test(e2e): backfill coverage for the git config guard, the retained workspace denylist, and the null-classed driver refusal - #5974
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 10 included reviews per hour; 5 remain after this review. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe PR adds four end-to-end coverage tests. The tests cover restricted workspace state, OpenClaw migration errors, hostile Git fsmonitor configuration, and ordinary Git status execution. The Git helper now isolates system and global Git configuration. ChangesSecurity and tool coverage
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to This test-only change adds targeted regression coverage, but the git refusal assertion is narrower than the documented secure behavior and could make CI fail on an equally safe refusal response; confirm the message contract or broaden the assertion before merging. Suggested reviewers: Poem
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How this change flows1 changed behaviour across 17 relationships. 6 surrounding behaviours are shown (60 graph nodes walked). 51 further behaviours left out to keep the diagram readable. flowchart LR
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classDef changed fill:#0d4429,stroke:#238636,color:#e6edf3
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classDef flagged fill:#5a1e02,stroke:#d93f0b,color:#ffffff
classDef blocking fill:#67060c,stroke:#f85149,color:#ffffff
Green: changed behaviour. Grey: surrounding behaviour. Arrows name the call, use, implementation, or test relationship. Orange: has findings. Red: has a finding that blocks the merge. |
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Inline comments:
In `@tests/raw_coverage/tools_agent_credentials_state_raw_coverage_e2e.rs`:
- Around line 1046-1049: Add an assertion after the write execution in the
relevant test to verify attempted_write.output() does not contain the seeded
token "do-not-read", while retaining the existing error-flag and file-content
checks.
- Around line 1114-1117: Update the assertion around the refusal error in the
relevant test to also verify that the error contains the configured class value
“null” after case normalization, while preserving the existing checks for
“mynull” and “class”.
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What failsWhy
Byte-for-byte the CI failure. So The entry is also redundant: Why it went unnoticedThe only test that drives That is the same coverage blind spot this PR exists to narrow, demonstrated on itself. What I have not doneI have not fixed it here. The fix is one line — drop Full write-up, including the two other findings from this work: (Also rebased onto current |
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Inline comments:
In `@tests/raw_coverage/tools_network_channels_raw_coverage_e2e.rs`:
- Line 478: Update the assertion in the test around the existing marker check so
it does not require the unavailable “core.fsmonitor” diagnostic; remove that
assertion or accept both documented outcomes, including “Not in a git
repository,” while preserving the marker assertion.
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tests/raw_coverage/tools_network_channels_raw_coverage_e2e.rs
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…orkspace denylist, and the null-classed driver refusal Three of the four gaps found auditing tinyhumansai#5672, tinyhumansai#5807, tinyhumansai#5825 and tinyhumansai#5847. Each test drives the surface an agent actually calls, and each was checked by reverting its fix and confirming the test fails naming its own assertion. - tinyhumansai#5672 — a repository config naming a command does not get to run it, asserted through `GitOperationsTool::execute` rather than the private helper the unit suite uses. The assertion is a marker file the planted `core.fsmonitor` hook would create: an error alone would not distinguish "refused" from "refused after spawning git". Revert the guard and the hook runs *and* the tool returns a clean status payload, so the agent is told everything is fine while attacker-controlled code executes. A second test pins the other direction — an ordinary `git init` + identity still works — so a future tightening of `ALLOWED_REPO_CONFIG` that breaks real repositories fails here rather than in the field. - tinyhumansai#5847 — the one behaviour deliberately retained when TinyPlace was deleted. Agent file tools cannot read or write `tinyplace/` inside the workspace at full autonomy, and the file is byte-identical afterwards, so a refusal that only prints an error would not pass. `redirect_links` and `codegraph` are asserted alongside it: all three are retained-after-removal entries with the same rationale, and a test naming only `tinyplace` would miss a regression that took all three. A control read of an ordinary workspace file keeps the test from passing because everything is blocked. - tinyhumansai#5807 — importing into a driver deliberately given `class = "null"` names that driver and its class, and does not blame a build with no memory module. Driven through `migration_helpers::rpc::migrate_openclaw`, the function the `config.openclaw` RPC handler calls, with an explicit `Config` so the assertion does not depend on process-global state shared with the rest of the merged test binary. tinyhumansai#5825 is deliberately not covered, and the reason is recorded rather than papered over: no provider reachable from an integration target exposes `as_scoring()`, so the only test that could be written there asserts the fail-open fallback — which is the pre-change behaviour and therefore passes with the fix reverted. A vacuous test that satisfies the string-match gate would be worse than the gap. One bug found while writing these: tinyhumansai#5672's refusal message never reaches the agent. Every operation is preceded by a `rev-parse --is-inside-work-tree` probe that runs through the same guarded function, so a refused probe collapses to "Not in a git repository" for a directory that plainly is one. The security property is unaffected; the diagnostic is lost. The test asserts the property that holds and carries a comment saying why it does not assert the message.
Review follow-ups on the tests this branch adds. The write-refusal assertion now also checks the refusal does not echo the protected file back. The read path already rejected the seeded token in its output; the write path checked only the error flag and the on-disk bytes, so a refusal that quoted the existing file would have satisfied both and still leaked it. The null-classed-driver assertion now requires the quoted `"null"` class rather than a bare `null` substring — the driver id in the fixture is `mynull`, which contains `null`, so the looser check would have been satisfied by the id alone and proved nothing about the class the refusal names. The product fix this commit originally carried — dropping `diff.external=` from NEUTRALISED_CONFIG — is gone: `30ba798fe` fixed the same bug on main and did it better, suppressing the external diff with `git diff --no-ext-diff` rather than relying on the allowlist alone, and `34fe8e90d` extended that to `--no-textconv`. Main's version is a strict superset, so the rebase keeps main's and drops mine.
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…\ntest(e2e): backfill coverage for the git config guard, the retained workspace denylist, and the null-classed driver refusal\n
Summary
-c diff.external=broke everydiffthrough the tool. See the commit and the note at the end.Problem
The repo's domain e2e gate is a string match, so a name appearing in a comment or an unrelated fixture satisfies it. All four PRs passed that gate while nothing asserted their behaviour:
tools_network_channels_raw_coverage_e2e.rsmatchedgit_operationsbut asserted only the sanitizer, policy-block and log round-trip; andtool-shell-git-flow.spec.tsmatched it inside a comment saying it does not drive the tool.is_workspace_internal_pathhit was inside an assertion message string in a non-_e2efile.embeddings_provider: Noneand asserts nothing about it.openclawhits were an unrelated channel-proxy fixture.Solution
git_tool_refuses_a_workspace_repo_config_that_names_a_command— plants acore.fsmonitorhook that touches a marker, proven to run before it is planted, then callsGitOperationsTool::execute. The marker is asserted first, before anything about the result: an error alone cannot distinguish "refused" from "refused after spawning git", and asserting the error first would abort before reaching the question that matters.git_tool_still_runs_under_an_ordinary_repository_config— the other direction. An allowlist that refusedgit init+ an identity would make the tool useless, so this fails ifALLOWED_REPO_CONFIGis ever tightened past real repositories.file_tools_cannot_reach_retained_legacy_state_in_the_workspace— full autonomy, workspace-relative paths (what an agent actually sends;workspace_onlyrejects every absolute path atpath_checks.rs:88for reasons unrelated to the denylist). Asserts the read is refused, the secret does not appear in the output, the write is refused, and the file is byte-identical afterwards — a refusal printed after the write would not pass. Coversredirect_linksandcodegraphtoo: same rationale, and a regression would take all three. A control read of an ordinary workspace file keeps it from passing because everything is blocked.openclaw_import_names_a_null_classed_driver_rather_than_the_build— drivesmigration_helpers::rpc::migrate_openclaw, the function theconfig.openclawRPC handler calls, with an explicitConfigso it does not depend on process-global state shared across the merged test binary.Revert-check results
git_tool_refuses_a_workspace_repo_config_that_names_a_commandhardened_git-clayer removedgit executed the command named by the workspace's own repository config (\core.fsmonitor`)` — and the tool returned a clean status payload, so the agent is told all is well while attacker-controlled code runsgit_tool_still_runs_under_an_ordinary_repository_configALLOWED_REPO_CONFIGemptiedordinary repo refused: Not in a git repositoryfile_tools_cannot_reach_retained_legacy_state_in_the_workspace"tinyplace"removed fromWORKSPACE_INTERNAL_DIRStinyplace: agent read of retained legacy state succeeded: {"legacy":"tinyplace","token":"do-not-read"}— the secret visibly leaksopenclaw_import_names_a_null_classed_driver_rather_than_the_builddriver_id()the refusal must name the configured driver and its class; got: … this build has no memory module compiled in …All four pass with the fixes restored (
4 passed; 0 failed).Why #5825 is not covered
To assert the changed behaviour an e2e needs a bound provider whose
as_scoring()isSome. None is reachable from an integration target: the default impl returnsNone,guard::test_supportispub(crate)(guard/mod.rs:111), every injection seam ispub(crate)(binding.rs:453/566/595), and the module route requires#[ignore]+ its own process by the repo's own convention (tool_stats_tests.rs:48) — impossible inside the mergedraw_coverage_allbinary.The test that is writable asserts the fail-open fallback ("scoring absent → model walk"), which is exactly the pre-#5825 behaviour and therefore passes with the fix reverted. It would satisfy the string-match gate and prove nothing, so I did not write it. Full analysis and what would unblock it:
~/tinyhuman/bugs/W2-test-findings.md.Submission Checklist
cargo test -p openhuman --test raw_coverage_allscoped to these four; did not runcargo llvm-covlocally (heaviest lane, and CI does it) — the CI gate is authoritative## Related— no matrix rows affectedCloses #NNN— this is coverage for already-merged PRs, not a fix for an open issueImpact
tests/raw_coverage/.Related
diffwas broken for every repository at every autonomy tier.NEUTRALISED_CONFIGpassed-c diff.external=, and git reads an emptydiff.externalas "run the program named ``", not "disabled". Proven with plain git (git -c diff.external= diff→ `error: cannot run : No such file or directory` / `fatal: external diff died`). Fixed in this PR; the entry was redundant anyway — `diff.external` is not on `ALLOWED_REPO_CONFIG` and `GIT_EXTERNAL_DIFF` is already cleared from the environment. Revert-checked: re-adding the entry reproduces the exact CI failure.25ea41efeonmain, which landed while this was in flight: fix(tools): refuse to run git under untrusted workspace repo config #5672's refusal message used to be swallowed intoNot in a git repositoryby the repository probe. Because that is fixed, the git test asserts the refusal namescore.fsmonitorrather than tolerating both shapes — and CI confirms it passes.~/tinyhuman/bugs/W2-test-findings.md.Summary by CodeRabbit