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Summary
This tightens the email backend's TLS trust boundary without changing the localhost / Protonmail Bridge workflow.
Problem
The code already treats loopback mail transport specially, but for non-local IMAP/SMTP paths it relies on library defaults that do not verify certificates when no explicit TLS context is passed. That means remote IMAPS, SMTPS, and STARTTLS connections can end up running without certificate validation.
For a daemon whose purpose is to safely expose personal messaging to sandboxed AI tools, that weakens the security model in exactly the wrong place.
What changed
localhost,127.0.0.1,::1)Validation
python3.11 -m unittest discover -s tests -vpython3.11 -m compileall messaging_daemon tests