A complete Go implementation of Impacket - 63 tools and 24 library packages for Windows network protocol interaction, Active Directory enumeration, and attack execution. Built as a native Go framework so you can compile once and run anywhere without Python dependencies.
Beta Release - Highly Experimental. gopacket is under active development. Core tools have been tested against Active Directory lab environments, but edge cases and protocol quirks are expected. If something isn't working, please test the same operation with Impacket side-by-side and include both outputs in your bug report. This helps us quickly identify whether it's a gopacket-specific issue or a shared protocol limitation.
git clone https://github.com/mandiant/gopacket
cd gopacket
# Build and install all tools as gopacket-<toolname> on your PATH
./install.sh
# Or just build without installing
./install.sh --build-only
# Or build with make
make buildRequires Go 1.24.13+, GCC, and libpcap development headers
(install with apt install build-essential libpcap-dev on Debian/Ubuntu/Kali,
or yum install gcc libpcap-devel on RHEL/CentOS, or brew install libpcap on macOS).
The libpcap headers are only needed by the sniff and split tools - if
libpcap is missing, install.sh will skip those two and build the rest.
To uninstall:
./install.sh --uninstallAll gopacket tools work through proxychains. Go binaries normally bypass proxychains because Go's runtime handles DNS and networking internally, skipping the LD_PRELOAD hooks that proxychains relies on. gopacket works around this by linking against the system C library for network operations, allowing proxychains to intercept connections normally.
proxychains gopacket-secretsdump 'domain/user:password@target'
proxychains gopacket-smbclient -k -no-pass 'domain/user@dc.domain.local'See the Library Developer Guide for full API documentation, code examples, and architecture overview for building custom tools on top of gopacket's 24 protocol packages.
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
| psexec | Remote command execution via SMB service creation |
| smbexec | Remote command execution via SMB (stealthier than psexec) |
| wmiexec | Remote command execution via WMI |
| dcomexec | Remote command execution via DCOM |
| atexec | Remote command execution via Task Scheduler |
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
| secretsdump | SAM/LSA/NTDS.dit extraction and DCSync (remote + offline) |
| dpapi | DPAPI backup key extraction |
| esentutl | Offline ESE database parser (NTDS.dit) |
| registry-read | Offline Windows registry hive parser |
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
| getTGT | Request a TGT with password, hash, or AES key |
| getST | Request a service ticket with S4U2Self/S4U2Proxy |
| GetUserSPNs | Kerberoasting - find and request SPNs |
| GetNPUsers | AS-REP roasting - find accounts without pre-auth |
| ticketer | Golden/silver ticket forging |
| ticketConverter | Convert between ccache and kirbi formats |
| describeTicket | Parse and decrypt Kerberos tickets |
| getPac | Request and parse PAC information |
| keylistattack | KERB-KEY-LIST-REQ attack (RODC) |
| raiseChild | Child-to-parent domain escalation via golden ticket |
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
| GetADUsers | Enumerate domain users via LDAP |
| GetADComputers | Enumerate domain computers via LDAP |
| GetLAPSPassword | Read LAPS passwords via LDAP |
| findDelegation | Find delegation configurations |
| lookupsid | SID brute-forcing via LSARPC |
| samrdump | Enumerate users via SAMR |
| rpcdump | Dump RPC endpoints via epmapper |
| rpcmap | Scan for accessible RPC interfaces |
| net | net user/group/computer enumeration via SAMR/LSARPC |
| netview | Enumerate sessions, shares, and logged-on users |
| CheckLDAPStatus | Check LDAP signing and channel binding requirements |
| DumpNTLMInfo | Dump NTLM authentication info from SMB negotiation |
| getArch | Detect remote OS architecture via RPC |
| machine_role | Detect machine role (DC, server, workstation) |
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
| addcomputer | Create/modify/delete machine accounts (SAMR + LDAP) |
| rbcd | Resource-Based Constrained Delegation manipulation |
| dacledit | Read/write DACLs on AD objects |
| owneredit | Read/modify object ownership |
| samedit | SAM account name spoofing (CVE-2021-42278/42287) |
| badsuccessor | BadSuccessor / backup operator escalation |
| changepasswd | Change/reset passwords via SAMR and LDAP |
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
| smbclient | Interactive SMB client (shares, ls, get, put, etc.) |
| smbserver | SMB server for file sharing |
| attrib | Query/modify file attributes via SMB |
| filetime | Query/modify file timestamps via SMB |
| services | Remote service management via SVCCTL |
| reg | Remote registry operations via WINREG |
| Get-GPPPassword | Extract Group Policy Preferences passwords from SYSVOL |
| karmaSMB | Rogue SMB server for hash capture |
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
| ntlmrelayx | Full NTLM relay framework with multi-protocol support |
ntlmrelayx supports:
- Capture servers: SMB, HTTP/HTTPS, WCF (ADWS), RAW, RPC, WinRM
- Relay clients: SMB, LDAP/LDAPS, HTTP/HTTPS, MSSQL, WinRM, RPC
- Attacks: secretsdump, smbexec, ldapdump, RBCD delegation, ACL abuse, shadow credentials, ADCS ESC8, addcomputer, DNS manipulation, and more
- Infrastructure: SOCKS5 proxy with protocol-aware plugins, interactive console, REST API, multi-target round-robin, WPAD serving
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
| mssqlclient | Interactive MSSQL client with SQL/Windows/Kerberos auth |
| mssqlinstance | MSSQL instance discovery via SQL Browser |
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
| wmiquery | Interactive WMI query shell |
| wmipersist | WMI event subscription persistence |
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
| tstool | Terminal Services session and process enumeration |
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
| rdp_check | RDP authentication check |
| mqtt_check | MQTT authentication check |
| exchanger | Exchange Web Services client |
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
| ntfs-read | Offline NTFS filesystem parser |
| ping / ping6 | ICMP ping |
| sniff / sniffer | Network packet capture |
| split | Split large files |
All network tools support three authentication methods:
# Password
gopacket-secretsdump 'domain/user:password@target'
# NTLM hash (pass-the-hash)
gopacket-secretsdump -hashes ':nthash' 'domain/user@target'
# Kerberos (pass-the-ticket)
KRB5CCNAME=ticket.ccache gopacket-secretsdump -k -no-pass 'domain/user@target'| Flag | Description |
|---|---|
-hashes LMHASH:NTHASH |
NTLM hash authentication (LM hash can be empty) |
-k |
Use Kerberos authentication |
-no-pass |
Don't prompt for password (use with -k or -hashes) |
-dc-ip IP |
IP address of the domain controller |
-target-ip IP |
IP address of the target (when using hostname for Kerberos) |
-port PORT |
Target port (defaults vary by tool) |
-debug |
Enable debug output |
# Dump domain hashes via DCSync
gopacket-secretsdump 'corp.local/admin:Password1@dc01.corp.local'
# Interactive SMB shell
gopacket-smbclient -hashes ':aabbccdd...' 'corp.local/admin@fileserver'
# Kerberoast
gopacket-getuserspns 'corp.local/user:pass@dc01.corp.local'
# Golden ticket
gopacket-ticketer -nthash <krbtgt_hash> -domain-sid S-1-5-21-... -domain corp.local admin
# NTLM relay with SOCKS proxy
sudo gopacket-ntlmrelayx -t smb://target -socks
# LDAP relay for RBCD
sudo gopacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldaps://dc01.corp.local --delegate-accessThe pkg/ directory contains 24 reusable protocol packages that can be imported independently.
| Package | Description |
|---|---|
| smb | SMB2/3 client with NTLM and Kerberos auth |
| ldap | LDAP client with NTLM/Kerberos bind |
| dcerpc | DCE/RPC client + 20 service implementations (DRSUAPI, SAMR, SVCCTL, LSARPC, WINREG, NETLOGON, DCOM, TSCH, EPMAPPER, etc.) |
| kerberos | Kerberos client, ticket forging (golden/silver), S4U2Self/S4U2Proxy |
| ntlm | NTLM authentication protocol |
| relay | NTLM relay framework (servers, clients, attacks, SOCKS) |
| tds | SQL Server TDS protocol |
| ese | Extensible Storage Engine parser |
| registry | Windows registry hive parser |
| ntfs | NTFS filesystem parser |
| security | Security descriptors, ACLs, SIDs |
| dpapi | DPAPI structures |
| mqtt | MQTT protocol client |
| session | Target/credential parsing (domain/user:pass@host) |
| flags | Unified CLI flag framework |
gopacket aims for full Impacket parity. The following are not yet implemented:
Relay protocol clients:
- IMAP relay client + attack (requires Exchange/IMAP server)
- SMTP relay client (requires SMTP server)
Relay attack modules:
- SCCM policies/DP attacks (requires SCCM infrastructure)
Standalone tools:
ifmap.py(DCOM interface mapping)mimikatz.py(limited Mimikatz over RPC)goldenPac.py(MS14-068 - obsolete on patched systems)smbrelayx.py(superseded by ntlmrelayx)kintercept.py(Kerberos interception)
These gaps are low priority - most require niche infrastructure to test or are obsoleted by newer techniques.
These are protocol-level limitations shared with Impacket, not gopacket bugs:
- SMB to LDAPS relay fails on patched DCs due to NTLM MIC validation (post-CVE-2019-1040). Use HTTP coercion instead.
- WinRM relay blocked by EPA (Extended Protection for Authentication) on patched Server 2019+.
- RPC relay attacks (tschexec, enum-local-admins) require PKT_INTEGRITY which is unavailable in relay sessions.
- LDAP relay to port 389 fails on DCs requiring LDAP signing. Always relay to LDAPS (port 636).
See KNOWN_ISSUES.md for detailed information on each issue and workarounds.
This is a beta release. Bugs are expected, and contributions are welcome.
Because gopacket implements the same wire protocols as Impacket, a large fraction of "bugs" turn out to be environmental, not gopacket-specific - patched DCs, LDAP signing requirements, EPA, PKT_INTEGRITY, SMB signing, NTLM MIC validation post-CVE-2019-1040, missing SPNs, time skew, DNS quirks, firewall rules, and so on. Running the same operation with Impacket side by side removes the environment from the equation:
- If Impacket fails the same way, the issue is almost always environmental and is likely already documented in KNOWN_ISSUES.md. No bug report needed.
- If Impacket succeeds where gopacket fails, that's a real gopacket bug and exactly what we want to hear about.
This single triage step saves a lot of round-trips, so please don't skip it.
- Run the same operation with Impacket and note whether it succeeds or fails
- Re-run gopacket with
-debugand capture the full output - Anonymize anything sensitive before posting. GitHub issues are public.
Strip or replace real hostnames, IP addresses, usernames, password hashes,
Kerberos tickets, domain names, SIDs, and any output line that could be
tied back to a real engagement. Replacing
corp.internal→example.localanddc01.corp.internal→dc01.example.localis fine - keep the structure of the data, just not the identifying values. If in doubt, redact it. - Open a GitHub issue and include:
- Both outputs (gopacket and Impacket), as text not screenshots, anonymized
- The exact command line you ran (anonymized)
- Target OS, AD functional level, and any relevant hardening (signing, EPA, channel binding, patch level)
- gopacket version / commit hash
Open a GitHub issue describing the use case and the Impacket equivalent (if any). If the feature is on the "Missing Features" list above, mention which one - it helps us prioritize.
PRs are welcome. Before opening one:
- Run
go build ./...,go vet ./...,gofmt -l ., andgo test ./...and make sure they all pass cleanly - Match the existing code style in the package you're touching
- Keep changes focused - separate refactors from feature work
- For non-trivial changes, open an issue first to discuss the approach
Threat actors are moving away from Python. Compiled Go and Rust tooling (Sliver, BRC4, Geacon, and bespoke loaders) is increasingly replacing Impacket in real-world intrusions. Most defensive tooling and detection logic was built around Impacket's Python-based network behavior, and that coverage is eroding as the attacker ecosystem shifts to compiled languages.
gopacket exists in part to help the security community get ahead of this shift. By providing an open-source, readable Go implementation of the same protocols and techniques, defenders and detection engineers can:
- Study how Go-based tooling behaves on the wire rather than waiting to encounter it during an incident
- Understand the protocol-level differences between Go and Python implementations that make existing signatures less effective
- Run realistic purple team exercises using the same compiled, single-binary tooling that threat actors are adopting, rather than testing exclusively against Python scripts that behave differently at the network layer
The gap between attacker tooling and defender visibility is widest when new tooling stays private. Open-sourcing gopacket narrows that gap.
- Kerberos authentication requires a valid ccache file (TGT or service ticket)
- For Kerberos, use the FQDN hostname - not an IP address
- If
KRB5CCNAMEis not set, tools will look for<username>.ccachein the current directory - All tools work through proxychains
- This project is for authorized security testing and research purposes only
Released under the Apache License 2.0.
gopacket is a clean Go reimplementation of Impacket; see NOTICE for full third-party acknowledgments.