A governance and boundary constitution for autonomous AI systems.
This repository defines the constitutional rules, threat model, and enforcement invariants for governed execution architectures built around:
- OpenExec (Deterministic Execution)
- ClawShield (Governance Gate)
- ClawLedger (Immutable Witness Ledger)
It is not a runtime. It is not an agent. It is not a policy engine.
It is the architectural constitution that defines what is allowed, what is impossible, and what must always be logged.
Autonomous AI agents introduce a fundamental risk:
They collapse reasoning, authorization, and execution into one mutable layer.
This creates:
- Prompt injection vulnerabilities
- Tool misuse escalation
- Data exfiltration pathways
- Privilege escalation
- Rogue action loops
- Memory poisoning
- Infrastructure mutation
- Cross-agent contamination
Most systems attempt to mitigate these risks at the prompt layer.
That is insufficient.
Security must be architectural.
Execution must be:
- Deterministic
- Governed externally
- Auditable immutably
- Structurally constrained
No autonomous system may self-authorize.
No execution may occur without governance context.
No action may be performed without producing a receipt.
The architecture enforces strict separation:
-
Reasoning Layer Proposes actions but cannot execute them.
-
Governance Layer (ClawShield) Evaluates policy, risk, and authorization.
-
Execution Layer (OpenExec) Performs only approved actions deterministically.
-
Witness Layer (ClawLedger) Records immutable execution receipts.
Each layer is independent. No layer may override another.
This constitutional layer addresses:
- Prompt Injection
- Tool Misuse
- Privilege Escalation
- Data Exfiltration
- Rogue Loops
- Memory Poisoning
- Supply Chain Attacks
- OAuth Abuse
- Sandbox Escapes
- Cost Explosions
- Cross-Agent Contamination
Detailed mappings are defined in:
- THREAT_TAXONOMY.md
- CONTROL_MATRIX.md
Security controls must be:
- Deterministic when possible
- Policy-as-code where feasible
- Hardware-isolated where required
- Immutable in logging
- Explicit in approval
LLM reasoning alone is not sufficient for security guarantees.
This constitution assumes future hardening through:
- MicroVM isolation (Firecracker / Kata)
- WebAssembly sandboxing
- Rust-based orchestration
- OPA/Rego policy enforcement
- Multi-party governance approval
- Circuit breakers for cost and loop control
- Immutable cryptographic receipt signing
A boundary architecture specification.
A security-first agent blueprint.
A constitutional contract between reasoning, governance, and execution.
It is not:
- A marketing document
- A safety disclaimer
- A promise of perfection
It is a structural commitment to governed execution.
Draft constitutional layer.
Under active hardening and formalization.