Add length validation for D-Star network packets - #878
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Should this not also be applied to other modes, and also the gateways? |
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Security: remotely exploitable out-of-bounds read
Incoming D-Star network UDP packets are accessed at fixed offsets after checking only the 4-byte DSRP header. A crafted short packet passes the header check but causes out-of-bounds reads. Since UDP source addresses are trivially spoofed, the existing source address check does not prevent exploitation.
An attacker who can send UDP packets to the D-Star gateway port can crash MMDVMHost or read adjacent memory contents.
Added minimum length checks for NETWORK_TEXT (34 bytes), NETWORK_HEADER (9 bytes), and NETWORK_DATA (10 bytes).