Fix/issue 2359 secure session rotation#2366
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…event OOM DOS attacks
… and HttpOnly cookie storage
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Description
Resolves Issue #2359 (Long-Lived Access Tokens & Missing Revocation) and Issue #2360 (JWT Storage Vulnerable to XSS).
The legacy authentication pipeline suffered from multiple severe architectural flaws. It issued static, 7-day access tokens with no revocation mechanism, creating massive windows of vulnerability during a breach. Furthermore, it relied on the client to store these tokens in
localStorage, making the entire session vulnerable to DOM-based XSS extraction.This PR establishes a state-of-the-art, secure session management architecture using split-token HttpOnly cookies.
Changes Made
access_tokenlifespan from 7 days to15 minutesto violently shrink the window of compromise.create_refresh_token(7 days) and a dedicatedPOST /api/auth/refreshendpoint to handle seamless background session extension without user interruption.Response.set_cookieutilizinghttponly=True,secure=True, andsamesite="lax"parameters, effectively sandboxing tokens away from malicious JavaScript.POST /api/auth/logoutendpoint to forcefully delete session cookies, providing immediate session termination.Type of Change