ci: auto-merge Dependabot patch-level security updates - #28
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Enables automatic merging of Dependabot patch-level security updates (approved by the repo owner).
Scope — deliberately narrow
Auto-merges only when both are true:
update-type == version-update:semver-patchMinor, major, and non-security patch bumps are not auto-merged and still need a human.
Why
Five repos hit the same failure in a single day: an audit/SBOM gate turning red from a freshly published advisory. Patch security updates are the class that is both urgent and low-risk enough to land unattended; letting them queue up is what produced the backlog.
Safety properties
gh pr merge --auto— this does not merge immediately. GitHub queues it and completes only once all required status checks pass. A red build blocks it exactly as for a human PR.pull_request_targetruns with repository write scope, so checking out and executing untrusted PR code would be a privilege-escalation hole. This job only reads metadata and calls the API.