Fix nasa/cFS#945: Harden CS_OneShotCmd against DoS via secondary memory validation#122
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Fix nasa/cFS#945: Harden CS_OneShotCmd against DoS via secondary memory validation#122
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Describe the contribution
This PR addresses a critical Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability in the CS application's OneShot command. On certain platforms, the initial memory validation is too permissive, allowing invalid or unmapped addresses to be passed to the background child task. When the child task attempts to calculate a checksum on this memory, it triggers a segmentation fault (SIGSEGV) and crashes the application.
This fix introduces a secondary, application level validation layer that checks requested memory ranges against a whitelist of known safe segments.
Testing performed
pc-linuxplatform within a standard cFS bundle.Expected behavior changes
System(s) tested on
Additional context
The validation logic was implemented using overflow safe subtraction math to prevent boundary check bypasses via large memory size parameters.
Third party code
None.
Contributor Info