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7 changes: 6 additions & 1 deletion src/protect/engine/fetch.js
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -165,7 +165,12 @@ export function parseMultipart(rawBody, boundary) {
const content = part.slice(sep.index + sep[0].length).replace(/\r?\n$/, '');
const filename = /filename="([^"]*)"/i.exec(disposition)?.[1];
if (filename !== undefined) {
files[name] = name in files ? [].concat(files[name], filename) : filename;
// Capture the part's declared content-type and CONTENT (not just the filename), so rules can
// inspect an upload's bytes (files.<name>.content) and detect a declared-vs-actual type
// mismatch (files.<name>.mismatch). The content rides inside the already-capped rawBody.
const partType = /content-type:\s*([^\r\n;]+)/i.exec(rawHeaders)?.[1]?.trim() || '';
const file = { filename, type: partType, content };
files[name] = name in files ? [].concat(files[name], file) : file;
} else {
body[name] = name in body ? [].concat(body[name], content) : content;
}
Expand Down
41 changes: 36 additions & 5 deletions src/protect/engine/request.js
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,3 +1,12 @@
// Resolvable DATA attributes of an uploaded file part (files.<name>.<attr>). The engine only exposes
// the raw data — WHAT counts as a malicious upload (signatures, type-vs-content mismatch) is expressed
// in rules (see the triage-vpatch-npm skill), not hardcoded here.
const FILE_ATTRS = new Set(['content', 'filename', 'type']);

// A captured file part is { filename, type, content }; tolerate the legacy bare-filename string.
const fileFilename = (f) => (f && typeof f === 'object' ? f.filename : f);
const fileAttribute = (f, attr) => (f && typeof f === 'object' ? f[attr] : attr === 'filename' ? f : undefined);

// WinterCG-safe base64 decode: use Buffer on Node, fall back to atob/TextDecoder on
// edge runtimes (Cloudflare Workers, Deno, Bun) where Buffer may be absent. Keeps the
// engine hot path free of Node-only APIs (per the ADR engine-language decision).
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -253,16 +262,38 @@ export class RequestResolver {

#resolveFiles(key) {
const files = this.#req.files;
if (!files) {
if (!files || typeof files !== 'object') {
return [];
}

if (key.endsWith('*')) {
return this.#resolveWildcard(files, key);
// files.<name>.<attr> — content | filename | type. Fans out over multiple files uploaded under
// the same field name.
const dot = key.lastIndexOf('.');
if (dot !== -1 && FILE_ATTRS.has(key.slice(dot + 1)) && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(files, key.slice(0, dot))) {
const attr = key.slice(dot + 1);
const entry = files[key.slice(0, dot)];
const list = Array.isArray(entry) ? entry : [entry];
const out = [];
for (const f of list) {
const v = fileAttribute(f, attr);
if (v !== undefined && v !== '') out.push(v);
}
return out;
}

const value = files[key];
return value !== undefined ? [value] : [];
// Bare files.<name> (or wildcard) → the filename(s), preserving the legacy behavior that
// filename-scoped rules rely on (the parser now stores a { filename, type, content } object).
const filenamesOf = (entry) => (Array.isArray(entry) ? entry.map(fileFilename) : [fileFilename(entry)]);
if (key.endsWith('*')) {
const prefix = key.slice(0, -1);
const out = [];
for (const [k, entry] of Object.entries(files)) {
if (k.startsWith(prefix)) out.push(...filenamesOf(entry));
}
return out.filter((v) => v !== undefined);
}
if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(files, key)) return [];
return filenamesOf(files[key]).filter((v) => v !== undefined);
}

#resolveRaw() {
Expand Down
3 changes: 2 additions & 1 deletion tests/protect/batch-hardening.test.ts
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -86,7 +86,8 @@ describe('item 3 — multipart on the node adapter + comparator coercion', () =>
`--${b}\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name="avatar"; filename="x.png"\r\n\r\nBINARY\r\n--${b}--\r\n`;
const shaped: any = fromNodeRequest({ method: 'POST', url: '/x', headers: { 'content-type': `multipart/form-data; boundary=${b}` } } as any, body);
expect(shaped.body.comment).toBe('<script>alert(1)</script>');
expect(shaped.files.avatar).toBe('x.png');
// File parts are captured as { filename, type, content } for content inspection.
expect(shaped.files.avatar).toMatchObject({ filename: 'x.png', content: 'BINARY' });
});

it('in_array / array_in_array coerce numeric rule values to match string request values', () => {
Expand Down
3 changes: 2 additions & 1 deletion tests/protect/multipart.test.ts
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -42,7 +42,8 @@ describe('multipart/form-data parsing', () => {
);
expect(shaped.body.title).toBe('<script>alert(1)</script>');
expect(shaped.body['__proto__[polluted]']).toBe('yes');
expect(shaped.files.avatar).toBe('evil.svg');
// File parts are now captured as { filename, type, content } (content inspection), not a bare filename.
expect(shaped.files.avatar).toMatchObject({ filename: 'evil.svg', type: 'image/svg+xml', content: '<svg onload=alert(1)>' });
expect(shaped._rawBody).toContain('__proto__');
});

Expand Down
70 changes: 70 additions & 0 deletions tests/protect/upload-inspection.test.ts
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
import { createProtection } from '../../src/protect/runtime.js';

// File-upload content inspection: the engine exposes an upload's DATA
// (files.<name>.content / .type / .filename); WHAT is malicious is expressed entirely in rules.
// These tests show the rule-composed patterns (content signature + declared-type-vs-content
// mismatch) and that bare files.<name> still returns the filename for existing filename rules.

const B = '----PSXBOUNDARY';
function upload(field: string, filename: string, type: string, content: string) {
const body =
`--${B}\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name="${field}"; filename="${filename}"\r\n` +
`Content-Type: ${type}\r\n\r\n${content}\r\n--${B}--\r\n`;
return new Request('https://app.com/upload', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'content-type': `multipart/form-data; boundary=${B}` },
body,
});
}
const mk = (rules: any[]) => createProtection({ mode: 'block', rules: { firewall: rules, whitelists: [], whitelist_keys: {} } as any });
const blocks = async (p: any, req: Request) => (await p.fetch(() => new Response('ok'))(req)).status === 403;

describe('files.<name>.content — signature inspection (pure rule)', () => {
it('matches a webshell / ImageMagick-MSL signature in the file bytes', async () => {
const p = await mk([
{ id: 's', rule_v2: [{ parameter: 'files.f.content', match: { type: 'regex', value: '/<\\?php|<\\?=|<(?:read|write|msl)[\\s>]/i' } }] },
]);
expect(await blocks(p, upload('f', 'cat.png', 'image/png', '\x89PNG\r\n<?php system($_GET[0]); ?>'))).toBe(true);
expect(await blocks(p, upload('f', 'x.jpg', 'image/jpeg', '<?xml version="1.0"?>'))).toBe(true);
expect(await blocks(p, upload('f', 'cat.png', 'image/png', '\x89PNG a normal image'))).toBe(false);
});
});

describe('type-vs-content mismatch — composed in a rule, not the engine', () => {
// "declared image AND content head is markup" — two inclusive (AND) conditions on the exposed data.
const mismatchRule = {
id: 'm',
rule_v2: [
{ parameter: 'rules', rules: [
{ parameter: 'files.f.type', mutations: [], match: { type: 'regex', value: '/^image\\//i' }, inclusive: true },
{ parameter: 'files.f.content', match: { type: 'regex', value: '/^\\s*<[a-z!?]/i' }, inclusive: true },
] },
],
};

it('flags a raster image that is really text/markup (svg-as-png, php-as-png)', async () => {
const p = await mk([mismatchRule]);
expect(await blocks(p, upload('f', 'cat.png', 'image/png', '<?php echo 1; ?>'))).toBe(true);
expect(await blocks(p, upload('f', 'x.png', 'image/png', '<svg><script>alert(1)</script></svg>'))).toBe(true);
});

it('does NOT flag a real image (binary head, markup only in metadata) — no false positive', async () => {
const p = await mk([mismatchRule]);
// Genuine binary image head; <script> only later in an EXIF/XMP-like text field.
expect(await blocks(p, upload('f', 'p.jpg', 'image/jpeg', '\xff\xd8\xff\xe1 EXIF <x:xmpmeta><dc:description><script>x</script></dc:description>'))).toBe(false);
expect(await blocks(p, upload('f', 'ok.png', 'image/png', '\x89PNG normal image bytes'))).toBe(false);
});
});

describe('backward compatibility', () => {
it('bare files.<name> still matches the filename', async () => {
const p = await mk([{ id: 'ext', rule_v2: [{ parameter: 'files.avatar', match: { type: 'contains', value: '.php' } }] }]);
expect(await blocks(p, upload('avatar', 'shell.php', 'application/octet-stream', 'x'))).toBe(true);
expect(await blocks(p, upload('avatar', 'ok.png', 'image/png', 'x'))).toBe(false);
});
it('exposes .type and .filename as sources', async () => {
const p = await mk([{ id: 't', rule_v2: [{ parameter: 'files.doc.type', match: { type: 'contains', value: 'application/x-httpd-php' } }] }]);
expect(await blocks(p, upload('doc', 'a.txt', 'application/x-httpd-php', 'x'))).toBe(true);
});
});
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