Security

Security

ClawDE is built for developers who want AI assistance without routing their code through third-party servers. This page explains the security model for both local and remote use.

Self-hosted mode (Free + Personal Remote)

Your code never leaves your machine unless you explicitly enable remote access.

• The daemon runs locally on localhost:4300
• AI provider processes (claude, codex) run on your machine using your credentials
• No code, messages, or session data is sent to ClawDE servers
• Your Anthropic/OpenAI credentials stay in their own CLI config (~/.claude/, etc.)

Local auth token

Every connection to the daemon must present an auth token before calling any RPC method.

The token is generated at first start and stored at:

Platform	Path
macOS	~/Library/Application Support/clawd/auth_token
Linux	~/.local/share/clawd/auth_token
Windows	%APPDATA%\clawd\auth_token

The file is readable only by the current user (chmod 0600 on Unix). The daemon rejects any connection that sends a wrong or missing token and closes the WebSocket.

To print your token:

clawd token show

To display it as a QR code for mobile pairing:

clawd token qr

Remote access (Personal Remote tier)

Remote access routes traffic through the ClawDE relay at api.clawde.io.

• TLS in transit — all relay traffic is encrypted with TLS 1.3
• Device pairing — each remote device is issued a unique device token via the QR/PIN pairing flow. Device tokens are stored by the daemon in SQLite and can be revoked with device.revoke
• Relay never sees plaintext session data — the relay is a WebSocket proxy; it forwards framed JSON-RPC messages without inspecting content
• Bearer token auth — the daemon validates device tokens on every connection; an expired or revoked token is rejected with error -32004

Threat model

Threat	Mitigation
Local process reads auth token	Token file is 0600 (owner read-only)
Network attacker intercepts LAN traffic	Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; LAN mode requires explicit --bind 0.0.0.0
Stolen device token	Revoke via device.revoke RPC or clawd CLI; token is invalidated immediately
Malicious tool call	Tool calls are logged; destructive calls can be configured to require approval
Relay MitM	TLS 1.3; cert pinning planned for a future release

Reporting vulnerabilities

Report security issues privately via GitHub Security Advisories: https://github.com/nself-org/clawde/security/advisories/new

Please do not open public issues for security vulnerabilities.

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Related

• Architecture — relay topology
• Getting-Started — install and first run
• Daemon-Reference — device.pair, device.revoke, daemon.auth