feat: authenticate Claude plugin with OAuth DCR and PKCE - #121
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ishaanxgupta wants to merge 1 commit into
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ishaanxgupta wants to merge 1 commit into
ishaanxgupta wants to merge 1 commit into
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Browser sign-in currently creates a long-lived API key with no registered OAuth client identity. New Claude plugin logins now use the same authorization server and organization/scope consent flow as Supermemory MCP: discover the provider, register a public client, authorize with S256 PKCE and a random state, and exchange a code for access/refresh tokens.
The registration is persisted separately from credentials and reused across logins. Each local credential profile has its own client ID. API hooks and the hosted MCP proxy share the tokens; the proxy reloads credentials for each message so it also recovers when login finishes after startup. Refresh rotation is serialized across hook/proxy processes and credentials are replaced atomically with owner-only permissions. Invalid grants require reauthentication; invalid clients cause a fresh registration on the next login. Transient failures preserve credentials and hooks continue to fail open within bounded timeouts.