🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix XSS vulnerability in HTML report generation#8
🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix XSS vulnerability in HTML report generation#8tejasbhor wants to merge 1 commit into
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- Added `html.escape()` to sanitize untrusted strings interpolated into HTML report logic (`report_service.py`). - Corrected python module shadowing of the `html` built-in module by renaming the output variable to `html_content`. - Recorded the correct truncation pattern applied when mitigating manual HTML formatting. Co-authored-by: tejasbhor <153384397+tejasbhor@users.noreply.github.com>
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🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix XSS vulnerability in HTML report generation
Severity: HIGH
Vulnerability: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability was present in the
report_service.pywhere manual string interpolations built the HTML report, leaving dynamic and user-provided properties likejob_idanddata_sourceunsanitized.Impact: An attacker could inject malicious JavaScript or HTML directly into the rendered report via user-controlled IDs and data source strings, potentially leading to session hijacking, malicious redirects, or defacement when viewing the report in a browser.
Fix: Added python's
html.escape()to all dynamic string variables before rendering them in the manual f-string. To avoid anUnboundLocalError, the localhtmlvariable was renamed tohtml_content. Finally, ensured string slicing properly occurs before string escaping.Verification: Verified against a custom test (
test_xss.py) which ensures script and img tags are properly encoded and no longer vulnerable. Checked via ruff to ensure zero linting issues.PR created automatically by Jules for task 14836851874452981505 started by @tejasbhor