Please do not open a public issue for security reports.

Email g.akashvarma@gmail.com with a description of the issue and, if possible, steps to reproduce. You can expect an acknowledgement within a few days and a fix or mitigation plan for confirmed issues.

Argus itself is a static browser app with no backend — no server-side attack surface, and all state lives in the browser's localStorage. The security-relevant components are the two optional companion CLIs, which run on the user's own machine:

• argus-bridge spawns local processes to relay stdio MCP servers. It binds to 127.0.0.1 by default, parses the exec string argv-style, and rejects shell metacharacters unless --allow-shell is passed. The child's stderr is never forwarded to the browser. Do not expose it with --host 0.0.0.0 on untrusted networks; prefer --cmd to pin a fixed command in shared or CI environments.
• argus-proxy forwards HTTP requests to enable cross-origin scans. It binds to 127.0.0.1 and refuses private/link-local address ranges unless --allow-private is passed.

When scanning third-party MCP servers, treat their responses as untrusted input.