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…20 writes / 10 min) for POST/PATCH/DELETE
…outes to prevent abuse
![github-advanced-security[bot]](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/in/57789?s=60&v=4){kind=small}
| const updateDoc = { $set: { ...updatePackageData } }; | ||
| const result = await Packagecollection.updateOne( | ||
| filter, | ||
| updateDoc, |
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Code scanning / CodeQL
Database query built from user-controlled sources High
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AI 10 months ago
To fix this vulnerability, sanitize the user-provided data before including it in any database update operation. Specifically, ensure that no property keys in updatePackageData start with $ (to prevent operator injection), and ideally, allow updating only specific, whitelisted fields.
Here's what should be changed:
- Before building
updateDoc, filterupdatePackageDataso it contains only allowed keys (e.g., a whitelist of fields that are actually updatable). - Alternatively, at the very least, remove any keys that start with
$fromupdatePackageData(to prevent operator injection). - Apply this change in the PATCH
/Package/:idroute, before constructingupdateDoc.
No new imports are strictly needed for the sanitization. The code can use a local helper function within the same file for filtering fields.
| @@ -63,7 +63,24 @@ | ||
| // Update a package | ||
| app.patch("/Package/:id", writeLimiter, async (req, res) => { | ||
| const id = req.params.id; | ||
| const updatePackageData = req.body; | ||
| const rawUpdatePackageData = req.body; | ||
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| // Whitelist allowed fields to update; adjust as appropriate! | ||
| const allowedFields = ["name", "description", "price", "status"]; // <-- adapt to your schema | ||
| const updatePackageData = {}; | ||
| for (const key of allowedFields) { | ||
| if ( | ||
| Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(rawUpdatePackageData, key) && | ||
| typeof key === "string" && | ||
| !key.startsWith("$") | ||
| ) { | ||
| updatePackageData[key] = rawUpdatePackageData[key]; | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| // If nothing remains to update, reject | ||
| if (Object.keys(updatePackageData).length === 0) { | ||
| return res.status(400).send({ error: "No valid fields to update." }); | ||
| } | ||
| const filter = { _id: new ObjectId(id) }; | ||
| const options = { upsert: true }; | ||
| const updateDoc = { $set: { ...updatePackageData } }; |
| try { | ||
| const user = await authModel.findOne({ email: email }); | ||
| if (user) res.json("Already Registerd"); | ||
| const user = await authModel.findOne({ email }); |
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AI 10 months ago
To best fix this issue, we should ensure that the user input for email is strictly a string and does not allow for query objects or other types that could be interpreted by MongoDB as operators. There are two recommended ways:
- Input validation: Check that
emailis a string, and reject the request if it is not. - MongoDB
$eqoperator: Use{ email: { $eq: email } }to enforce thatemailis interpreted as a literal value.
The best fix is input validation, which gives immediate feedback to the client if the type is incorrect, but using the $eq operator provides a robust fallback that makes the query safe regardless. Implementing both is even better, but per instructions, we should minimize changes and maintain existing functionality.
Specific file/region to change:
- In
taskapp/backend/index.js, within the/registerroute (lines 72–88).
Required additions:
- Before executing the query, check that
emailis a string. - If not, return a 400 response.
Alternatively, change the query to use $eq to ensure the value is strictly matched, but input validation provides a clearer error message to the user.
| @@ -71,6 +71,9 @@ | ||
| // Register | ||
| app.post("/register", authLimiter, async (req, res) => { | ||
| const { userName, email, password } = req.body; | ||
| if (typeof email !== "string") { | ||
| return res.status(400).json({ error: "Invalid email type" }); | ||
| } | ||
| const salt = await bcrypt.genSalt(10); | ||
| const hashedPassword = await bcrypt.hash(password, salt); | ||
| const newAuth = new authModel({ userName, email, password: hashedPassword }); |
| app.post("/forgotpass", authLimiter, async (req, res) => { | ||
| const { email } = req.body; | ||
| await authModel.findOne({ email: email }).then((user) => { | ||
| await authModel.findOne({ email }).then((user) => { |
Check failure
Code scanning / CodeQL
Database query built from user-controlled sources High
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AI 10 months ago
To fix this vulnerability, we need to ensure that the user-supplied email value used in the MongoDB query is guaranteed to be a string literal, so that MongoDB interprets the query as a safe equality comparison and not as a potentially malicious query object. This can be accomplished by checking the type of email before running the query. If email is not a string, the handler should reject the request with a 400 Bad Request error and return early. This change should be implemented inside the /forgotpass handler before line 157. No additional methods or imports are needed, as basic JavaScript type checking (typeof) suffices.
| @@ -154,6 +154,9 @@ | ||
| // Forgot Password | ||
| app.post("/forgotpass", authLimiter, async (req, res) => { | ||
| const { email } = req.body; | ||
| if (typeof email !== "string") { | ||
| return res.status(400).send({ Status: "Invalid email format" }); | ||
| } | ||
| await authModel.findOne({ email }).then((user) => { | ||
| if (!user) return res.send({ Status: "Enter a valid email" }); | ||
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2 participants
Changes
express-rate-limitto all critical routes (/user,/tour,/booking,/review)..env) for DB connection strings and secrets.