LP-0019: Private DAO — proposal lifecycle, deliberation, and voting-weight delegation by weboko · Pull Request #138 · logos-co/lambda-prize

weboko · 2026-09-02T06:17:00Z

LP-0019 from logos-co/ecosystem#190. $3,000, Large.

Scope. The composition layer — proposal lifecycle, per-proposal deliberation, private voting with member-held weight, delegation. Execution, voting and deliberation each sit behind an adapter with a reference backend, so the prize is buildable before RFP-005 (rfp#113) and a private-voting spec land. RFP-005 becomes the primary execution backend once it exists.

Central requirement. Delegation and ballot privacy are in structural tension — delegates need to be accountable, members need to not be coercible. A submission has to take a defended position on it, enforce direct-vs-delegated double-count prevention in the verifier rather than the client, and ship a cross-layer privacy accounting document. Per-component privacy claims that don't compose are the realistic failure mode for a composing app.

Adoption. Typed as an end-user app: B2 + B3, C1, E2, with C2/C3/C4 discretionary. Two additions, because account-history checks can't carry anti-Sybil weight when members are unlinkable by design:

member-side counts supplied as governance attestations — proofs of the counts, not account lists. Also a Functionality deliverable.
contested-outcome modifier — 8 of 30 proposals with the losing side at ≥25% of participating weight. Governance that only ratifies isn't evidence anyone deliberated.

Logos Circle: left N/A, though the Adoption section requires two Circles to adopt it — worth attaching one.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

…eight delegation Drafts the composition layer for private DAO governance: lifecycle, per-proposal deliberation, private voting with member weight, and delegation. Execution, voting and deliberation sit behind adapters so the prize is buildable ahead of RFP-005 and a private-voting spec. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

github-actions · 2026-09-02T06:17:12Z

✅ Validation passed

A reviewer will assess against the prize criteria.
ℹ️ Prize proposal for LP-0019.

Automated check. See solution template and TERMS.

fryorcraken · 2026-09-04T05:16:29Z

+
+A DAO is not a voting contract. It is a loop: someone raises a proposal, members argue about it, members vote on it, and — if it passes — something executes against a treasury or an admin authority. Logos has, or is building, a component for each of those steps. What does not exist is the thing that makes them one organisation.
+
+This prize funds a **Private DAO app for Logos Basecamp**: the proposal lifecycle that carries a decision from draft to execution, the deliberation surface bound to each proposal, private voting with member-held weight, and voting-weight delegation — with a privacy boundary that holds *across* those steps rather than inside each one.


I think we should also mention nice integration with treasury, and potentially token governance creation GUI?

fryorcraken · 2026-09-04T06:35:57Z

+
+### Why a prize, and why now
+
+The individual layers are being addressed: execution by RFP-005, membership by LP-0003, deliberation by the Forum Sample App line and by LP-0016's delivered moderation SDK. Composition is the gap, and it is the part with no obvious right answer — the design space (where the privacy boundary sits, how delegation is reconciled with accountability, how quorum is proven over hidden weights, how spam is bounded under anonymity) admits several defensible positions. That is what a competitive prize is for.


do add title of RFPs/LP, nobody knows wha tis "RFP-005" from the top of their head.

it is defined in the Resources section, do you want to mention it everywhere?

fryorcraken · 2026-09-04T06:46:20Z

+
+- [ ] Ballot proof generation completes in **under 10 seconds** on a standard laptop, matching the bar set by LP-0016.
+- [ ] Tally verification cost is documented **as a function of member count and of participating-weight distribution**, with the largest DAO size that remains viable within LEZ block limits reported. If the viable ceiling is small, that finding is a reportable result rather than something to be silently shipped around.
+- [ ] Compute-unit / cycle counts documented for every on-chain operation (DAO creation, membership change, delegation, ballot submission if on-chain, tally, execution), benchmarked with **real proving** (`RISC0_DEV_MODE=0`). Development-mode figures are not accepted.


I dont think this is necessary for a LP.

I added it since we have similar point in multiple LPs already (like here)

fryorcraken · 2026-09-04T06:48:26Z

+
+**Attested participation (member-side)**
+
+- [ ] Across those proposals, at least **50 distinct members** cast a ballot, and at least **25 delegations** are in force from at least **15 distinct delegators** across at least **3 distinct delegates**, with no single delegate holding more than 40% of delegated weight in any DAO counted here. Supplied as governance attestations — proofs of the counts, not lists of the accounts. Attestations must be independently verifiable by an evaluator against on-chain state, and a DAO that can only supply these numbers by disclosing its membership roll does not satisfy this criterion.


I would not coount delegation vs dlegators etc. too fine grain. same for the 40%. keep it much more simple

simplified but kept 50 members criteria

maybe 25 if better?

fryorcraken · 2026-09-04T06:48:39Z

+
+- [ ] Across those proposals, at least **50 distinct members** cast a ballot, and at least **25 delegations** are in force from at least **15 distinct delegators** across at least **3 distinct delegates**, with no single delegate holding more than 40% of delegated weight in any DAO counted here. Supplied as governance attestations — proofs of the counts, not lists of the accounts. Attestations must be independently verifiable by an evaluator against on-chain state, and a DAO that can only supply these numbers by disclosing its membership roll does not satisfy this criterion.
+
+**Continued use after the award**


????
If the award is paid, then it's done.

we discussed to potentially split the prize in 2 parts, that would be second part

removed for now

…o lp-0025-private-dao

weboko marked this pull request as ready for review September 2, 2026 06:17

weboko requested review from fryorcraken, jzaki and mart1n-xyz September 2, 2026 06:17

mart1n-xyz reviewed Sep 2, 2026

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Comment thread prizes/LP-0025.md Outdated

mart1n-xyz reviewed Sep 2, 2026

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Comment thread prizes/LP-0025.md Outdated

mart1n-xyz reviewed Sep 2, 2026

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Comment thread prizes/LP-0025.md Outdated

update nubmer and open LP

f0fbe2b

weboko changed the title ~~LP-0025: Private DAO — proposal lifecycle, deliberation, and voting-weight delegation~~ LP-0019: Private DAO — proposal lifecycle, deliberation, and voting-weight delegation Sep 3, 2026

fryorcraken reviewed Sep 4, 2026

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weboko added 2 commits September 5, 2026 21:36

Merge branch 'master' of https://github.com/logos-co/lambda-prize int…

a3e6912

…o lp-0025-private-dao

address comments

57600d1


		A DAO is not a voting contract. It is a loop: someone raises a proposal, members argue about it, members vote on it, and — if it passes — something executes against a treasury or an admin authority. Logos has, or is building, a component for each of those steps. What does not exist is the thing that makes them one organisation.

		This prize funds a Private DAO app for Logos Basecamp: the proposal lifecycle that carries a decision from draft to execution, the deliberation surface bound to each proposal, private voting with member-held weight, and voting-weight delegation — with a privacy boundary that holds across those steps rather than inside each one.


		### Why a prize, and why now

		The individual layers are being addressed: execution by RFP-005, membership by LP-0003, deliberation by the Forum Sample App line and by LP-0016's delivered moderation SDK. Composition is the gap, and it is the part with no obvious right answer — the design space (where the privacy boundary sits, how delegation is reconciled with accountability, how quorum is proven over hidden weights, how spam is bounded under anonymity) admits several defensible positions. That is what a competitive prize is for.


		Attested participation (member-side)

		- [ ] Across those proposals, at least 50 distinct members cast a ballot, and at least 25 delegations are in force from at least 15 distinct delegators across at least 3 distinct delegates, with no single delegate holding more than 40% of delegated weight in any DAO counted here. Supplied as governance attestations — proofs of the counts, not lists of the accounts. Attestations must be independently verifiable by an evaluator against on-chain state, and a DAO that can only supply these numbers by disclosing its membership roll does not satisfy this criterion.


		- [ ] Across those proposals, at least 50 distinct members cast a ballot, and at least 25 delegations are in force from at least 15 distinct delegators across at least 3 distinct delegates, with no single delegate holding more than 40% of delegated weight in any DAO counted here. Supplied as governance attestations — proofs of the counts, not lists of the accounts. Attestations must be independently verifiable by an evaluator against on-chain state, and a DAO that can only supply these numbers by disclosing its membership roll does not satisfy this criterion.

		Continued use after the award

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weboko commented Sep 2, 2026 •

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