feat: add switches to disable public sign-up and password login

[mashpie]

What

We self-host Hopp for a single team. This adds a small set of opt-in switches for closed
instances. Without them set, behaviour stays as it is today, with one exception noted below.

DISABLE_SIGNUP=true

Today anyone who can reach an instance can create an account and a new team, via
POST /api/sign-up or a social login. With the switch, new accounts need a valid team
invitation. The first account of an empty instance can still be created, so a fresh
deployment can be bootstrapped.

DISABLE_PASSWORD_LOGIN=true

Rejects email/password sign-in, sign-up and password reset, leaving only the configured
OAuth providers. The backend refuses to start if none is configured, so nobody can lock
themselves out by accident.

Social providers only when configured

selfhost/.env.example says OAuth providers are "auto-disabled when empty", but all three
were always registered and the Google/GitHub buttons always rendered. A provider is now
registered and shown only when its key and secret are set. This is the one change that is
visible without setting a switch.

Billing UI without Stripe

The backend already treats everyone as Pro when STRIPE_SECRET_KEY is unset. The web app
still showed the Subscription page with a checkout that cannot work; it is now hidden in
that case.

How the web app finds out

A small public endpoint, GET /api/config, returns signup_enabled,
password_login_enabled, billing_enabled and auth_providers. The self-host image is
prebuilt and configured at runtime, so build-time VITE_* flags are not an option here.

Commits

1. feat(backend): register social login providers only when configured
2. feat(backend): add DISABLE_SIGNUP and DISABLE_PASSWORD_LOGIN switches
3. feat(web-app): follow instance config on login and subscription pages
4. doc: document access control switches for self-hosting

The diff of Login.tsx looks larger than it is: wrapping the form in a condition makes
Prettier re-indent it.

Testing

• Integration tests for both switches, the first-account bootstrap, invitations (password
  and social), and the config endpoint. A unit test covers the startup check.
• Checked in the browser against a local backend for each combination: default, sign-up
  disabled, password login disabled, and with/without Stripe.
• selfhost/.env.example, selfhost/compose.yml and the self-hosting docs are updated.

Happy to adjust naming or scope.

Summary by CodeRabbit

• New Features
  • Added instance-level controls for sign-ups and password-based login, while allowing configured social login options to remain available.
  • Login and sign-up screens now reflect each instance’s available authentication options and explain when sign-ups are disabled.
  • Added a public configuration endpoint reporting sign-up, login, billing, and social provider availability.
• Bug Fixes
  • Subscription navigation and page access now reflect whether billing is enabled.
  • Sign-ups that are not allowed are rejected with a clear message; password login and password recovery are unavailable when password login is disabled.
• Documentation
  • Documented self-hosting access settings and their requirements.

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ℹ️ Recent review info

⚙️ Run configuration

• Configuration used: defaults
• Review profile: CHILL
• Plan: Advanced
• Run ID: d498c2fb-c923-4b91-9a03-2a46ed4c7807

📥 Commits

Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between 17197dd and 7597fb6.

📒 Files selected for processing (4)

• backend/internal/config/config.go
• backend/internal/config/config_test.go
• docs/src/content/docs/open-source/self-hosting.md
• selfhost/.env.example

🚧 Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (1)

• docs/src/content/docs/open-source/self-hosting.md

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📝 Walkthrough

Walkthrough

The backend adds signup and password-login settings, exposes them through unauthenticated GET /api/config, and enforces the configured access rules. The web app uses the returned settings to control login options and billing access.

Changes

Instance access controls and billing

Layer / File(s)	Summary
Configuration and public instance settings backend/internal/config/*, backend/internal/handlers/instanceConfig.go, backend/internal/server/server.go, backend/api-files/openapi.yaml, tauri/src/openapi.d.ts, web-app/src/openapi.d.ts, backend/internal/config/config_test.go, selfhost/.env.example, selfhost/compose.yml, docs/src/content/docs/open-source/self-hosting.md	The backend loads signup and password-login flags, identifies configured social providers, and serves an unauthenticated GET /api/config response. API declarations, self-hosting configuration, documentation, and tests describe these settings.
Backend signup and password-login enforcement backend/internal/handlers/handlers.go, backend/internal/server/server.go, backend/test/integration/feature_switches_test.go	Signup checks reject uninvited registrations when signup is disabled, while allowing the first account and valid invitations. Middleware rejects password-login routes when password login is disabled. Provider registration includes only configured providers. Integration tests cover these behaviors.
Web app login and billing controls web-app/src/pages/Login.tsx, web-app/src/components/sidebar.tsx, web-app/src/pages/Subscription.tsx	The login page conditionally renders password and configured social-login options. The sidebar shows Subscription only when billing is enabled, and the subscription page redirects to the dashboard when billing is disabled.

Priority: ➖ Normal

Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~25 minutes

Change: Feature

Sequence Diagram(s)

sequenceDiagram
  participant LoginForm
  participant ConfigRoute
  participant AuthHandler.GetInstanceConfig
  participant Config
  LoginForm->>ConfigRoute: Request GET /api/config
  ConfigRoute->>AuthHandler.GetInstanceConfig: Handle request
  AuthHandler.GetInstanceConfig->>Config: Read access, billing, and provider settings
  Config-->>AuthHandler.GetInstanceConfig: Return configured values
  AuthHandler.GetInstanceConfig-->>LoginForm: Return InstanceConfig JSON

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Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to 7597f

A Slack-only instance with password login disabled now fails at startup rather than presenting a login page with no usable sign-in option. No actionable merge-blocking risk remains in the supplied evidence.

Security Architecture Review

Security architecture risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to 17197

The restrictions are enforced on the server, but concurrent first-account registrations can defeat the intended bootstrap limit. A Slack-only configuration can also leave the web login page without an offered authentication method after password login is disabled.

Retained concerns

• Medium · security · inferred: With DISABLE_SIGNUP enabled, concurrent uninvited registrations on an empty PostgreSQL instance can both observe zero users and create separate teams and administrator accounts. The transactions protect individual team/user creation from rollback failures but do not serialize the instance-wide admission decision. This undermines the new first-account-only exception during bootstrap; it does not establish cross-team data access.
• Medium · reliability · observed: A Slack-only configuration satisfies the startup requirement for DISABLE_PASSWORD_LOGIN, but the web login recognizes only Google and GitHub as offered social methods and hides password authentication. This accepted rollout state leaves ordinary web sign-in and bootstrap without an offered method, impairing access to administrative controls. Direct Slack OAuth remains reachable, so this is a web-access and recovery defect rather than total server authentication lockout.

Security review details

Security Blast Radius

• inferred — The bootstrap concern affects admission to one reachable, empty instance. An attacker needs an enabled signup path satisfying its existing validation, or a successful configured OAuth identity, but no invitation or prior account. The established outcome is persistent additional accounts with administrator authority over newly created teams; existing-team takeover or infrastructure privilege gain is not established.

Security Findings and Attack Paths

• inferred — Two distinct uninvited registrations can enter separate transactions, both count zero committed users, and then commit their independent team/user inserts. User uniqueness prevents duplicate identities, not multiple different bootstrap identities. Ordinary PostgreSQL isolation permits this schedule; deployed isolation and practical reproduction remain unverified.

Trust Boundaries and Controls

• observed — Password restrictions are enforced before handlers at all four public password routes. Client visibility is not the authorization boundary. Billing endpoints retain JWT protection and server-side team-admin checks for checkout, portal access and billing settings; the new navigation and redirect behavior does not replace those controls.

Resilience and Maintainability Implications

• inferred — The Slack-only rollout mismatch can obstruct ordinary access to administrative controls without invalidating the backend OAuth route. Recovery can use that direct route when the external provider works, or an operator-controlled configuration change and restart. Provider credentials alone do not prove matching existing-user emails or valid redirects.

Hardening Proposals

• proposed — Make bootstrap admission an atomic, instance-wide transition shared by manual and OAuth signup, with defined rollback and retry behavior. Align accepted password-disabled configurations with authentication methods actually offered by the web client, and validate an operator recovery path before enabling the policy.

🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1

❌ Failed checks (1 warning)

Check name	Status	Explanation	Resolution
Docstring Coverage	⚠️ Warning	Docstring coverage is 8.00% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 25 functions across 11 files. (2 skipped: …	Write docstrings for the functions missing them to satisfy the coverage threshold.

✅ Passed checks (4 passed)

Check name	Status	Explanation
Description Check	✅ Passed	Check skipped - CodeRabbit’s high-level summary is enabled.
Title check	✅ Passed	The title clearly summarizes the main change: adding controls to disable public sign-up and password login.
Linked Issues check	✅ Passed	Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Out of Scope Changes check	✅ Passed	Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.

Full details: Docstring Coverage

Explanation

Docstring coverage is 8.00% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 25 functions across 11 files. (2 skipped: 2 unsupported.)

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Actionable comments posted: 1

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Inline comments:
Review comments at @web-app/src/pages/Login.tsx:
- Line 121: Update Login’s hasSocialLogin check to include Slack, and render an
active Slack sign-in button gated on authProviders including "slack" so
Slack-only configurations provide a sign-in option.

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ℹ️ Review info

⚙️ Run configuration

• Configuration used: defaults
• Review profile: CHILL
• Plan: Advanced
• Run ID: cc49d2e6-3be6-4b12-828f-2e72d4ffcb80

📥 Commits

Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between eb2468c and 17197dd.

📒 Files selected for processing (15)

• backend/api-files/openapi.yaml
• backend/internal/config/config.go
• backend/internal/config/config_test.go
• backend/internal/handlers/handlers.go
• backend/internal/handlers/instanceConfig.go
• backend/internal/server/server.go
• backend/test/integration/feature_switches_test.go
• docs/src/content/docs/open-source/self-hosting.md
• selfhost/.env.example
• selfhost/compose.yml
• tauri/src/openapi.d.ts
• web-app/src/components/sidebar.tsx
• web-app/src/openapi.d.ts
• web-app/src/pages/Login.tsx
• web-app/src/pages/Subscription.tsx

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