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Security hardening: close supply-chain and policy gaps - #4
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Gap analysis (deep scan 2026-09-25)
Checked: Dependabot alerts,
pip-auditon project env, secret scan (tree + full history), dangerous code patterns (eval/exec/pickle.loads/yaml.load/subprocess), Actions pinning, workflow permissions, Dependabot config, branch protection, secret scanning/push protection, CodeQL status.Already secure (verified, no change):
pip-auditclean; alerts chore(deps): bump the uv group across 1 directory with 2 updates #1 (torch), Add Bandit security linter workflow #2 (setuptools CVE-2026-59890), Create SECURITY.md for security policy #3 (black) allfixedtorml/contents: read); secret scanning + push protection enabled; CodeQL greenGaps fixed in this PR (one commit each):
@v4/@v5, supply-chain risk) → pinned to SHAsdependabot.yml(updates were ad-hoc) → weekly schedule, groupeduvupdatesSECURITY.md→ reporting policy + supported versionsDeliberately not changed (needs your call):
mainis off — recommend requiring PR + CI/Test checks (command in comments)release.ymlhas no provenance attestation — follow-up once publishing to PyPI