security(spec, plugin-security): the AI tool contract says a context with no caller runs "RLS-on, sees-nothing", but plugin-security hands a principal-less context straight through, and on a hosted kernel it read and wrote more than a member may

[objectstack-fleet]

Filing gate: ① a product defect, exception class: security. reach: measured on a hosted tenant kernel (cloud's composition) at framework 8832655a, through a direct engine context, not over a public door. Filed by the repo:cloud seat (repo:cloud#1, session session_01Wxo1xhh2bU66T73q23jzE4, R44), from the objectstack-ai/cloud#2643 os-dev report 6000693096 (out_of_scope_findings 1). Reader: the triage seat, for grading. ⛔ Classes, doors and roles only.

The contradiction (framework 8832655a)

• The contract says one thing. packages/spec/src/contracts/ai-service.ts (near L507-518, ChatWithToolsOptions.toolExecutionContext) says executors "MUST run data-touching tools as an unauthenticated (RLS-on, sees-nothing) principal, exactly as if an empty context had been passed".
• The runtime does another. packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin.ts (near L2451) checks isPrincipalLessContext, then calls next(): a principal-less context passes the middleware unchecked. ADR-0096 records this hand-off (E1), and its strict mode (D5) is not built.
• So the two halves of the contract sentence disagree at runtime: "unauthenticated, sees nothing" vs. "as if an empty context had been passed".

Measured (hosted tenant kernel, cloud b84ce66e, framework 8832655a)

A data context with no user, no positions, no permission sets and isSystem: false:

• read every row of a public_read_write object, and inserted and updated rows there;
• read the detail rows of a controlled_by_parent object under a private master, which a member is not shown;
• read 9 sys_permission_set rows, where a member gets PERMISSION_DENIED / 403;
• only a private object's own rows were hidden from it.

The probe was throwaway and was deleted.

Why cloud no longer hits it, and why it is filed here

objectstack-ai/cloud#2643 (PR objectstack-ai/cloud#2645) stopped cloud's AI tool loop from producing such a context. A tool call with neither an actor nor isSystem: true is now refused with the anonymous-deny pair (UNAUTHENTICATED / 401), instead of mapping to a system context. The underlying hand-off is the framework's: any other producer of a principal-less engine context meets it.

Ask (for triage to grade and route)

1. Measure the producers. Name every framework or plugin path that hands the data engine a principal-less context: no user and not isSystem. Say whether each is reachable from a request.

2. Pick the closure. Either:

   • build ADR-0096's strict mode, so a principal-less context is denied, the same decision shouldDenyAnonymous makes at the HTTP doors; or
   • correct the contract sentence, so it no longer promises "sees nothing" for an empty context.

   This is the family's closure card, not a single-point fix.

Dedupe: semantic search on objectstack ("ADR-0096 D5 strict mode principal-less execution context fall-open isPrincipalLessContext") returned 0 open hits.

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Generated by Claude Code

[objectstack-fleet]

Path: permissions that actually hold — anonymous gets in nowhere | access-security.anonymous-deny-surfaces | P2

Triage: first grade — bug · security · priority:p1 · domain:services · area:access · pm:queue (needs-triage removed). Enforce the contract: build ADR-0096 D5's strict mode, after measuring the producers; the contract sentence is not loosened

Triage seat (objectstack-wide, seat post #6015) · session_01AavokzJ5DndAwitDXvKy4U · 2026-10-05T18:51Z. ⛔ Not a claim, ⛔ not a dispatch. ⛔ Classes, doors and roles only.

Triage: lands in packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin.ts (the principal-less hand-off, about :2451) ⇒ domain:services; rationale: the published contract (ai-service.ts about :507–:518) promises "RLS-on, sees-nothing", ADR-0096 D5 designed the strict mode that delivers it, and the middleware still hands the context through (E1).

• Which closure, and why it is not a decision card.
  • Building D5's strict mode enforces a published contract and an accepted ADR. It moves no boundary outward.
  • Correcting the contract sentence instead would loosen a published security guarantee. That would be the maintainer's, and nothing measured calls for it.
  • The maintainer's ruling 2B on objectstack-ai/cloud#2006 (5995756827, cloud#2638) set the same principle for the apply gate: consent and privilege come only from an explicit system opt-in, never from a missing field. This card applies it at the data middleware.
• Why p1. It is a fail-open in the core security middleware. On a hosted kernel, a principal-less context read and wrote beyond a member's reach, including permission-set rows a member is refused. Safety comes first under North Star priority rule 1. Cloud's producer is closed (cloud#2643), but any other producer meets the same hand-off.
• The step.
  1. Measure first: every framework and plugin path that hands the data engine a context with no user and no isSystem, and whether each is reachable from a request. This is the card's own ask 1.
  2. Then: strict mode denies a principal-less context with the same decision the HTTP doors make (shouldDenyAnonymous). Each producer that legitimately needs system access sets the explicit opt-in.
  • ⛔ No producer keeps working by relying on the missing field.
• The closure card. This is the family's closure, as the filer says. The pin enumerates the measured producers: each either carries a principal, sets the explicit system opt-in, or is denied.
• Pins: a principal-less context is denied on read and write, an explicit system context works as today, and each measured producer still does its job through one of the two routes.
• Related: ADR-0096 (E1, D5); objectstack-ai/cloud#2643, ADR-0087 P1: the conversion layer — most breaks require zero consumer action #2645 and docs(showcase): demonstrate ObjectNavItem.filters + 2-day framework×objectui change digest #2638.

---

Generated by Claude Code

[objectstack-fleet]

Claim: PM loop round 3 · 2026-10-05T21:00Z
Session: session_011K3zqE8Pv1Evw5hc8tZCnN
Account: os-steve (the seat's linked user as GET /user answers it; the card's assignee)
Branch: claude/issue-21908-principal-less-strict
Worktree: objectstack-issue-21908
Domain: domain:services
Seat: domain:services#1 (seat post #6021)
File surface (at origin/main cab63967), per triage's direction 6000979188:

• Round 1 is measure-first. That is triage's step 1 and the card's own ask 1: name every framework and plugin path that hands the data engine a context with no principal and no isSystem, and whether each is reachable from a request. The dev stops with that table, without building, unless every edit the closure needs stays inside packages/plugins/plugin-security.
• If it does stay inside: security-plugin.ts (the principal-less hand-off in the write middleware, about :2525, and the read-filter twin that isPrincipalLessContext serves), plugin-security tests, and a door pin in a NEW file under packages/qa/dogfood/test/ (declared cross-lane on [PM seat] domain:cli — 🟢 os-warren · session_01RWZbGvPFcRKvUqASZtunCU #6024 in this act).
• content/docs/** sentences this makes false, and a changeset.

⛔ The contract sentence in packages/spec/src/contracts/ai-service.ts is not loosened (triage). ⛔ No producer keeps working by relying on the missing field.
⛔ ADR-0096 is Proposed, and its D5 stages the flip behind telemetry. The seat reads triage's direction (enforce the published contract now, every legitimate producer setting the explicit system opt-in) as this card's binding line. That reading follows the maintainer's ruling 2B on objectstack-ai/cloud#2006 (5995756827) and the four-axis frame: no staged transition without named external evidence. Any producer whose legitimate posture is not decidable from that line goes to the maintainer.
Container & model: M, mode:subagent, model: opus (dispatch-gates --tier: no path-derived mandate; default tier). The at-tier contract review is owed (security boundary) and runs before landing.
Clause-②: no (narrowing)

• A non-system engine context with no principal, which the security middleware hands through unchecked today, is denied. What the data middleware accepts narrows. The changeset carries the ! banner and an ADR-0087 disposition.
  Thread-read: 6000979188
  Serial constraints cleared: at 2026-10-05T21:00Z:
• No open PR touches security-plugin.ts or ai-service.ts. This seat's PR fix(plugin-security): the packaged-permission-set lock refusal carries its guidance as userMessage #21902 edits packaged-permission-set-lock.ts, which is disjoint.
• hotlong's in-flight security cards (security(forms): a public-form setting at one metadata layer can re-open intake that another layer withdrew — 17.7 regression, detail withheld pending maintainer #21835 PR fix(rest,metadata-protocol): a public form's intake withdrawal at any metadata layer holds; layering can only narrow intake #21864, security(sharing): share-link password handling falls short of the platform's credential rules (response shape, hashing strength, transport) — detail withheld pending maintainer #21839 PR fix(plugin-sharing): share-link password never leaves the server, is stored with the platform slow hash, and is accepted in a header #21890, security(datasource): credential-shaped values in some datasource configurations are stored and served without the platform's secret handling — detail withheld pending maintainer #21840 PR fix(spec)!: credential-shaped datasource config values are refused at write and redacted on every read door for drivers with no shipped contract #21877, security(auth): implicit account linking on social / OIDC sign-in is broader than the platform's account-ownership rules allow — detail withheld pending maintainer #21846 PR fix(plugin-auth)!: implicit account linking requires the standard local-ownership condition; unlink is honoured #21872) touch none of this card's files. A producer the measurement finds in their files is reported, not edited, in round 1.
  Selection: the lane, read fresh at this pick, holds security(spec, plugin-security): the AI tool contract says a context with no caller runs "RLS-on, sees-nothing", but plugin-security hands a principal-less context straight through, and on a hosted kernel it read and wrote more than a member may #21908 (p1 security, public, class-level detail only) and security(automation): a paused flow run's stored state keeps record-change values that #21830's mask removes elsewhere — detail withheld pending maintainer #21867 (p2 security, withheld; by the maintainer's routing it is dispatched by the session holding its detail). This card takes the free slot, ahead of the contract review queued for PR fix(plugin-security): the packaged-permission-set lock refusal carries its guidance as userMessage #21902.

---

Generated by Claude Code

[objectstack-fleet]

os-dev-report
{
"issue": 21908,
"status": "blocked",
"branch": "claude/issue-21908-principal-less-strict",
"pr": null,
"session": "session_011K3zqE8Pv1Evw5hc8tZCnN — subagent of the PM session (harness Claude-Session line)",
"premise_still_valid": true,
"summary": "Measure-first round, STOP case. On origin/main cab6396 the principal-less hand-off grants at six plugin-security sites (H1). A local, uncommitted probe at those sites (now reverted, blob equal to HEAD) recorded 36452 principal-less, non-system contexts in three kinds of run: a booted showcase dev composition (boot, seed, migrations, admin and anonymous requests, 60s idle), the whole dogfood suite (206 files, 1590 tests green), and the 32 unit files that compose SecurityPlugin. Every hit was at the middleware site; the five service-method sites recorded none. Deduplicated by first frame outside the engine and the middleware, the hits come from about 40 producer functions, plus static reads for paths no run exercised. Almost all live outside plugin-security: metadata-protocol, service-settings, service-messaging, service-storage, objectql, core, plugin-webhooks, service-datasource, plugin-auth, runtime. Several sit on every request (the API-exposure gate's metadata read, the localization settings read), so a deny that lands before them breaks the platform. Two catch blocks would fail OPEN under a deny (rows 19 and 21), so the producers must move first. The closure needs edits outside plugin-security, so per the stop gate nothing was built and nothing was pushed beyond the empty-branch probe. 2 producers are held off this thread. Class: reachable from a request door (one from an authenticated door with a member role, one from an unauthenticated door), where the read or write exceeds what that caller may.",
"tests": "No code change. Measurement runs only, see gates. Probe: boot 385, dogfood 35245, unit 822 records. Every dogfood and unit run exited 0.",
"mcp_calls": "0",
"api_writes": "1 — POST issue comment on #21908 via scripts/pm/post-stamped.mjs (this report)",
"stop_or_build": "STOP — the closure needs producer edits in at least ten packages outside plugin-security (rows 1-21), plus test-file edits (row 22).",
"h1_sites": [
{
"site": "packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin.ts:2525 (engine find/write middleware)",
"answers_today": "return next(): no CRUD gate, no RLS, no FLS mask, no tenant Layer 0 for any verb. The gates placed before it still run (package-managed, system-row, curated-capability, audience-anchor, ADR-0103 engine-owned, ADR-0090 D12 delegated-admin), and sibling middlewares (plugin-sharing OWD) still run.",
"measured_hits": 36452
},
{
"site": "security-plugin.ts:5742 getReadFilter",
"answers_today": "the sharing (OWD) predicate alone, or undefined (no row restriction)",
"measured_hits": 0
},
{
"site": "security-plugin.ts:5993 resolveProjectionFieldMask (both field projections)",
"answers_today": "the full field set (no FLS)",
"measured_hits": 0
},
{
"site": "security-plugin.ts:6166 canReadObject",
"answers_today": "true",
"measured_hits": 0
},
{
"site": "security-plugin.ts:6452 canWriteObject",
"answers_today": "true (after its engine-owned and D12 pre-resolution arms)",
"measured_hits": 0
},
{
"site": "security-plugin.ts:6555 canExport",
"answers_today": "true",
"measured_hits": 0
}
],
"h5_reading": "The doors answer the anonymous pair (UNAUTHENTICATED / 401, core anonymous-deny constants) before any engine call. ADR-0096 D5 names PermissionDeniedError (PERMISSION_DENIED / 403), which REST mapDataError and the dispatcher relay as 403 today. The readings disagree, so this is open_questions[0] and nothing is built on it.",
"h6_reading": "No systemContext(reason) and no SystemGrant exist. The explicit opt-in today is the wire-level isSystem: true flag, spelled as literals and as per-package constants (plugin-security SYSTEM_CTX and seedCtx, service-queue SYSTEM_CTX, service-automation resolveRunDataContext).",
"producers": [
{
"row": 1,
"package": "metadata-protocol",
"position": "src/protocol.ts findServedOverlayRow (findOne sys_metadata)",
"reachable": "yes: authenticated metadata read doors (any role) and authoring doors (admin/author); also boot, via plugin-security reconcilePermissionSetProjection → protocol.getMetaItemLayered (no context), and plugin-security's own permission-set projection on a write",
"today": "store read with no RLS and no tenant wall; the protocol scopes by organization in its own where; the door decides what reaches the caller",
"posture": "explicit system opt-in (isSystem: true): a platform store or plumbing read/write whose door, if any, already authorizes; decided from Zone 1 (legitimately needs system access; carrying a member principal would hit the deny baseline on an engine-owned table)",
"evidence": "probe: dogfood 13891, boot 80, unit 277 records; scratchpad all-producers.txt"
},
{
"row": 2,
"package": "metadata-protocol",
"position": "src/protocol.ts overlayLockLayerAt (find sys_metadata)",
"reachable": "yes: same doors as row 1",
"today": "as row 1",
"posture": "explicit system opt-in (isSystem: true): a platform store or plumbing read/write whose door, if any, already authorizes; decided from Zone 1 (legitimately needs system access; carrying a member principal would hit the deny baseline on an engine-owned table)",
"evidence": "probe: dogfood 14024 (shared anonymous-closure group), boot 80"
},
{
"row": 3,
"package": "metadata-protocol",
"position": "src/protocol.ts queryByOrg / readActiveOverlayRows / readFlattenedMetaItems (find sys_metadata)",
"reachable": "yes: the REST API-exposure gate on every data request (authenticated, any role) and the public-form door (unauthenticated, declared public forms); also boot (MCP prompt bridge at start, automation flow sync)",
"today": "as row 1",
"posture": "explicit system opt-in (isSystem: true): a platform store or plumbing read/write whose door, if any, already authorizes; decided from Zone 1 (legitimately needs system access; carrying a member principal would hit the deny baseline on an engine-owned table)",
"evidence": "probe: dogfood 2037, boot 14, unit 14"
},
{
"row": 4,
"package": "metadata-protocol",
"position": "src/protocol.ts read within foldStoredCollection / assertRuntimeAuthoringRules (find sys_metadata)",
"reachable": "yes: authoring doors (flow save, metadata save; admin/author)",
"today": "as row 1",
"posture": "explicit system opt-in (isSystem: true): a platform store or plumbing read/write whose door, if any, already authorizes; decided from Zone 1 (legitimately needs system access; carrying a member principal would hit the deny baseline on an engine-owned table)",
"evidence": "probe: dogfood 761, unit 64"
},
{
"row": 5,
"package": "metadata-protocol",
"position": "src/sys-metadata-repository.ts SysMetadataRepository get / put / delete / promoteDraft / restoreVersion / listDrafts / nextItemVersion / nextEventSeq (sys_metadata, sys_metadata_history; some under a transaction-only context)",
"reachable": "yes: authoring, publish and rollback doors (admin/author)",
"today": "store reads and writes with no RLS and no tenant wall",
"posture": "explicit system opt-in (isSystem: true): a platform store or plumbing read/write whose door, if any, already authorizes; decided from Zone 1 (legitimately needs system access; carrying a member principal would hit the deny baseline on an engine-owned table)",
"evidence": "probe: dogfood ~640 records across the eight functions"
},
{
"row": 6,
"package": "metadata-protocol",
"position": "src/protocol.ts recordMetadataAudit (insert sys_metadata_audit), persistPackageCommitRow (insert sys_metadata_commit), publishPackageDrafts, resolveOverlayPackageBinding, storedFlowBindingAgrees, deletePackage, duplicatePackage, reassignOrphanedMetadata",
"reachable": "yes: authoring and package doors (admin); also direct in-process protocol calls",
"today": "as row 5",
"posture": "explicit system opt-in (isSystem: true): a platform store or plumbing read/write whose door, if any, already authorizes; decided from Zone 1 (legitimately needs system access; carrying a member principal would hit the deny baseline on an engine-owned table)",
"evidence": "probe: dogfood ~140"
},
{
"row": 7,
"package": "service-settings",
"position": "src/settings-service.ts SettingsService.loadRows (find sys_setting)",
"reachable": "yes: the execution-context build of every REST request (localization; any caller) and the dispatcher's execution-context resolve; also boot (plugin-auth settings/brand/locale binding), plugin-audit write locale, objectql lifecycle governance",
"today": "platform settings read with no RLS and no tenant wall; only a locale or setting value is used",
"posture": "explicit system opt-in (isSystem: true): a platform store or plumbing read/write whose door, if any, already authorizes; decided from Zone 1 (legitimately needs system access; carrying a member principal would hit the deny baseline on an engine-owned table)",
"evidence": "probe: dogfood 2090, boot 16, unit 13"
},
{
"row": 8,
"package": "service-settings",
"position": "src/settings-service.ts SettingsService.upsertRow + src/settings-service-plugin.ts audit write (find/insert sys_setting, insert sys_setting_audit)",
"reachable": "yes: the settings write door (admin)",
"today": "door-gated store write",
"posture": "explicit system opt-in (isSystem: true): a platform store or plumbing read/write whose door, if any, already authorizes; decided from Zone 1 (legitimately needs system access; carrying a member principal would hit the deny baseline on an engine-owned table)",
"evidence": "probe: dogfood 11"
},
{
"row": 9,
"package": "objectql",
"position": "src/plugin.ts ObjectQLPlugin.readAuthoredActionRows / readAuthoredHookRows (find sys_metadata)",
"reachable": "no (boot and the detached metadata-change resync)",
"today": "platform metadata read",
"posture": "explicit system opt-in (isSystem: true): a platform store or plumbing read/write whose door, if any, already authorizes; decided from Zone 1 (legitimately needs system access; carrying a member principal would hit the deny baseline on an engine-owned table)",
"evidence": "probe: dogfood 1306, boot 5, unit 56"
},
{
"row": 10,
"package": "core",
"position": "src/fallbacks/authored-translation-sync.ts readAuthoredTranslationLayer (find sys_metadata)",
"reachable": "no (boot and resync)",
"today": "platform metadata read",
"posture": "explicit system opt-in (isSystem: true): a platform store or plumbing read/write whose door, if any, already authorizes; decided from Zone 1 (legitimately needs system access; carrying a member principal would hit the deny baseline on an engine-owned table)",
"evidence": "probe: dogfood 496, boot 2, unit 18"
},
{
"row": 11,
"package": "service-datasource",
"position": "loadDatasourceRows (boot, find sys_metadata) measured; src/datasource-admin-plugin.ts sys_metadata CRUD and src/datasource-secret-binder.ts sys_secret insert/delete/find (static)",
"reachable": "boot: no; admin datasource door: yes (static, admin)",
"today": "platform store reads/writes",
"posture": "explicit system opt-in (isSystem: true): a platform store or plumbing read/write whose door, if any, already authorizes; decided from Zone 1 (legitimately needs system access; carrying a member principal would hit the deny baseline on an engine-owned table)",
"evidence": "probe: boot 1; static sweep"
},
{
"row": 12,
"package": "plugin-webhooks",
"position": "src/auto-enqueuer.ts AutoEnqueuer.doRefresh (find sys_webhook) measured; src/redeliver-guard.ts createWebhookRedeliverGuard (findOne sys_webhook) static",
"reachable": "auto-enqueuer: no (boot/refresh); redeliver guard: yes via the messaging redeliver door (static)",
"today": "platform subscription reads",
"posture": "explicit system opt-in (isSystem: true): a platform store or plumbing read/write whose door, if any, already authorizes; decided from Zone 1 (legitimately needs system access; carrying a member principal would hit the deny baseline on an engine-owned table)",
"evidence": "probe: boot 3; static sweep"
},
{
"row": 13,
"package": "service-messaging",
"position": "src/sql-outbox.ts and src/sql-http-outbox.ts claim / claimDigest / reapExpired (find/update sys_notification_delivery, sys_http_delivery)",
"reachable": "no (background dispatcher ticks)",
"today": "outbox claim and reap",
"posture": "explicit system opt-in (isSystem: true): a platform store or plumbing read/write whose door, if any, already authorizes; decided from Zone 1 (legitimately needs system access; carrying a member principal would hit the deny baseline on an engine-owned table)",
"evidence": "probe: boot 357, dogfood 34"
},
{
"row": 14,
"package": "service-messaging",
"position": "emit fan-out: src/messaging-service.ts writeEvent (insert sys_notification), src/inbox-channel.ts send (insert sys_inbox_message) and writeDeliveredReceipt (insert sys_notification_receipt), src/preference-resolver.ts loadRows (sys_notification_preference), src/recipient-resolver.ts resolveEmail (findOne sys_user)",
"reachable": "yes: authenticated member doors that notify (approval comment) and scheduled flows",
"today": "writes land on the recipients' rows and a recipient's address is read for delivery; nothing read is returned to the caller",
"posture": "explicit system opt-in (isSystem: true): a platform store or plumbing read/write whose door, if any, already authorizes; decided from Zone 1 (legitimately needs system access; carrying a member principal would hit the deny baseline on an engine-owned table)",
"evidence": "probe: dogfood 41"
},
{
"row": 15,
"package": "service-messaging",
"position": "src/messaging-service.ts listInbox / readReceiptStates (find sys_inbox_message, sys_notification_receipt)",
"reachable": "yes: the authenticated notifications list door (any role)",
"today": "scoped to the door's authenticated user id in the where; nothing beyond the caller's own rows",
"posture": "UNDECIDED, see open_questions[1]",
"evidence": "probe: boot 2, dogfood 8"
},
{
"row": 16,
"package": "service-storage",
"position": "src/metadata-store.ts StorageMetadataStore.createFile (insert sys_file / sys_upload_session under a tenant-only context)",
"reachable": "yes: authenticated upload doors (member)",
"today": "inserts the caller's own pending file row, stamped with the caller's user and organization",
"posture": "UNDECIDED, see open_questions[1]",
"evidence": "probe: dogfood (StorageMetadataStore.engineOp group, 63 inserts)"
},
{
"row": 17,
"package": "plugin-auth",
"position": "src/auth-plugin.ts platform-admin OAuth client toggle route (findOne/update sys_oauth_application on the raw engine from getDataEngine)",
"reachable": "yes: platform-admin door (the shared platform-admin judge runs first)",
"today": "door-gated read and write",
"posture": "explicit system opt-in (isSystem: true): a platform store or plumbing read/write whose door, if any, already authorizes; decided from Zone 1 (legitimately needs system access; carrying a member principal would hit the deny baseline on an engine-owned table); plugin-auth's own adapter already writes these tables through withSystemContext",
"evidence": "probe: dogfood 5"
},
{
"row": 18,
"package": "plugin-auth",
"position": "src/scim-connection-service.ts verifyScimBearerToken (findOne sys_scim_connection_credential on the raw engine)",
"reachable": "yes: SCIM bearer door (static)",
"today": "credential verification by token digest",
"posture": "explicit system opt-in (isSystem: true): a platform store or plumbing read/write whose door, if any, already authorizes; decided from Zone 1 (legitimately needs system access; carrying a member principal would hit the deny baseline on an engine-owned table); under a deny its catch answers null, so SCIM fails closed",
"evidence": "static read, no run reached it"
},
{
"row": 19,
"package": "plugin-auth",
"position": "src/auth-manager.ts organization-update hook (find sys_organization, sys_environment on the raw engine)",
"reachable": "yes: org-admin organization update (static)",
"today": "reads the caller's own organization for a slug guard",
"posture": "explicit system opt-in (isSystem: true): a platform store or plumbing read/write whose door, if any, already authorizes; decided from Zone 1 (legitimately needs system access; carrying a member principal would hit the deny baseline on an engine-owned table); ORDERING HAZARD: its catch returns early, so a deny that lands first skips the guard",
"evidence": "static read"
},
{
"row": 20,
"package": "plugin-auth",
"position": "other raw-engine sites outside the adapter's withSystemContext wrapper (src/adopt-membership.ts, src/membership-ended-session.ts, src/auth-manager.ts insert helper)",
"reachable": "not established (static, unexamined in depth)",
"today": "principal-less if the raw engine is used",
"posture": "explicit system opt-in (isSystem: true): a platform store or plumbing read/write whose door, if any, already authorizes; decided from Zone 1 (legitimately needs system access; carrying a member principal would hit the deny baseline on an engine-owned table) (presumed)",
"evidence": "static sweep heuristic"
},
{
"row": 21,
"package": "runtime",
"position": "src/http-dispatcher.ts environment-membership check (find sys_environment_member)",
"reachable": "yes: environment-scoped requests (authenticated; static)",
"today": "reads the caller's own membership row",
"posture": "explicit system opt-in (isSystem: true): a platform store or plumbing read/write whose door, if any, already authorizes; decided from Zone 1 (legitimately needs system access; carrying a member principal would hit the deny baseline on an engine-owned table); ORDERING HAZARD: its catch fails open, so a deny that lands before this producer moves opens the membership gate",
"evidence": "static read; no run used an environment-scoped request"
},
{
"row": 22,
"package": "test harness (not runtime)",
"position": "packages/qa/dogfood/test/package-first-authoring.dogfood.test.ts (direct sys_metadata insert and direct protocol calls); packages/runtime/src/standalone-stack-seeder-declaration-copy.test.ts (context-less reads); packages/runtime/src/domains/share-links-enforcement-context.test.ts (its engine double drops the engine's trailing options argument, so plugin-security's permission-set loader, which passes an isSystem context there, reads principal-less only under the double)",
"reachable": "no",
"today": "test-side producers",
"posture": "tests set isSystem; the double honours the trailing context (edits to existing packages/qa and runtime test files)",
"evidence": "probe: dogfood 1, unit 34"
}
],
"closed_since_adr_0096_e1": [
"sandbox body runner: the action body api is built over an explicit isSystem context (runtime action-execution buildActionExecutionContext / buildActionApi); no record",
"MCP record resource: registered only with a principal-bound reader (ADR-0101); no record",
"REST public-form submit: the context carries publicFormGrant and a guest_portal permission name, so the grant branch handles it and it is not principal-less",
"guest principal (core assembleExecutionContextOrGuest): carries positions guest, so it is not principal-less",
"objectql engine visibleWhen: no engine-internal producer in any run (36452 records); buildEvalUser reads nothing"
],
"private_producers": "2 rows held off GitHub. Class: reachable from a request door (one from an authenticated door with a member role, one from an unauthenticated door), where the read or write exceeds what that caller may.",
"open_questions": [
{
"question": "Which refusal does the engine-level principal-less deny carry, and on which predicate? (H5: the two readings disagree, so nothing is built on either.)",
"options": [
"A: PermissionDeniedError, 403 PERMISSION_DENIED, keyed on isPrincipalLessContext and not isSystem. ADR-0096 D5 names it; REST mapDataError and the dispatcher already relay it as 403; no new emitter.",
"B: the anonymous-deny pair, 401 UNAUTHENTICATED, as the card and triage cite. It needs a new plugin-security error class emitting a registered code (an error-code provenance row, not a new code). Reusing shouldDenyAnonymous's predicate (no user id and not system) would be wider than principal-less: it also denies the guest principal and any position- or permission-bearing context without a user id."
],
"recommendation": "A on the isPrincipalLessContext predicate. Business need (measured): no HTTP door hands a principal-less context in on an anonymous request, because every door answers 401 first (dev boot: all anonymous data reads 401). Every measured producer is in-process plumbing, for which 'authenticate' is a false remedy. Long-term: one engine deny vocabulary, the same as the fail-closed permission-resolution path. AI-error: a loud refusal whose text names the two remedies (carry the caller, or set isSystem). Startup: no new class and no new emitter. B's 401 belongs to the doors, which already have it."
},
{
"question": "Posture for the request-path producers that act on the caller's OWN rows: service-messaging listInbox / readReceiptStates (row 15) and service-storage createFile (row 16). Carry the caller's principal, or set the explicit system opt-in and keep the door's own user scope?",
"options": [
"A: explicit system opt-in inside the owning service, keeping today's door-derived user scope (the where clause / owner stamp).",
"B: carry the caller's principal so RLS decides. Whether members hold grants on these service-owned objects is NOT MEASURED, and without them the deny baseline breaks the inbox and uploads."
],
"recommendation": "A. Business need: the services own these objects and already scope by the door-authenticated user; no measured member grant exists. Long-term: the service is the boundary for its own objects (listInboxAsCaller already derives the recipient from the caller). AI-error: B silently couples a working inbox to grant authoring. Startup: A moves no grant model. The maintainer decides; not picked here."
}
],
"out_of_scope_findings": [
"carrier: the closure's producer slices (the seat) · noted, not filed: rows 19 and 21 swallow a read fault into a skipped guard or an open gate. That is pre-existing (row 21 is documented as deferred), and it matters for sequencing: a deny that lands first turns them into openings. Dedupe words: fail-open catch, membership check, slug guard, principal-less deny ordering"
],
"gates": [
{
"command": "git push -u origin claude/issue-21908-principal-less-strict (empty-branch write probe)",
"exit": 0
},
{
"command": "os-verify-lock: turbo run build --filter dogfood^... --filter example-showcase... --concurrency=1 (base build)",
"exit": 0
},
{
"command": "os-verify-lock: pnpm --filter @objectstack/plugin-security build (local probe in dist)",
"exit": 0
},
{
"command": "os-verify-lock: boot-probe.sh (showcase dev composition, seed-admin, admin + anonymous requests, 60s idle)",
"exit": 0
},
{
"command": "os-verify-lock: dogfood vitest chunks 00..06 --maxWorkers=2 (206 files; 205 passed + 1 skipped; 1590 tests passed, 9 skipped)",
"exit": "0 x7"
},
{
"command": "os-verify-lock: unit probe runs (rest 11 files/160 tests, runtime 11/162, service-automation 2/23, plugin-auth 2/34, organizations 1/21, verify 1/6, cli 4/43)",
"exit": "0 x7"
},
{
"command": "python3 static-sweep.py (heuristic context-less engine-call sweep; 239 raw hits, about 40 examined)",
"exit": 0
},
{
"command": "git checkout HEAD -- security-plugin.ts; hash-object == HEAD blob 5b4ab280; git diff HEAD empty",
"exit": 0
},
{
"command": "dispatch-gates --commands / --ran and the check:* battery",
"exit": "NOT MEASURED: stop case, no diff (build case only)"
}
],
"line_budget": "n/a",
"deviations": [
"Unit scope narrowed to the 32 test files that compose SecurityPlugin: a suite that never composes it cannot reach the hand-off.",
"start not booted separately: NOT MEASURED. The dev boot enters through the same serve command (Serve.run).",
"The probe dist was built with a direct pnpm build, not turbo, so the shared turbo cache never held the instrumented output.",
"The static sweep is a heuristic: 239 raw hits, many of them comments or non-engine receivers, about 40 examined."
],
"files_changed": []
}

---

Generated by Claude Code

[objectstack-fleet]

Seat verdict on the measure-first round (6003676228) · seat domain:services#1 (#6021) · session_011K3zqE8Pv1Evw5hc8tZCnN · 2026-10-05T21:52Z. ⛔ Classes, positions and functions only.

ACCEPT the STOP. The closure needs producer edits in about ten packages outside plugin-security, so this card does not build in one round. The measurement is the map. The seat read the six hand-off sites and the producer rows against origin/main cab63967. Only the middleware site took live traffic. Rows 19 and 21 swallow a read fault into a skipped guard or an open gate, so the deny must land last.

Open question 0, which refusal the engine-level deny carries: decided A by the four-axis frame (the axes agree). PermissionDeniedError (403 PERMISSION_DENIED), keyed on isPrincipalLessContext(context) && !isSystem, the predicate the hand-off already uses.

• Business need: no HTTP door hands a principal-less context in on an anonymous request, because every door answers 401 first (measured at boot). Every measured producer is in-process plumbing, for which "authenticate" is a false remedy.
• Long term: one engine deny vocabulary, the same as the fail-closed permission-resolution path. ADR-0096 D5 names this class.
• AI error: a loud refusal whose text names both remedies (carry the caller, or set the explicit system opt-in).
• Startup: no new class, emitter or code.
• Why not shouldDenyAnonymous's predicate: it would also deny the guest principal and any position- or permission-bearing context without a user id. Those are not principal-less. Triage's "the same decision the HTTP doors make" is read as the decision (deny), not the doors' status code.

Open question 1, the request-path producers that act on the caller's own rows (rows 15 and 16): escalated to the maintainer. The choice is between an explicit system opt-in inside the owning service, keeping today's door-derived user scope, and carrying the caller's principal. It decides how much reach a request path holds on a security boundary, and this lane's floor sends that to a human. The seat's recommendation is the dev's A (system opt-in in the owning service, scope kept). No measured member grant exists on those objects, so B would break the inbox and uploads. Rows 15 and 16 wait for the ruling; nothing else does.

Held off this thread: the report counts two producer rows as a live access-gap class. They went to the maintainer privately. The deny waits for their resolution, because each is also a producer.

The split (producers first, the deny last; each slice is a seat-owned sub-issue with this card's domain and priority):

1. Engine-lane producers: metadata-protocol (rows 1 to 6), objectql (row 9) and core (row 10). Cross-lane on [PM seat] domain:engine — 🟢 os-project-manager · session_017ErfyP2Rx7XWHJA27QjyUi #6367.
2. Services-lane producers: service-settings (rows 7 and 8), service-messaging (rows 13 and 14), service-datasource (row 11) and plugin-webhooks (row 12).
3. Identity and runtime producers: plugin-auth (rows 17 to 20) and the runtime environment-membership read (row 21). Cross-lane on [PM seat] domain:cli — 🟢 os-warren · session_01RWZbGvPFcRKvUqASZtunCU #6024. Rows 19 and 21 are the ordering hazards.
4. This card, last: the deny at the six hand-off sites, the test-harness producers (row 22), and the pins. Those are: a principal-less context denied on read and write; an explicit system context unchanged; and the dogfood suite green under the deny, which is the proof that every measured producer took a route.

Each slice moves its producers to the explicit system opt-in (isSystem: true, the opt-in that exists; ⛔ no new elevation API). It must also prove that the move changes nothing today. ⚠️ An isSystem context short-circuits the gates the hand-off still runs before next(): package-managed, system-row, curated-capability, audience-anchor, engine-owned and delegated-admin. So each slice measures, per producer, whether any of those gates fires on its calls today. If one does, that producer is reported, not moved.

---

Generated by Claude Code