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Applications are affected only if a schema renames keys with a regular-expression source and a Joi.expression() / Joi.x() target that interpolates the pattern's own match data, combined with { multiple: true }, for example .rename(/^x-(.+)$/, Joi.x('{#​1}'), { multiple: true }). Because the target is rendered from the matched input key, an attacker who controls input keys can send x-__proto__ with an object value and make the rename target render as __proto__, which sets the prototype of the object joi returns instead of creating a key on it. The global Object.prototype is not modified, so the effect is confined to the object returned by that one validate() call.
Schemas using a static string rename target are not affected, and neither are schemas left on the default { multiple: false }.
Patches
Versions 17.13.5 and 18.2.4 have been released to address the issue.
Workarounds
Replace the template rename target with a static string target.
Keep the template but make the capture unable to produce __proto__, using a negative lookahead: .rename(/^x-(?!__proto__$)(.+)$/, Joi.x('{#​1}'), { multiple: true })
Drop { multiple: true } from the rename, which stops the rename before the assignment.
An application that passes attacker-controlled data into joi's custom message configuration (messages(), message(), prefs({ messages }), Joi.extend({ messages }) or rule({ message })) lets the attacker write properties onto Object.prototype, where every object in the process then inherits them. A key named __proto__ was treated as a language name, and the code reused the object it found at that key, which resolves to the prototype rather than to a new own property; a key named constructor did the same to the Object function's statics. A consuming application that gates on the mere presence of a property (if (user.isAdmin)) can be made to take the wrong branch for every object it inspects.
This is not reachable from data that joi validates. Custom messages are schema-construction configuration, normally written by the application developer. Exploitation therefore requires an application that feeds untrusted input straight into schema construction.
Patches
Upgrade to version 18.2.5 or 17.13.6.
Workarounds
Do not pass untrusted input into messages(), message(), prefs({ messages }), Joi.extend({ messages }) or rule({ message }). Or validate that they don't contain any __proto__ or constructor property.
Neither CVE affects Freelens. The bump is still worth merging (dependency hygiene, and it silences the advisory scanners), but there is no exploitable path in this codebase.
How joi is used here
joi is a direct dependency of packages/core and freelens only — the lockfile has no other package pulling it in, and only joi@18.2.5 resolves after this PR. It is not re-exported through the extension API, so extension code cannot reach it either.
Ten files import it; all of them build plain Joi.object({...}) schemas out of Joi.string() / Joi.boolean() / Joi.array() primitives:
packages/core/src/common/cluster-types.ts:36 — cluster model checkers
packages/core/src/renderer/components/dock/logs/log-tab-data.validator.ts:11 — log tab data
packages/core/src/main/router/route.ts:67,133 plus the five route injectables under main/routes/{resource-applier,helm/releases} — request payload validators
CVE-2026-84367 — rename() with a Joi.x() target and { multiple: true }
Not applicable. There is no .rename( call anywhere in the repo that touches joi (the only rename hits are fs.promises.rename in packages/core/src/main/kubectl/kubectl.ts:512 and an unrelated logger method). Consequently there is also no Joi.x() / Joi.expression() and no { multiple: true } — all three preconditions of the advisory are absent.
CVE-2026-84368 — prototype pollution via a __proto__ language key in custom messages
Not applicable. No messages(), message(), prefs({ messages }), Joi.extend({ messages }) or rule({ message }) call exists in the codebase. The only options ever passed to joi are validation flags:
route.ts:133 — payloadValidator.validate(payload) with no options
The advisory also notes this path is not reachable from validated data at all; it requires untrusted input fed into schema construction, which never happens here — every schema is a static module-level constant.
Verdict
Merge as routine maintenance. No code change or workaround is needed, and no follow-up mitigation is required in Freelens.
Note: I did not run the build or test suite for this — the question was reachability analysis only, answered by reading the source and the lockfile.
| Branch: renovate/npm-joi-vulnerability | Model: claude-opus-5[1m]
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This PR contains the following updates:
18.2.3→18.2.5joi: object().rename() with a template target can set the validated object's prototype
CVE-2026-84367 / GHSA-gg4h-3hg2-grpc
More information
Details
Impact
Applications are affected only if a schema renames keys with a regular-expression source and a
Joi.expression()/Joi.x()target that interpolates the pattern's own match data, combined with{ multiple: true }, for example.rename(/^x-(.+)$/, Joi.x('{#​1}'), { multiple: true }). Because the target is rendered from the matched input key, an attacker who controls input keys can sendx-__proto__with an object value and make the rename target render as__proto__, which sets the prototype of the object joi returns instead of creating a key on it. The globalObject.prototypeis not modified, so the effect is confined to the object returned by that onevalidate()call.Schemas using a static string rename target are not affected, and neither are schemas left on the default
{ multiple: false }.Patches
Versions 17.13.5 and 18.2.4 have been released to address the issue.
Workarounds
__proto__, using a negative lookahead:.rename(/^x-(?!__proto__$)(.+)$/, Joi.x('{#​1}'), { multiple: true })Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:NReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
joi: Prototype pollution via a
__proto__language key in custom messagesCVE-2026-84368 / GHSA-6w3j-5fw6-r9vr
More information
Details
Impact
An application that passes attacker-controlled data into joi's custom message configuration (
messages(),message(),prefs({ messages }),Joi.extend({ messages })orrule({ message })) lets the attacker write properties ontoObject.prototype, where every object in the process then inherits them. A key named__proto__was treated as a language name, and the code reused the object it found at that key, which resolves to the prototype rather than to a new own property; a key namedconstructordid the same to theObjectfunction's statics. A consuming application that gates on the mere presence of a property (if (user.isAdmin)) can be made to take the wrong branch for every object it inspects.This is not reachable from data that joi validates. Custom messages are schema-construction configuration, normally written by the application developer. Exploitation therefore requires an application that feeds untrusted input straight into schema construction.
Patches
Upgrade to version 18.2.5 or 17.13.6.
Workarounds
Do not pass untrusted input into
messages(),message(),prefs({ messages }),Joi.extend({ messages })orrule({ message }). Or validate that they don't contain any__proto__orconstructorproperty.Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:NReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Release Notes
hapijs/joi (joi)
v18.2.5Compare Source
v18.2.4Compare Source
Configuration
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