ci: publish drive9 CLI image to GHCR#517
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe PR adds containerization and publication infrastructure for the CLI application: a Dockerfile defines an Alpine-based image with the drive9 binary, and a GitHub Actions workflow automates building, tagging deterministically from commit metadata, and pushing to GHCR. ChangesCLI Docker Image Build and Publication
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Actionable comments posted: 2
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
Inline comments:
In @.github/workflows/ghcr-cli-image.yml:
- Line 60: The workflow currently injects a GitHub expression directly into
shell code via OVERRIDE_TAG="${{ github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' &&
inputs.image_tag || '' }}", which is a command-injection risk; instead move that
expression to a safe GitHub Actions environment variable (e.g. define
OVERRIDE_TAG in an env: block using the expression), then reference it in your
shell step as a quoted shell variable ("$OVERRIDE_TAG") and optionally
sanitize/validate its contents in Bash (e.g. check allowed pattern) before
using; update the occurrences that reference the inline expression (the
OVERRIDE_TAG assignment and the other instance at line 72) to use the new env
variable and quoted/sanitized usage.
In `@Dockerfile.cli`:
- Around line 1-2: The Dockerfile currently runs as root by default, which is a
container hardening risk; modify the image build to create a dedicated non-root
user and group (e.g., add a user like "appuser"), set appropriate ownership on
any runtime directories/files created during build, switch to that user with a
USER instruction before the final CMD/ENTRYPOINT, and ensure no privileged
operations require root at runtime so the container runs as the non-root user.
🪄 Autofix (Beta)
Fix all unresolved CodeRabbit comments on this PR:
- Push a commit to this branch (recommended)
- Create a new PR with the fixes
ℹ️ Review info
⚙️ Run configuration
Configuration used: defaults
Review profile: CHILL
Plan: Pro
Run ID: bb14a170-574c-4e56-a46d-bdc9b9db72f9
📒 Files selected for processing (2)
.github/workflows/ghcr-cli-image.ymlDockerfile.cli
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| FULL_SHA="$(git rev-parse HEAD)" | ||
| SHORT_SHA="$(git rev-parse --short=7 HEAD)" | ||
| OVERRIDE_TAG="${{ github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.image_tag || '' }}" |
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Avoid direct ${{ }} interpolation inside shell code (command injection risk).
Line 60 and Line 72 inject workflow-dispatch input directly into Bash source text. A crafted input containing quotes/shell syntax can break out before your validation logic runs.
Suggested fix
- name: Resolve image tags
+ env:
+ OVERRIDE_TAG_INPUT: ${{ github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.image_tag || '' }}
+ REF_NAME_INPUT: ${{ github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.publish_ref || github.ref_name }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
FULL_SHA="$(git rev-parse HEAD)"
SHORT_SHA="$(git rev-parse --short=7 HEAD)"
- OVERRIDE_TAG="${{ github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.image_tag || '' }}"
+ OVERRIDE_TAG="${OVERRIDE_TAG_INPUT}"
if [ -n "$OVERRIDE_TAG" ]; then
case "$OVERRIDE_TAG" in
@@
else
- REF_NAME="${{ github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.publish_ref || github.ref_name }}"
+ REF_NAME="${REF_NAME_INPUT}"
REF_NAME=${REF_NAME#refs/heads/}
REF_NAME=${REF_NAME#refs/tags/}Also applies to: 72-72
🧰 Tools
🪛 zizmor (1.25.2)
[error] 60-60: code injection via template expansion (template-injection): may expand into attacker-controllable code
(template-injection)
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
In @.github/workflows/ghcr-cli-image.yml at line 60, The workflow currently
injects a GitHub expression directly into shell code via OVERRIDE_TAG="${{
github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.image_tag || '' }}", which is
a command-injection risk; instead move that expression to a safe GitHub Actions
environment variable (e.g. define OVERRIDE_TAG in an env: block using the
expression), then reference it in your shell step as a quoted shell variable
("$OVERRIDE_TAG") and optionally sanitize/validate its contents in Bash (e.g.
check allowed pattern) before using; update the occurrences that reference the
inline expression (the OVERRIDE_TAG assignment and the other instance at line
72) to use the new env variable and quoted/sanitized usage.
Source: Linters/SAST tools
| FROM public.ecr.aws/docker/library/alpine:3.19 | ||
| RUN apk add --no-cache ca-certificates |
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Run the image as a non-root user.
Line 1-2 and Line 7-9 build a root-default image with no USER drop. That’s an avoidable container hardening gap; compromise impact is higher if the process runs as root.
Suggested fix
FROM public.ecr.aws/docker/library/alpine:3.19
RUN apk add --no-cache ca-certificates
+RUN addgroup -S drive9 && adduser -S -G drive9 drive9
LABEL org.opencontainers.image.source="https://github.com/mem9-ai/drive9"
LABEL org.opencontainers.image.description="drive9 CLI container image"
-COPY ./bin/drive9 /drive9
+COPY --chown=drive9:drive9 ./bin/drive9 /drive9
+USER drive9
ENTRYPOINT ["/drive9"]Also applies to: 7-9
🧰 Tools
🪛 Trivy (0.69.3)
[error] 1-1: Image user should not be 'root'
Specify at least 1 USER command in Dockerfile with non-root user as argument
Rule: DS-0002
(IaC/Dockerfile)
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
In `@Dockerfile.cli` around lines 1 - 2, The Dockerfile currently runs as root by
default, which is a container hardening risk; modify the image build to create a
dedicated non-root user and group (e.g., add a user like "appuser"), set
appropriate ownership on any runtime directories/files created during build,
switch to that user with a USER instruction before the final CMD/ENTRYPOINT, and
ensure no privileged operations require root at runtime so the container runs as
the non-root user.
Source: Linters/SAST tools
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| - 'cmd/**' | ||
| - 'pkg/**' | ||
| - 'go.mod' |
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With this paths filter, pushes that only touch internal/** do not run the publisher, but the CLI binary depends on github.com/mem9-ai/dat9/internal/schemaspec (checked with go list -deps ./cmd/drive9). If that internal package changes on main, GHCR keeps serving the previous CLI image until another listed path changes, so the published tags can lag behind the repository state.
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| @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ | |||
| FROM public.ecr.aws/docker/library/alpine:3.19 | |||
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As of June 8, 2026, alpine:3.19 is past its November 1, 2025 end-of-support date in Alpine's release table (https://www.alpinelinux.org/releases/), so every newly published CLI image starts from a base that no longer receives normal security updates. Since this Dockerfile creates a new public GHCR artifact, bump the base to a currently supported Alpine branch before publishing it.
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| FULL_SHA="$(git rev-parse HEAD)" | ||
| SHORT_SHA="$(git rev-parse --short=7 HEAD)" | ||
| OVERRIDE_TAG="${{ github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.image_tag || '' }}" |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
For manually dispatched runs, this line substitutes inputs.image_tag directly into the shell script before the validation below runs. A tag override containing shell syntax such as command substitution is evaluated while assigning OVERRIDE_TAG, so anyone allowed to dispatch this workflow can execute arbitrary commands with this job's packages: write token; pass the input through env: or another non-interpolated channel before validating it.
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| if [ "$PUSH_LATEST" = "true" ]; then | ||
| docker push "$IMAGE_NAME:latest" |
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This workflow has no concurrency guard or final origin/main check before pushing latest. When two pushes to main overlap, the older build can finish after the newer build and execute this push last, repointing ghcr.io/mem9-ai/drive9:latest to an older commit even though the SHA-specific tags are correct.
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Summary
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