OmaWarden handles access to a decrypted Bitwarden vault. Security fixes take priority over features and polish.

Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting for this repository. Do not open a public issue containing an exploit, credential, session key or vault data. Include the version, steps to reproduce, observed impact and, if you have one, a suggested fix.

OmaWarden keeps secrets out of the Omarchy shell UI, shell configuration, process arguments, logs and clipboard history.

Trusted: the local user account and kernel; Omarchy, Quickshell, Pinentry, bw and wl-copy; the Wayland compositor; the plugin's installed source.

Out of scope: malware running as the same user; debuggers or memory readers with access to the shell, the helper or bw; a compromised clipboard consumer, compositor, Pinentry or Bitwarden CLI; someone reading usernames or item names off your screen.

Both prompts end the same way: the password is written to a mode-0600 FIFO that bw unlock --passwordfile reads, the FIFO is deleted, the Python buffers are overwritten, and the session key stays in the helper's memory — passed to child bw processes through their environment, never their arguments.

Pinentry (default). The helper runs a separate Pinentry process and reads the password over its Assuan pipe. The master password never exists inside the shell process.

Native (optional, selected explicitly in Settings). The shell draws a themed prompt on an overlay with exclusive keyboard focus, as the lock screen does. The password is written to the helper's stdin (never argv or the environment), relayed to the agent over the private socket, and cleared from each holder as soon as it moves on. The field is cleared on submit, dismiss and session lock. QML strings are garbage-collected, so clearing them cannot promise a physical overwrite — that is the trade-off this prompt makes.

The Bitwarden CLI decrypts full items. The helper immediately keeps only login and card entries and reduces them to allowlisted metadata. For logins that is the item ID, name, optional username, first safe web URL, favourite flag, type and password/TOTP capability flags. For cards it is the item ID, name, optional cardholder, brand, last four digits, favourite flag, type and field capability flags. Full card numbers, security codes and expiration dates are not indexed or returned to QML. Unlock and sync prepare that index before their background work reports ready; when sync is disabled, preparation starts only after the unlock password and its FIFO have been cleared. The metadata stays in memory for the life of the session and is wiped on lock, sign-out, profile change, privacy change and exit. It is never written to disk.

The helper remembers the IDs of the last five entries copied or opened, in memory only. They survive a lock and are forgotten on sign-out, CLI or profile change, and exit.

While the agent owns an unlocked session, routine status polls reuse its metadata-only status response instead of repeatedly launching the Bitwarden CLI. Lock, sign-out, profile changes, failed status checks and inactivity locking clear that response together with the session capability, so this cache cannot keep an otherwise closed vault accessible.

When enabled, the service watches Omarchy's omarchy.lock service and queues the same lock action as the panel button the moment the session locks. A busy copy or sync cannot drop the event; the service retries until the session key and index are gone. An open native prompt is dismissed at the same time.

For login fields, bw get <field> is piped straight into wl-copy --sensitive; neither Python nor QML sees the value. The CLI has no equivalent card-field command, so bw get item is piped through a short-lived filter process that emits only the requested card value into wl-copy. The full card object never enters QML, IPC responses or the long-lived agent and the filter exits immediately after the copy pipe is filled. The clipboard owner is terminated at the configured deadline, on the next copy, on lock and on sign-out. --paste-once is not used because Omarchy's clipboard-history watcher would consume the single paste while checking the sensitivity flag. Copy requests must match a capability in the current index. The panel's countdown is cosmetic; the helper owns the clipboard lifetime.

The Unix socket and lock file live in a user-owned runtime directory with no group or world permissions. The socket is mode 0600, the lock cannot be a symlink, and every peer's UID is checked. Requests, responses and password frames have size limits and a protocol version; an incomplete client is dropped after three seconds. An advisory lock keeps it to one helper per user.

bw login runs in a terminal so credentials and two-step codes go to the CLI's own prompt. A configured server URL is applied with bw config server before login, only while signed out. Sign-out runs bw logout, clears the clipboard and wipes the session, index and recents.

• No password reveal.
• No create, edit, delete, attachments, identities or notes.
• No bw serve.
• No session keys in files, configuration, IPC responses or arguments.
• No copy over IPC; secrets are copied from the panel only.
• Only credential-free http and https URLs from your own vault entries can be opened.