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Security: jiangkoumo/agenttape

Security

SECURITY.md

Security policy

AgentTape processes local tool traces that may contain sensitive inputs or outputs. Do not attach live credentials, private production captures, or unredacted .agent-tape/runtime/ files to public issues.

Reporting a vulnerability

Use the repository host's private security-advisory channel when available. Include the affected AgentTape version, a minimal redacted reproduction, and the expected security boundary. If no private channel is available, open a public issue containing only non-sensitive reproduction steps and request a private follow-up channel.

Security boundaries

  • Runtime captures remain under the active workspace's .agent-tape/ directory.
  • MCP reads are limited to .agent-tape/tapes/ under the resolved workspace root.
  • Regression writes are limited to tests/agenttape/ and do not overwrite by default.
  • Tape reads reject directory escapes, symbolic links, oversized files, invalid schemas, and duplicate tape IDs.
  • Structural replay never calls a model or live tool.
  • The public demo contains only a generated, redacted fixture and cannot access local captures.
  • The remote MCP accepts only caller-supplied tapes marked as redacted, rejects encoded documents over 1 MiB, and has no storage, model calls, or live-tool calls.
  • Remote assertion results omit compared captured values; validation errors report schema paths rather than captured values.

AgentTape cannot redact secrets that never reach supported hooks, and it cannot observe hosted tools outside local hook coverage. Review exported .tape files before sharing them.

The redactions.applied marker is evidence that the recorder ran; it is not proof that arbitrary free-form content contains no sensitive information. Never send a tape to any remote service without reviewing it first.

There aren't any published security advisories