fix(ci): run adversarial audit on Dependabot PRs

[Conrad Rockenhaus (skyphusion)]

Summary

• Drop the Dependabot author skip on the adversarial audit workflow.
• Dependabot-triggered runs use org Dependabot secrets (same names as Actions secrets).
• PR comment step is continue-on-error (Dependabot GITHUB_TOKEN is read-only; artifact remains).

Template + runbook: skyphusion-labs/fleet-chezmoi#1520

Test plan

• After merge, update an open Dependabot PR onto main
• Confirm Adversarial audit runs and does not skip

[github-actions]

Adversarial security audit

Generated 2026-08-05T10:21:41.739Z · f6b8c2e...ca9a4f6

Workflow change removes Dependabot skip while providing same-named Dependabot org secrets, keeps branch-resident credential-risk and PR comment fail-open, with no hardened runner controls.

Severity	Location	Finding
high	.github/workflows/adversarial-audit.yml:73	Dependabot secrets now reachable via same-named org secrets: Removing the dependabot[bot] skip means malicious or compromised Dependabot PRs will execute the workflow using the newly seeded Dependabot org secrets, which now mirror the names of the Actions org secrets.
high	.github/workflows/adversarial-audit.yml:1	PR branch workflow still reaches CF tokens (known residual): pull_request triggers run the workflow from the PR branch, so any write-access user can rewrite this file and exfiltrate ADVERSARIAL_AUDIT_CF_API_TOKEN/CF_AIG_TOKEN.
medium	.github/workflows/adversarial-audit.yml:147	continue-on-error masks PR comment failures: Adding continue-on-error: true to the PR comment step hides failures of the advisory posting, reducing visibility of tampering or broken posting.
medium	.github/workflows/adversarial-audit.yml:92	AUDIT_SCRIPTS_PIN env envar can be overridden by branch: AUDIT_SCRIPTS_PIN is set as an env variable on the job; because pull_request uses the branch copy, an attacker can override it and checkout/run an arbitrary public repo commit or tag.
medium	.github/workflows/adversarial-audit.yml:95	No runner integrity or network egress hardening: The job runs on ubuntu-latest with default network egress, no step-security/harden-runner, and broad outgoing connections for Node/AI gateway.
low	.github/workflows/adversarial-audit.yml:149	GH_TOKEN passed implicitly to shell script: The github.token is exported as GH_TOKEN and passed into a bash script; if post-pr-comment.sh logs the token or is tampered with, it is exposed.