Hotwash is WIP. Only the latest commit on the main branch, and the latest
published hotwash-mcp release on npm, receive security fixes. Pin to a tagged
release if you need a known-good version.
Please do not open a public GitHub issue for security problems. Email me@solomonneas.dev with:
- A short description of the issue.
- Steps to reproduce (or a minimal proof of concept).
- The version, commit, or
hotwash-mcprelease you tested against. - Whether you would like to be credited in the release notes.
You should get an acknowledgment within 72 hours. If you do not, please follow up - the mail may have been filtered.
- Authentication or authorization flaws in the FastAPI backend (
api/), including the API-key check and the HMAC verification onPOST /api/ingest/wazuh. - Server-side request forgery (SSRF) in the SOAR integration clients
(
api/integrations/), including DNS-rebinding, redirect, and private-address bypasses. - Path traversal or injection via
case_idand other values forwarded to external platforms (for example TheHive). - Secrets (API keys, HMAC seeds, integration tokens) leaking into logs, responses, or the repository.
- Confused-deputy or missing-confirmation flaws in the
hotwash-mcpMCP server that let an agent take destructive actions (cancel a run, accept or dismiss a suggestion) without the documentedconfirm: truegate. - CORS or origin-validation weaknesses that expose the backend to untrusted browser origins.
hotwash-mcp is a thin client over the Hotwash REST API. It is only as
trusted as the backend you point HOTWASH_URL at and the credentials in
HOTWASH_API_KEY. Treat the MCP server as something that can start, advance,
and abandon real incident-response runs:
- Destructive tools (
hotwash_cancel_run,hotwash_accept_suggestion,hotwash_dismiss_suggestion) refuse to act unless the caller passesconfirm: true. A report that bypasses this gate is in scope. - Do not point the server at a backend you do not control, and do not put a privileged API key in an MCP config that an untrusted agent can read.
- Bugs in third-party dependencies (FastAPI, React, React Flow, the MCP SDK). Report those upstream; we will bump the pin once a fix is released.
- Issues that require an attacker to already have write access to the host, the repo, or the deployment's environment variables.
- SOAR action templates that a team customizes incorrectly. The built-in actions are starting points, not hardened production integrations.
- Denial of service from sending the backend obviously malformed or oversized input, absent a concrete amplification or auth-bypass angle.
We aim to ship a fix within 14 days of confirming a valid report. A coordinated disclosure timeline can be negotiated for issues that need longer.