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…ending cap, sanitize justification Rejects HandshakeRequest messages with no pubkey/signature before they enter the pending queue or auto-trust path. Bounds the pending map per source (maxPendingPerSource=16) on top of the global cap to limit flood surface. Sanitizes attacker-controlled justification before display. Adds WS5 flood test. No enforcement flag is toggled; empty-pubkey reject is unconditional. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…approval, timestamp-independent replay key Addresses reported vulnerabilities PPA-001/002/008 (replay-set), verified against source. - PPA-001: HandshakeAccept/HandshakeRevoke now require the claimed msg.NodeID to equal the AEAD-authenticated stream identity (stream.RemoteAddr().Node). A forged unsigned accept/revoke for a victim node arrives on the attacker's own authenticated stream and is rejected; honest accept/revoke (msg.NodeID == own id == authenticated peer) still complete. Closes the trust-injection / forced-revoke bypass that reached the accept/revoke handlers by choosing a message Type other than Request. - PPA-002: processRelayedApproval requires a matching outgoing request before granting Mutual trust, so an unsolicited relayed approval for a peer we never contacted no longer establishes trust. - PPA-008 (replay-set): the replay/dedup key is derived from signature-covered fields plus message Type instead of the full JSON (which included the mutable, unsigned Timestamp), so a captured signed message re-stamped with a fresh timestamp is caught. Including Type keeps a legitimate revoke following a request from being falsely deduped. The wire-breaking signed-freshness change (nonce inside the signed preimage) is deferred. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
# Conflicts: # go.mod # go.sum
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Superseded — this hardening is already on main (accept/revoke identity binding, relayed-approval gate, timestamp-independent replay key) and shipped in v0.2.3/v0.2.4. |
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Closes the handshake findings from the PPA vulnerability register.
HandshakeAccept/HandshakeRevokenow require the claimedmsg.NodeIDto match the authenticated stream identity (stream.RemoteAddr().Node) — an attacker can no longer inject/revoke trust for an arbitrary node_id. Fail-closed onstream == nil. No new wire field.processRelayedApprovaldrops any relayed approval with no matching outgoing request.sha256(Type ‖ challenge ‖ Signature)— the mutable, unsignedTimestampno longer lets a captured signature evade the replay set.Compat-safe: legitimate P2P Accept/Revoke arrive over the sender's own authenticated stream; only forged/relayed injection is blocked. Full
go test ./...green.🤖 Generated with Claude Code