feat(plugin-security): the boot writes no sys_position row — delete the built-in and declared position seeders and the everyone baseline junction writer (ADR-0131 D2, #15204 stage 6a)

.changeset/15204-s6a-position-seeders.md

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+---
+'@objectstack/plugin-security': minor
+---
+
+feat(plugin-security): the boot no longer writes `sys_position` rows — the built-in and declared position seeders and the `everyone` baseline junction writer are deleted
+
+Clause-②: no
+
+`SecurityPlugin` no longer seeds a `sys_position` row for the six built-in positions (`platform_admin`, `org_owner`, `org_admin`, `org_member`, `everyone`, `guest`) or for a position a stack declares, and no longer writes a `sys_position_permission_set` row binding the baseline sets to `everyone`. Positions are served by the security catalog (ADR-0131 D2): the built-ins are this plugin's declarations, a stack's positions are registry items, and `everyone`'s baseline — the app's default set and `member_default`, minus any set the high-privilege check refuses — is that anchor's declared `permissionSets`. `GET /api/v1/meta/position` lists all of them, and assigning a declared position needs no row.
+
+No authorization decision changes: since the resolver reads position definitions, no grant reads a `sys_position` or `sys_position_permission_set` row, and a fresh database and an existing one grant every principal the same. On a database that was already seeded, the existing rows stay as they are; they are no longer refreshed at boot.
+
+FROM → TO:
+
+- FROM reading the built-in or declared positions from `sys_position` → TO the security catalog read (`createSecurityCatalogReader`) or `GET /api/v1/meta/position`.
+- FROM the `everyone` → baseline `sys_position_permission_set` rows → TO the `everyone` definition's `permissionSets`.

content/docs/permissions/authorization.mdx

@@ -164,9 +164,11 @@ package (metadata); subject bindings and env-specific values stay as config.**
   env-admin-only construct.
 - This is what makes package **uninstall** well-defined (drop the package's
   own sets) and the objectui Access matrix scopable to `{ packageId }`.
-- Declared positions and sharing rules seed the same way
-  (`bootstrapDeclaredPositions`, ADR-0057 D6) — a declarable-but-never-seeded
-  array is exactly the inert-metadata smell ADR-0078 prohibits.
+- Declared sharing rules seed the same way (ADR-0057 D6) — a
+  declarable-but-never-seeded array is exactly the inert-metadata smell
+  ADR-0078 prohibits. Declared positions need no row at all: the security
+  catalog serves them from the registry, and no boot step writes a
+  `sys_position` row (ADR-0131 D2).
 
 ### Package capability declaration (ADR-0066 D1)
 
@@ -272,7 +274,7 @@ one of two doors, each writing only what it owns:
 
 | Stage | What holds today | Owned by |
 |---|---|---|
-| 1 · Package development | Zod-validated authoring; positions / sharingRules / permissions seeded at boot with provenance | ADR-0057 D6, ADR-0086 D5, ADR-0049/0078 gates |
+| 1 · Package development | Zod-validated authoring; sharingRules / permissions seeded at boot with provenance; positions served from the registry, with no row (ADR-0131 D2) | ADR-0057 D6, ADR-0086 D5, ADR-0131 D2, ADR-0049/0078 gates |
 | 2 · Distribution / install / upgrade / uninstall | Install-consent scopes (ADR-0025 — consent ≠ RBAC grants); namespaced, collision-free composition; provenance axis makes uninstall well-defined | ADR-0025/0028/0048/0086 |
 | 3 · Environment composition / assignment | Platform-owned assignment records (`sys_user_position` etc.); anti-escalation; union semantics | ADR-0057 D4 |
 | 4 · Runtime enforcement | The six-gate chain above; each enforced primitive holds a row naming its enforcement site — the matrix file is the authority on the count and on which rows CI can check | ADR-0056 D10 matrix |

content/docs/permissions/permission-metadata.mdx

@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ The built-in context variables available in RLS `using`/`check` clauses include
 (ADR-0068). `positions` is a **string array** — the canonical assignment field
 (D3 reserves the word "role"; there is no `current_user.roles`) — so test
 membership with CEL: `'org_admin' in current_user.positions` or
-`current_user.positions.exists(p, p == 'sales_manager')`. The framework-seeded
+`current_user.positions.exists(p, p == 'sales_manager')`. The framework-declared
 built-in position names are `platform_admin`, `org_owner`, `org_admin`, and
 `org_member`; `everyone`/`guest` are the implicit audience anchors (ADR-0090 D9).
 (`current_user.isPlatformAdmin` is the `PLATFORM_ADMIN` standing of

content/docs/permissions/positions.mdx

@@ -80,7 +80,9 @@ including holders of plain CRUD on the table — is denied.
 ## Built-in identity positions (ADR-0068)
 
 `current_user.positions` is a string array — the only canonical field (there
-is no singular `current_user.position` at runtime). Framework-seeded names:
+is no singular `current_user.position` at runtime). The built-in names are
+declared by the platform — served by the security catalog, with no
+`sys_position` row (ADR-0131 D2):
 
 | Position | Meaning |
 |:---|:---|

content/docs/permissions/system-context.mdx

@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ that silently does not happen.
 | 9b | The master-detail write check the `security` service serves (`checkControlledByParentWrite`, ADR-0055) answers `allow` | plugin-security | Get: `allow` for any record, with no master judged — the write path's own first exit, so a gate composing it admits exactly what the record's own system-context update would. Lose: nothing a caller reaches today: its two consumers, the `sys_attachment` and `sys_comment` parent gates, return before they ask for a system session | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin.ts#checkControlledByParentWrite` |
 | 10 | Anonymous-deny treats the caller as authenticated | core | Get: passes the 401 seam with no `userId` | `packages/core/src/security/anonymous-deny.ts#shouldDenyAnonymous` |
 | 11 | Permission-set projection middleware skipped | plugin-security | Lose: projection of permission-set-derived columns | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/permission-set-projection.ts#createPermissionSetWriteThrough` |
-| 11b | Position write-through skipped — a `sys_position` write is not mirrored into the environment ledger | plugin-security | Get: the seeders and the package door write rows for definitions that already have their home, untouched. Lose: a system-written row has no environment definition, so the security catalog read does not resolve it until a data-door edit, or the one-time row-only position backfill, gives it one | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/position-write-through.ts#createPositionWriteThrough` |
+| 11b | Position write-through skipped — a `sys_position` write is not mirrored into the environment ledger | plugin-security | Get: the package door writes rows for definitions that already have their home, untouched (no boot seeder writes a `sys_position` row, ADR-0131 D2). Lose: a system-written row has no environment definition, so the security catalog read does not resolve it until a data-door edit, or the one-time row-only position backfill, gives it one | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/position-write-through.ts#createPositionWriteThrough` |
 | 12 | Session-resolution middleware skipped | plugin-auth | Get: no session lookup attempted | `packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/auth-plugin.ts#start` |
 | 13 | Per-request performance timings disclosed | observability | Get: timing headers a normal caller cannot pull | `packages/observability/src/perf-timing.ts#isPerfDisclosurePrincipal` |
 | 15 | MCP stdio bridge skips the object API-exposure gate | mcp | Get: the bridge reaches objects whose `apiEnabled` / `apiMethods` would refuse an external caller | `packages/mcp/src/stdio-data-bridge.ts#enforceApiExposure` |
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ that silently does not happen.
 | 21b | **`readonly` strip bypassed — the write PREVIEW (`ObjectQL.validate`)** | objectql | Same as 19–21, in the preview: it runs the write's caller-write strips under the write's own gate, so a system preview reports no `readonly` drop and judges the value a system write would store. The `computed` strip of a `formula` value is NOT gated here or on either write verb — no driver has a column for it, so it runs for every caller | `packages/objectql/src/engine.ts#validate` |
 | 22 | Strict-drop refusal never fires | objectql | Lose: a caller that opted into loud refusal gets **silence** — strict refuses exactly what the strip would have taken, and the strip took nothing. One exception: a `formula` value, which the `computed` strip takes from every caller, so strict still refuses it | `packages/objectql/src/engine.ts#insert`, `packages/objectql/src/readonly-strict-errors.ts#READONLY_CLASS_REASONS` |
 | 23 | **Referential-integrity check skipped** | objectql | Get: writes proceed against unreachable/unresolvable targets. Lose: an `isSystem` caller can write a **dangling reference** | `packages/objectql/src/engine.ts#assertReferencesResolve` |
-| 23b | **Position-catalog check skipped** — a `sys_user_position` write whose `position` names no position in the security catalog is not refused | plugin-security | Get: a system writer can store an assignment naming no position — the seed loader writes `stack.data` from `AppPlugin.start()`, before `kernel:ready` seeds the declared position catalog, so a refusal there would fail every authored assignment seed on a fresh boot. Lose: such a row grants nothing and nothing says so. A non-system insert, or a non-system update that changes `position`, is refused `400 VALIDATION_FAILED` / `reference_not_found` instead when the security catalog holds no position of that name: the environment registry (ADR-0131 D3), one per deployment, which takes no organization, so a name only a `sys_position` row carries — any organization's — is refused like one nobody carries. It is the same stand-down as the engine's referential-integrity check for a lookup column | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/position-catalog-refusal.ts#assertPositionNamesCatalogRow` |
+| 23b | **Position-catalog check skipped** — a `sys_user_position` write whose `position` names no position in the security catalog is not refused | plugin-security | Get: a system writer can store an assignment naming no position — the seed loader writes `stack.data` from `AppPlugin.start()` under a system context, as invitation acceptance and the platform's own bootstraps do. Lose: such a row grants nothing and nothing says so. A non-system insert, or a non-system update that changes `position`, is refused `400 VALIDATION_FAILED` / `reference_not_found` instead when the security catalog holds no position of that name: the environment registry (ADR-0131 D3), one per deployment, which takes no organization, so a name only a `sys_position` row carries — any organization's — is refused like one nobody carries. It is the same stand-down as the engine's referential-integrity check for a lookup column | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/position-catalog-refusal.ts#assertPositionNamesCatalogRow` |
 | 23c | **Grant-name check relaxed for an unresolvable id** — a `sys_user_permission_set` write that supplies `permission_set` beside a `permission_set_id` naming no set the writer's context reaches keeps the supplied name | plugin-security | Get: a system writer can store a grant naming a set whose row does not exist yet — seed replay and boot provisioning may write the grant before the set row, the ordering the engine's referential-integrity check also stands down for. Lose: such a row's name is unchecked until a backfill names it. Everything else is judged for every caller, system included: the name is derived from the id on every write that carries one, and a supplied name that names any other set is refused `400 VALIDATION_FAILED` / `invalid_value`; a non-system caller's name beside an unresolvable id is refused the same way, read as `{ ...context, isSystem: true }` through the hook's `ctx.api.sudo()`, never a bare `{ isSystem: true }` (ADR-0131 D4) | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/grant-permission-set-name.ts#settle` |
 | 23d | **Grant-holder membership check skipped** — a `sys_user_position` or `sys_user_permission_set` write naming a user with no `sys_member` row in the row's organization is not refused | plugin-security | Get: a system writer can store such a grant — invitation acceptance writes the membership and its placement together, and seed replay, the organization-admin reconcile and the platform bootstraps write grants as the system. Lose: such a row takes effect once its user is admitted to the organization. A non-system insert, or a non-system update that moves `user_id` or `organization_id`, is refused `400 VALIDATION_FAILED` / `reference_not_found` at `user_id` instead, for every caller, a platform administrator included; the membership is read as `{ isSystem: true, tenantId }` with `tenantId` the row's own organization, never another one. A row stored with no organization is a global grant and is not judged | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/grant-holder-membership-refusal.ts#onInsert`, `#onUpdate` |
 | 24 | Tenant-audit warning silenced; `bypassTenantAudit` threaded to the driver | objectql | Get: unscoped system writes stop warning. Lose: the signal that would flag a genuine user-path scoping bug | `packages/objectql/src/engine.ts#buildDriverOptions` |

content/docs/permissions/tenant-audit-census.mdx

@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ what moved this page's population from 225 to 227; nothing about the two sites
 changed, only whether this instrument could see them.
 
 **The expensive failure direction is a keyword.** Sites whose receiver the author
-typed `any` have no type to read, and there are 50 of them — just over a fifth
+typed `any` have no type to read, and there are 46 of them — just under a fifth
 of the population, concentrated in exactly the seed and bootstrap paths this
 control exists for. Scoring an unreadable receiver as "not an engine" would have
 dropped every one of them silently, with a clean exit and a smaller number that
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ are reported as `undecidable` rather than assumed either way.
 
 The same holds twice over for the context. An options argument spelled as a
 literal can be read; one spelled `options`, `{ ...opts }`, or handed through a
-forwarding shim cannot, and **53 of the 238 sites are spelled that way**. A
+forwarding shim cannot, and **53 of the 233 sites are spelled that way**. A
 context resolved from an inline literal or a local `const` can be tested for
 `isSystem`; one arriving from a helper call cannot.
 
@@ -187,10 +187,10 @@ reproduce them. Where it disagrees, it disagrees on the page:
 
 | carried figure | where it survives | this census |
 | :--- | :--- | ---: |
-| 175 write call sites | quoted in the merged changeset | **238** |
+| 175 write call sites | quoted in the merged changeset | **233** |
 | 24 carrying no tenant context | quoted in the merged changeset | **2** provable and tenancy-enabled; **32** more whose options argument is unreadable |
-| 127 of 175 statically decidable, 48 runtime-parameter-name sites | restated on the `isSystem`-scoping card | **159 of 238** decidable, **79** undecidable |
-| 135 (77%) silenced by the `isSystem` guard before the posture gate | the lost issue body — **no surviving corroboration** | **not reproduced**: 126 decidably elevated, 0 decidably not, 104 undecidable |
+| 127 of 175 statically decidable, 48 runtime-parameter-name sites | restated on the `isSystem`-scoping card | **158 of 233** decidable, **75** undecidable |
+| 135 (77%) silenced by the `isSystem` guard before the posture gate | the lost issue body — **no surviving corroboration** | **not reproduced**: 126 decidably elevated, 0 decidably not, 99 undecidable |
 | 141 and 132, two independent re-derivations | the card that filed this work | — |
 
 **The differences are not reconciled, and deliberately so.** The old census's
@@ -200,18 +200,18 @@ be stated is what this instrument counts, which is written above and re-runnable
 at any commit.
 
 Two structural facts do plausibly widen this reading against any hand or regex
-one, and both are counted in the generated tables below: the 50 sites reached
+one, and both are counted in the generated tables below: the 46 sites reached
 through an erased (`any`) receiver, and the 53 that name their object through a
 `const` rather than inline. An instrument that read either the way a person does
 would report a smaller number and would not say so.
 
 The fourth row is the one worth flagging to anyone citing it. **The 135 / 77%
 figure has no surviving corroboration anywhere in the tree.** This census reads
-126 of 238 (53%) as decidably elevated, with 104 more whose elevation is a
+126 of 233 (54%) as decidably elevated, with 99 more whose elevation is a
 run-time fact — so the claim is neither confirmed nor refuted, and the honest
 answer is that a static reading cannot settle it.
 
-⇒ **Cite `2 / 238`, and say what it is**: the sites whose options argument was
+⇒ **Cite `2 / 233`, and say what it is**: the sites whose options argument was
 READ and holds no tenant context, against a decidably tenancy-enabled object.
 That is the control's provable yield surface. ⛔ Do not cite it as "the sites
 without tenant context" — **32 further sites** have an options argument this
@@ -223,30 +223,30 @@ cannot read, and they are neither in nor out.
 
 | what | count |
 | :--- | ---: |
-| write call sites on the application surface | **238** |
-| …whose object name is statically decidable | 159 |
-| …whose object name is chosen at run time | 79 |
-| …against an object with tenancy ENABLED | 158 |
+| write call sites on the application surface | **233** |
+| …whose object name is statically decidable | 158 |
+| …whose object name is chosen at run time | 75 |
+| …against an object with tenancy ENABLED | 157 |
 | …against an object that declares tenancy off | 1 |
-| threading a tenant context | 177 |
+| threading a tenant context | 172 |
 | PROVABLY carrying none (options read, no context key) | **8** |
 | …of those, against a decidably tenancy-enabled object | **2** |
 | options argument UNREADABLE — may or may not carry one | 53 |
 | …of those, against a decidably tenancy-enabled object | 32 |
 | threading a decidably ELEVATED (`isSystem`) context | 126 |
 | threading a context that is decidably NOT elevated | 0 |
-| threading a context whose elevation is a run-time fact | 104 |
+| threading a context whose elevation is a run-time fact | 99 |
 
 | how the instrument reached the site | count |
 | :--- | ---: |
-| receiver carried a readable engine type | 188 |
+| receiver carried a readable engine type | 187 |
 | receiver erased, placed by the object NAME | 32 |
-| receiver erased, placed by an `object: string` PARAMETER | 13 |
+| receiver erased, placed by an `object: string` PARAMETER | 9 |
 | receiver erased, placed by an `UNTYPED_RECEIVERS` row | 5 |
 
-| object name spelled inline | 106 |
+| object name spelled inline | 105 |
 | object name spelled through a `const` | 53 |
-| object name is an `object: string` parameter | 17 |
+| object name is an `object: string` parameter | 13 |
 | object name is some other run-time expression | 62 |
 
 ### Subtractions the census could NOT defend — enforced
@@ -297,11 +297,11 @@ holds still. They are required to be HERE and to say WHEN they were true;
 their values are not compared. The reasoning, and the measurement behind it,
 are in `scripts/check-tenant-audit-census.mjs`.
 
-Measured on 2026-10-11 at `a18c51496`.
+Measured on 2026-10-11 at `64e53f1d0`.
 
 | corpus scale (not enforced) | count |
 | :--- | ---: |
-| tracked non-test sources scanned | 637 |
+| tracked non-test sources scanned | 633 |
 | engine-shaped types recognised | 72 |
 | declared objects in the registry | 117 |
 | same-named calls subtracted as non-engine | 162 |