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[examples] SecondFi Cardano predictable key-generation drain (T11.004)#1

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iZonex merged 2 commits into
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examples/secondfi-cardano-t11004-key-gen-drain
Jul 3, 2026
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[examples] SecondFi Cardano predictable key-generation drain (T11.004)#1
iZonex merged 2 commits into
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examples/secondfi-cardano-t11004-key-gen-drain

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@iZonex iZonex commented Jun 24, 2026

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What

Adds a worked example for the SecondFi Cardano (ADA) wallet drain disclosed 2026-06-23, mapped to OAK-T11.004 (Insufficient-Entropy Key Generation).

  • New: examples/2026-06-secondfi-cardano-web-wallet-predictable-key-generation-drain.md
  • Backlink in techniques/T11.004-insufficient-entropy-key-generation.md
  • Regenerated STATS.md, BACKLOG.md, index.html count (646 → 647)

Why this is a clean T11.004 anchor

Multiple outlets and SlowMist confirm the root cause: SecondFi's native Cardano web-wallet key-generation software produced private keys with predictable randomness, so the entire generated cohort is derivable — including wallets not yet drained. This is OAK's first non-EVM / wallet-provider-software anchor for the class (existing anchors are EVM/Profanity), and it re-exercises both load-bearing T11.004 properties: cohort-computable exposure and the half-life-of-known-vulnerability tail.

  • Confirmed: 16M ADA ($2.4M) across ~178 wallets (374 addresses per SecondFi).
  • Exposure: up to 129M ADA ($20M) per SlowMist.

Developing / partially disputed — handled per OAK neutral framing

The ~129M ADA "rescue to a third-party custodian" SecondFi describes is disputed: SlowMist and community trackers link the large flows to attacker-tagged addresses (addr1q8g8c…7vuz99), and on-chain a cohort-wide sweep of derivable keys by an attacker is indistinguishable from a custodial rescue of the same wallets.

  • Mechanism = confirmed; disposition = contested metadata; attribution = pseudonymous.
  • Entry is explicitly marked developing / partially-disputed with a re-map path: add T5.007 / T11.010 as co-primary disposition if forensics confirm the flow is operator-controlled.
  • The entry does not amplify SecondFi's "do nothing / don't restore your seed / submit a claim" guidance — for a weak-entropy cohort, immediate rotation to a cleanly generated key is the only protective action, and inaction is the failure mode. The literal "restoring the same phrase doesn't help" is true; "leave funds in place and wait" is not.

Validation

All gates pass: check_linkage OK · check_backlinks 0 hard / 0 warn · check_integrity clean · markdownlint 0 errors · verify_citations clean. Exports (oak.json / oak-stix.json) and SPECS.md unchanged (examples aren't part of those artifacts). Citations are inline-only (no new bibtex entries).

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

iZonex and others added 2 commits June 24, 2026 15:49
@iZonex @claude
[examples] add SecondFi Cardano predictable key-generation drain (646…
fbdd022 
… -> 647)

SecondFi (Cardano web wallet) disclosed 2026-06-23 that its native
web-wallet key-generation software produced private keys with predictable
randomness, so the full generated cohort is derivable, including wallets
not yet drained. Confirmed ~16M ADA (~$2.4M) stolen across ~178 wallets
(374 addresses per SecondFi); SlowMist puts total exposure up to ~129M ADA
(~$20M at ~$0.15/ADA). Maps to T11.004 (Insufficient-Entropy Key
Generation) -- OAK's first non-EVM / wallet-provider-software anchor for
the class (existing anchors are EVM/Profanity).

The ~129M ADA "rescue to a third-party custodian" SecondFi describes is
disputed: SlowMist and community trackers link the large flows to
attacker-tagged addresses, and an attacker sweeping every derivable key is
on-chain indistinguishable from a custodial rescue of the same wallets.
Documented per OAK neutral framing -- mechanism confirmed, disposition
recorded as contested metadata; attribution pseudonymous. Entry marked
developing / partially-disputed with an explicit re-map path (add T5.007 /
T11.010 if the flow is confirmed operator-controlled).

Does not amplify the "do nothing / don't restore your seed / submit a
claim" guidance: for a weak-entropy cohort, immediate rotation to a cleanly
generated key is the only protective action a holder can take unilaterally;
inaction is the failure mode (T11.004 half-life-of-known-vulnerability tail).

Backlink: T11.004. Regenerated STATS/BACKLOG + index.html count
(646 -> 647; bibtex steady 1555 / inline-only; pseudonymous 305 -> 306;
T11 144 -> 145). Exports (oak.json/oak-stix.json) and SPECS.md unchanged --
examples are not part of those artifacts.

All gates pass: check_linkage OK, check_backlinks 0 hard / 0 warn,
check_integrity clean, markdownlint 0 errors, verify_citations clean.

Signed-off-by: Dmytro Chystiakov <dlchistyakov@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
@iZonex @claude
[examples] add 5 late-June 2026 incidents (647 -> 652)
1ad7636 
Pulls the new late-June 2026 attacks into the PR alongside SecondFi. Five
worked examples covering six incidents, all dated 2026-06:

- Secret Network / Axelar (~$4.67M): a forked CW20-ICS20 bridge contract
  with source-channel + escrow checks commented out accepted forged IBC
  packets over an attacker-opened permissionless channel, minting unbacked
  sa* tokens redeemed over the real Axelar route. T10.002 (message-
  verification bypass) + T11.013 (legacy carry: flaw from the 2023 deploy
  survived a 2026-03 migration). Encrypted balances masked the loss ~7 days;
  sibling detection case to Namada 2026-06.
- jaredfromsubway.eth MEV bot (~$7.5M): counter-MEV honeypot; ~66 counterfeit
  WETH/USDC/USDT contracts (T6.006) baited the bot's routing logic into
  leaving standing allowances that a coordinator swept via transferFrom in one
  tx. T4.004. Inverts the 2023 jaredfromsubway.eth attacker entries.
- Polymarket (~$3.0-3.1M, ~11 wallets): compromised third-party frontend
  vendor injected wallet-draining JS into the live official site, soliciting
  fraudulent approvals; backend/contracts intact. T15.002 + T4.002. Distinct
  from the 2026-01 Polymarket trader-tooling npm campaign (T11.009).
- Gitcoin + Yield Yak "Eleven drainer" cohort (losses undisclosed): the same
  drainer kit injected into legitimate project subdomains (files.gitcoin.co,
  vote.yieldyak.com) three days apart. T6.008 + T4.004; access vector
  undisclosed (candidate T15.004). Detection-stage entry.
- mySwap CL, Starknet (~$305K, developing): a fake "EVIL" token abused a
  shared concentrated-liquidity vault's accounting to drain residual LP.
  Preliminary T9.004; exact line-level bug undisclosed, candidate flagged.

Neutral framing throughout: mechanism + prevention; attacker identity and
fund disposition recorded as neutral metadata. Backlinks added to the primary
technique of each. Regenerated STATS/BACKLOG + index.html count (647 -> 652;
2026-06 15 -> 20; pseudonymous 306 -> 308, unattributed 149 -> 152). Exports
and SPECS unchanged (examples are not part of those artifacts).

Deferred to backlog pending root-cause disclosure: Haedal Vault (~$915K, Sui;
mechanism single-origin) and Hinkal (~$820K, 2026-07-03; root cause
unconfirmed between proof-bypass and key-compromise).

All gates pass: check_linkage OK, check_backlinks 0 hard / 0 warn,
check_integrity clean, markdownlint 0 errors, verify_citations clean,
detect_ai_tells 0 violations over threshold.

Signed-off-by: Dmytro Chystiakov <dlchistyakov@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
@iZonex iZonex merged commit 1a1482d into main Jul 3, 2026
6 of 7 checks passed
@iZonex iZonex deleted the examples/secondfi-cardano-t11004-key-gen-drain branch July 3, 2026 16:20
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