🔒 [security fix] Fix path traversal in model download path construction#4
🔒 [security fix] Fix path traversal in model download path construction#4swizzcheeze wants to merge 1 commit intomainfrom
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Introduced path validation using `pathlib.Path.resolve()` to ensure that constructed download paths for models and files remain within the intended base directory. This fixes a vulnerability where malformed `model_id` or `filename` inputs could be used to perform path traversal and write files outside of the designated storage area. Changes: - Added `validate_path` helper function to both `Hugging Hugger.py` and `CLI HUG.py`. - Integrated validation into single-file and entire-model download flows. - Added clear error reporting for blocked traversal attempts. - Improved path construction consistency in `CLI HUG.py`.
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🎯 What: This security fix addresses a path traversal vulnerability in the Hugging Face model downloader (both GUI and CLI versions).
../or absolute paths in themodel_idorfilenamefields to escape the intended base download directory. This could lead to files being written to arbitrary locations on the user's filesystem, potentially overwriting critical files or planting malicious content.🛡️ Solution: I implemented a
validate_pathutility function that:If a traversal attempt is detected, the application now raises a
ValueErrorwith a "Security Alert" message, which is caught and displayed to the user, and the download operation is aborted.I have verified this fix with a reproduction script that tested various malicious payloads (
../../etc/passwd,/etc/passwd, etc.) and confirmed they are all successfully blocked while legitimate repository IDs and filenames continue to work correctly.PR created automatically by Jules for task 14625578579913403015 started by @swizzcheeze