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Co-authored-by: rschumann <360788+rschumann@users.noreply.github.com>
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π¨ Severity: HIGH
π‘ Vulnerability: The
executeRemotefunction was vulnerable to SSRF. It validated the scheme and host, but reconstructed the URL by copying the parsedurl.URLstruct by value and only modifying thePath. If an attacker provided an opaque URL (e.g.,http:example.com/...), theString()method would prioritize theOpaquefield, bypassing the path constraint.π― Impact: An attacker could bypass routing constraints and potentially perform server-side request forgery (SSRF) against internal services or arbitrary external hosts.
π§ Fix: Replaced the struct copy with an explicit
url.URL{}struct literal instantiation, extracting only the safe fields (Scheme,Host,User,RawQuery) and applying the path constraint securely.β Verification: Verified by generating test scripts mimicking opaque URLs before and after the fix, and confirming resolution via
gosecscanner.PR created automatically by Jules for task 5820898506683009800 started by @rschumann