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Security: privateer-agent/pi-privacy

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Reporting a vulnerability

Please report security issues privately, not in a public issue or PR.

Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting: on the repository's Security tab, click Report a vulnerability (privateer-agent/pi-privacy security advisories). This opens a private advisory only the maintainers can see.

Please include: affected version, a description, reproduction steps, and the impact you see. We aim to acknowledge within a few days and to coordinate a fix and disclosure timeline with you. We're grateful for responsible disclosure and will credit reporters who want it.

Supported versions

pi-privacy is pre-1.0 and ships fixes on the latest published version. Please reproduce on the current release before reporting.

Scope — what this package does and does not promise

pi-privacy's guarantees are graded by evidence, and its limits are part of its design. Understanding them helps target reports at real gaps rather than documented bounds:

  • Attested tiers (tee-verified) rest on the pragmatic checks in src/posture/verify.ts + src/attest/ — remote attestation plus a live-TLS-key match. These are suited to an interactive agent, not a replacement for a full verifier (nearai/cloud-verifier, tinfoil-cli); /verify prints the raw report so you can independently check it. A flaw that lets an unattested channel earn a green verified badge is a serious bug — please report it.
  • ZDR tiers are policy (or, for zdr-enforced, observably enforced routing), never hardware attestation. A provider seeing-but-not-retaining data is within scope of the design, not a vulnerability.
  • PII / secret detection is best-effort structured matching, local and deterministic — it never sends data to a model to detect it, and it cannot catch names, addresses, or contextual PII. Missed unstructured PII is a known limitation, not a vulnerability. A false-negative on a structured pattern we claim to detect (e.g. a valid credit-card number the Luhn path misses) is worth reporting.
  • The tool-exfiltration and downgrade gates are best-effort heuristics over a best-effort detector. A bypass that defeats the stated heuristic (e.g. a loopback URL vouching for a sibling egress command in the same line) is in scope; an entirely novel exfil channel the heuristic never claimed to cover is a feature request.

When unsure whether something is a bug or a documented limit, report it privately and we'll sort it out.

There aren't any published security advisories