True) to prevent shell injection.
5. Zero Mandatory Runtime Dependencies: The core library relies exclusively on Python standard library modules (urllib, json, threading, subprocess, sqlite3, etc.), minimizing supply-chain attack surfaces.
6. Local Platform & SQLite Isolation: iMessageConnector queries local macOS chat.db in read-only mode using strict parameterized queries, never modifies database records, and immediately fails closed with safe status on non-Darwin platforms.
7. Encrypted Transport: All HTTP-based connectors (SlackConnector, TelegramConnector, DiscordConnector, WhatsAppConnector, WebhookConnector, HomeAssistantConnector) enforce TLS/HTTPS endpoints.

• Third-party platform infrastructure outages or security incidents (Slack, Telegram, Discord, Meta WhatsApp, Signal Network, Home Assistant).
• Vulnerabilities within external system binaries such as signal-cli (report upstream to AsamK/signal-cli).
• Insecure storage of secrets in user code, configuration files, or environment variable management outside this library's boundaries.