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This seems to be a spurious service start
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Normally these kind of changes are done upstream (i.e. in debian). Surely there's a some reason it's not already shipping like this? |
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Debian seems to be moving towards shipping AppArmor profiles with their packages to enforce security policy (which is incompatible with SELinux). Having some experience with such work, I suspect it is not already done for all services (whether by using AppArmor/SELinux or in a more limited fashion through systemd's features) because it is extremely difficult to write a security policy that is strict enough to be useful, yet does not break functionality, without knowing the context in which it is used. In our case, though, we know which services are run and how they are configured. |
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We should revisit this, preferably once integration testing is underway. As a FYI, the Debian project is drafting unit files best practices that are moving in that direction: https://etherpad.fr/p/systemd-best-practices |
This configuration change enforces by default some restriction on services:
PrivateTmp: they get their own/tmpand/var/tmp;PrivateDevices: they only get to view API pseudo-devices (/dev/null,full,random, ...);ProtectSystem:/usr,/bootand/etcare read-only;ProtectHome: prevents access to/home,/rootand/run/user;NoNewPrivileges: prevents uid changes and some other things;CapabilityBoundingSet: prevents use ofCAP_SYS_ADMIN,CAP_DAC_OVERRIDEandCAP_SYS_PTRACE.Some services needs specific overrides, that need to be put in
systemd/system/$UNIT.d/override.conf.The provided override are probably both suboptimal and insufficient.
WARNING: Do not merge yet. In particular, this would break
sshdwithout #28.This is meant, in a first time, for review only.