docs: security audit of main @ cfccbbb (2026-08-18) - #9
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Read-only review of auth, court/grants, Electron IPC, secrets, SSRF, and the recent session-delete / stop / draft claims. No product code changed. Co-authored-by: wu1w <wu1w@users.noreply.github.com>
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August 18, 2026 02:08
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Read-only security audit of
wu1w/tevarnatcfccbbb9ed3a8a489097aa3a6e42ee0049a66e43(origin/main).This PR adds a single markdown report:
docs/audit-security-2026-08-18.md. No product or application code is changed.Scope
Authn/authz (JWT, cookies,
jwt_fp, detached backend reuse), host court / grants /extra_roots/ MCP, Electron preload IPC, secret handling and log leakage, SSRF fromweb_search/http/python, session delete / draft restore / tool stop (including whatcfccbbbactually fixed), and workspace/credential escape via tools or MCP.How to read it
Findings are ranked critical / high / medium / low, each with file path, why it matters under the local single-user Agent OS threat model, and a suggested fix (not implemented). There is an explicit “what you verified is OK” section so this is not a fear list.
Highest-impact items:
python/commandinherit control-plane secrets on the local spawn pathJobBackendhas no FS isolation →pythonbypasses the secret floorhost_data_roots()widenextra_rootswithout confirmmanage_mcppersists credentials without the admin REST gateRecent session-delete / stop / draft work is real at the agent-task layer and incomplete for background OS children.