Only the currently deployed revision of mongodb-mcp — the main branch, served at https://mongodb.nyuchi.dev/mcp — is supported. Cloudflare Workers rollouts atomically replace older revisions, so there are no back-versions to patch.

If you believe you've found a security vulnerability — particularly anything that could

• bypass the WorkOS OAuth gate on /mcp (Authorization Code + PKCE against the Connect application),
• get a session outside the WORKOS_ALLOWED_ORG_IDS allowlist, or without the required mongodb:access permission in its granted scope, accepted into the MCP tool surface,
• reach user or role administration through the server — no tool exposes it and runCommand refuses the command family, so any path that creates a user, grants a role, or otherwise needs userAdmin is a privilege-escalation bug,
• defeat a confirm gate on an irreversible tool (dropCollection, dropDatabase, dropIndexes, convertToCapped, enableSharding, shardCollection, or deleteMany with an empty filter),
• leak MONGODB_URI or COOKIE_ENCRYPTION_KEY,
• or trigger arbitrary writes / drops on connected MongoDB clusters via the MCP tools —

please email security@nyuchi.com rather than opening a public issue. We aim to acknowledge within two business days and to ship a fix or mitigation for high-severity issues within thirty days.

Please include:

• a description of the issue and the impact you observed,
• a minimal reproduction or proof of concept,
• the WorkOS organization id you were operating under (if relevant), and
• whether you have disclosed the issue to anyone else yet.

We don't currently run a paid bug-bounty programme, but we will credit reporters in release notes unless you prefer to remain anonymous.

In scope:

• the deployed worker at https://mongodb.nyuchi.dev/*,
• the source in this repository,
• the WorkOS OAuth flow and org/permission gate in src/authkit-handler.ts, the OAuthProvider wiring in src/index.ts, and the client-approval cookie helpers in src/workers-oauth-utils.ts,
• the tool guards in src/tools.ts: assertNotIdentityCommand, the confirm gates, and the 256 KiB response cap in src/ejson.ts.

Out of scope:

• vulnerabilities in upstream dependencies (mongodb, agents, @modelcontextprotocol/sdk, @modelcontextprotocol/server, jose, zod) — please report those upstream and we'll roll the patched release;
• the MCP tools doing what an authorized caller asked with the privileges the MONGODB_URI credential holds. Scope that credential to the least role that covers your usage (see the README's role table); it must never hold userAdmin, userAdminAnyDatabase, or root;
• social engineering of Nyuchi staff or contractors;
• denial-of-service against Cloudflare or WorkOS infrastructure;
• findings from automated scanners without a working proof of concept.

We follow a 90-day coordinated-disclosure window by default. If we ship a fix earlier, public disclosure can happen as soon as the fix is deployed. If we need longer (e.g. to roll a backwards-incompatible change through dependent services), we'll let you know and agree an extended timeline.