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fix(service-messaging)!: mark-read writes a read receipt only for a notification delivered to that user - #22037

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Fixes #22026
Clause-②: no (narrowing)

A read receipt belongs to a recipient: ADR-0030 keys sys_notification_receipt by recipient. MessagingService.markRead is the method behind the notifications mark-read door and behind markReadAsCaller. It used to insert a read receipt for any notification id it was handed, stamped with that notification's organization, and never checked that the caller was a recipient. It now inserts one only for a notification that was delivered to that user. This follows triage's direction (6022270298) and the seat verdict on the measure-first round (6023979476, option A). Rows already written are not cleaned up; the verdict ruled that out.

What changed

Positions are at base b88c356413, in packages/services/service-messaging/src/messaging-service.ts.

  • upsertReadReceipt (near :888) keeps its first step: it flips a receipt keyed (notification_id, user_id, channel 'inbox') to read in place. That read is also the receipt half of the delivery check. The receipt key is the delivered receipt's key, so when the read finds nothing, there is no delivered receipt either.
  • When nothing is found, the new private inboxMessageNames checks for the inbox half. It reads the caller's own sys_inbox_message for that notification: where: { user_id, notification_id }, fields: ['id'], under INBOX_SYSTEM_CONTEXT. An inbox message is enough on its own, because the inbox channel's delivered receipt is best-effort: writeDeliveredReceipt logs a failure and moves on, and the inbox row stays.
  • If neither half holds, upsertReadReceipt returns 0. No row is written, readCount does not count the id, and notificationOrganization is not called. That organization read now happens only on the delivered path.
  • If the inbox read throws, the error reaches markRead's existing per-id catch. It is logged at warn, the id counts 0, and no row is written. A check should fail in that direction.
  • markAllRead is unchanged. Its ids come from unreadNotificationIds, which reads the user's own inbox rows that carry a notification_id. So every id it passes already has an inbox message for that user. A pin below covers it.
  • Doc comments. The markRead docblock now says an undelivered id writes nothing. The inbox-system-context.ts docblock lists the new read among the calls that context carries; that edit is comment-only, in the same package.
  • Unchanged: the response shape { success, readCount }. There is no spec, permission-set or plugin-security change, and nothing changes who may read what.

Reachability, measured before the build

Triage asked for this measurement first. It was taken on base b88c356413 with a local engine-level probe: the real SecurityPlugin, ObjectQL and SqlDriver, the shipped permission sets, and the isolated, group and single postures. The probe was deleted and never committed. Classes and roles only:

  • No reader in the stamped organization reads a non-recipient's receipt row, by list or by id. That covers the member, the viewer, the org admin, and the platform admin with that organization active. The _self policy binds every authenticated principal on this object, and the object grants no superuser bypass.
  • The stamp grants nobody a read. Its only effect on reads: the writer cannot see their own wrongly stamped row on the generic data door. That row is the defect's own output, and this change stops producing it.
  • The inbox's own reads run under their user-keyed context, and the stamp does not reach them.

Report: 6023938722. Seat verdict: 6023979476.

Pins and ablation

The pins are in messaging-service.test.ts, block [#22026]. They use the file's existing stateful inboxEngine double, observed through spies, so no new double was added.

  • The recipient half: with an inbox message and no receipt, the receipt persists, is stamped with the notification's organization, and counts 1.
  • ⛔ The non-recipient half, for the same notification: the call returns { success: true, readCount: 0 }. The receipt table stays empty, nothing is inserted, the event's organization is not read, and the recipient's state does not move.
  • ⛔ The same holds through markReadAsCaller.
  • A mixed call counts only the delivered id and writes only its receipt.
  • The receipt half: a delivered receipt with no inbox message is still flipped in place, as before.
  • The delivery check reads only the caller's own inbox: keyed on user_id, run with { isSystem: true }, and projecting id alone.
  • An inbox row with no notification_id: a call naming its row id writes nothing, and the row still lists as unread.
  • markAllRead: only delivered ids are swept, by construction. The test counts 2 and finds receipts for that user only.

Fixture triage: in read-receipt-organization.test.ts (pins E and E2), the reader had no delivery evidence. The fixture now gives them their inbox message, which is exactly the case the insert path exists for. The assertions are unchanged.

Ablation. Run on the committed state 7eb0b82008 with scripts/ablation-replace.mjs in wrap mode: delete the delivery-check statement, run the block, restore.

  • The anchor count went 1 to 0, and the blob went 448159c99cee to ac84bbb73a43.
  • 5 of the 8 pins turned red. The non-recipient half read expected { success: true, readCount: 1 } to deeply equal { success: true, readCount: +0 }.
  • The 3 that stayed green are the recipient half, the receipt half and markAllRead, which do not depend on the check.
  • After the restore, the blob matched HEAD 448159c99cee and git diff HEAD was empty.

#22025's pins (system-context.pin.test.ts) are green and unchanged.

Tests

Head f2d085db22 unless a line says otherwise. That commit merges origin/main 2301e17eaf, a CI-script commit that touches none of these files.

  • Builds. pnpm --filter '@objectstack/service-messaging^...' build exited 0. pnpm --filter @objectstack/service-messaging build exited 0, with check-dts-emitted: 2/2.
  • Package suite. pnpm --filter @objectstack/service-messaging test: 48 files and 531 tests passed. typecheck exited 0, and tsc --listFiles shows its program includes all 48 test files, the two edited ones among them.
  • Gates. node scripts/pm/dispatch-gates.mjs --commands, run on this change with no paths, derives 65 commands: the dispatch's 51 plus 14 from the changeset and test-file families, none dropped. All 65 exit 0. The --ran reconciliation over the recorded exit codes reads "65 derived, 65 run, 0 NOT-MEASURED, 0 UNRUN".
  • Two gates needed a build first. In the first run, at 7eb0b82008, check:dual-build-cjs-loads and check:i18n exited 3 (PREREQUISITE NOT MET: no build output). After a turbo build of the workspace (72 tasks, 71 cached), both exited 0, and they exit 0 at the merge head too.
  • Verdict lines.
    • check-nul-bytes: OK, no raw ASCII control bytes.
    • check-adr-0087-registration printed its no-migration-prescription exemption notice.
    • check-empty-changeset: "No empty-frontmatter changeset introduced by this diff".
    • check-system-context-census: OK.
    • check-changeset-no-major reads its level axis from the PR payload, so that half is answered in CI.
  • Dogfood, at 7eb0b82008 (the merge touched no package). These suites reach service-messaging through dist/, which was checked to contain the change: approval-notification-body.dogfood.test.ts, schedule-acting-organization.dogfood.test.ts, schedule-sweep-organization-scope.dogfood.test.ts and platform-app-object-entry-views.test.ts. 4 files and 84 tests passed.
  • Runtime, through the real HTTP mark-read door, at 7eb0b82008. notifications.hono.integration.test.ts delivers through the real pipeline, marks one notification read (readCount: 1), then marks all read. Together with notification-schema-conformance.test.ts and domains/notifications-query-validation.test.ts: 3 files and 54 tests passed.
  • Left to CI: repo-wide lint, the whole-workspace type-check lanes, the Test Core shards and the full dogfood shards.

Acceptance notes

  • Comment drift in plugin-security, carrier: none. In default-permission-sets.ts, the comment above sys_inbox_message_self says neither inbox object declares organization_id, so Layer 0 is inert on them. In fact the registry injects organization_id into sys_notification_receipt (it is engine-owned, not better-auth), and the tenant wall and the driver's native tenant scope do act on it, only ever narrowing. This is comment drift, not a behaviour defect. That file is not edited here.
  • Rows written by the old path stay. No non-system reader can read them, and they expire under the object's declared 90-day transient lifecycle. If the same user marks the same id read again, that existing row is flipped, as before: the flip path is unchanged by ruling.
  • Inbox rows without a notification_id. notification: 没有 notification_id 的 sys_inbox_message 行永远无法被标记已读 —— 读态的键在事件 id 上 #6448, which asked about such rows, ended in the not-planned state. listInbox looks up read state only through a row's notification_id, so a row without one always lists as unread. Nothing regresses for those rows.
  • The changeset is minor with a BREAKING banner (an accept-set narrowing, under the launch-window convention) and carries an ADR-0087 not-required (no-migration-prescription) disposition.

Generated by Claude Code

claude added 2 commits October 6, 2026 19:39
…otification delivered to that user

upsertReadReceipt inserts a read receipt only when the notification was
delivered to the caller: a receipt keyed on them already exists (flipped
in place, unchanged), or their inbox holds a message for it. Any other id
writes no row, is not counted in readCount, and its event's organization
is not read. The delivery check reads the caller's own inbox under
INBOX_SYSTEM_CONTEXT, keyed on user_id.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WMQprn46CND82KmY8sZWBu
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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github-actions Bot commented Oct 6, 2026

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📓 Docs Drift Check

This PR changes 1 package(s): @objectstack/service-messaging, touching 3 documentable anchor(s). ⚠️ 1 changed file(s) yielded no anchor (packages/services/service-messaging/src/inbox-system-context.ts), so the pages documenting them are NOT COVERED by this run — this is not a clean bill of health for those files.

⛔ 1 release-owned page(s) name something this change touched. These are read-only:

  • content/docs/releases/v17/17-2.mdx (via MessagingService (symbol, a top-level class))

content/docs/releases/ is RELEASE-OWNED (AGENTS.md "Documentation Guardrails"): release
notes are written centrally at release time, and a code PR that edits them is the exact PR
that guardrail exists to stop. They are still audited — read-only. If one of them is actually
wrong, file an issue or open a dedicated docs-only PR; do not edit it here.

What this run could not see
  • 1 changed file(s) yielded no anchor (packages/services/service-messaging/src/inbox-system-context.ts) — pages documenting those are invisible to this run
  • the SDK route bridge reached 54 of 206 client-bound route-ledger rows — the other 152 have no registrar path: tail to select them, so pages documenting THEIR client methods cannot appear above, on this or any run. Of those 152: 0 are remediable by widening that discovery convention (an in-repo file declares the path; the convention did not scan it); 55 are structural — on a ledger where NOT ONE row is declared in-repo, so no discovery change reaches them at any price; 97 are undecided (no in-repo declaration, on a ledger that has other in-repo registrars — absence and an unreadable spelling are not distinguishable here). The rows themselves: node scripts/docs-audit/affected-docs.mjs --bridge-coverage
  • a page that states a rule by its inputs shares no identifier with the emitter that implements the rule, so an emitter-only diff cannot list it — not on this run and not on any run. Measured on fix(driver-sql): emit varchar(maxLength) for a text field a declared index keys on #11430: content/docs/protocol/objectql/types.mdx documents the text-family column mapping by the ObjectQL type names it maps FROM (text / textarea / html) while the diff changed createColumn; it went unlisted, and it was the page that diff falsified, in four places. No shared token exists to detect this on, so a rule your change carries has to be re-read by hand in the pages that restate it.
  • a key NAME is not a key, so the hand re-read the line above prescribes can land on the wrong schema. The same spelling is authorable on one governed type and a [REMOVED] tombstone on another for each of active, aria, joins, objects, template, tools and version (censused on [finding] tools is a key on BOTH AgentSchema (tombstoned, dead) and SkillSchema (live, cloud-attested), so a name-based search attributes skill examples to the agent key — it produced a false stop-the-line alarm on PR #19059 #19093 over the liveness ledger's governed types, top-level keys); nothing in a search result distinguishes the two, so a grep hit on a LIVE example reads as evidence about the DEAD key. Measured on fix(spec): the agent.tools liveness row says dead — it claimed live on a key the schema tombstoned #19059: content/docs/ai/agents.mdx was reported as contradicting the agent.tools tombstone over its tools: example at :161, which is inside the defineSkill({ block opened at :155 — the page was already correct. Settle ownership by PARSING the value against both schemas, never by the name: that literal PASSES SkillSchema, and as an AgentSchema it FAILS at tools with the tombstone prescription. ⛔ These names are not the whole class — a key retired through a .strict() guidance map leaves no tombstone in the walked shape and none of them here (tool.category, live as AIToolDefinition.category).

Coarse fallback — 5 page(s) merely mention a changed package (the pre-#9192 predicate, kept for the deliberately-wide backstop): node scripts/docs-audit/affected-docs.mjs --json 2301e17eaf470c2cdefe2eb1cd05b41ba350cc84 → packageMentionDocs.

Which tree this was computed on

This run read content/docs from 7000293be03d435b72c079849c2b6c0921414b89 — the merge of head f2d085db2236498fa12419f85ed9103ba4a88002 into base 2301e17eaf470c2cdefe2eb1cd05b41ba350cc84, which is what actions/checkout gives a pull_request run. Not the PR head.

A worktree cut from an older main holds a different content/docs, so re-deriving there can legitimately return a different list — that is a different tree, not a wrong row. To answer on the same tree:

# while this PR is open — GitHub drops the merge commit once it closes
git fetch origin 7000293be03d435b72c079849c2b6c0921414b89 && git checkout 7000293be03d435b72c079849c2b6c0921414b89
# afterwards, rebuild it from the two parents, which stay fetchable
git fetch origin 2301e17eaf470c2cdefe2eb1cd05b41ba350cc84 f2d085db2236498fa12419f85ed9103ba4a88002 && git checkout -B drift-repro 2301e17eaf470c2cdefe2eb1cd05b41ba350cc84 && git merge --no-ff f2d085db2236498fa12419f85ed9103ba4a88002

node scripts/docs-audit/affected-docs.mjs --json 2301e17eaf470c2cdefe2eb1cd05b41ba350cc84

⚠️ That checkout carried uncommitted changes, so the commit above does not fully identify what was read.

Advisory only, and a precision-first one (#9192): a page is listed because it names a
symbol, wire route or SDK method this diff touched — not because it mentions a changed
package. Each row says which anchor put it there, so a wrong row is reportable rather than
merely annoying. To re-verify, run the docs-accuracy-audit workflow scoped to these files:
node scripts/docs-audit/affected-docs.mjs 2301e17eaf470c2cdefe2eb1cd05b41ba350cc84 → pass the list as
args.docs, on the commit named under Which tree this was computed on.

@objectstack-fleet
objectstack-fleet Bot marked this pull request as ready for review October 6, 2026 21:14
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objectstack-fleet Bot enabled auto-merge October 6, 2026 21:14
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objectstack-fleet Bot added this pull request to the merge queue Oct 6, 2026
Merged via the queue into main with commit 0db5ad5 Oct 6, 2026
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@objectstack-fleet
objectstack-fleet Bot deleted the claude/issue-22026-read-receipt-recipient-only branch October 6, 2026 21:53
akarma-synetal pushed a commit to akarma-synetal/framework that referenced this pull request Oct 7, 2026
…thods and the HTTP outbox's redeliver take the explicit system opt-in (objectstack-ai#22045)

Part of objectstack-ai#21908
Clause-②: no

Phase two, stage 2a of the principal-less hand-off closure (ADR-0096 E1
/ D5), per the maintainer's ruling on the card (letter A). Seven more
producers of a principal-less, non-system data context now take the
explicit system opt-in (`isSystem: true`) inside their owning service.
The deny itself lands last and is not in this PR, so objectstack-ai#21908 stays open.
⛔ No `plugin-security`, `packages/spec`, `metadata-protocol` or
`docs/adr` file is in the diff, there is no new elevation API, and no
door's authorization changed.

## What moved

Positions are at the base `9a0401fdd3`. "Gate fired" means one of the
six gates the security middleware still runs before its hand-off
(package-managed, system-row, curated-capability, audience-anchor,
ADR-0103 engine-owned, ADR-0090 D12 delegated-admin) fires on the
producer's calls. Counts are principal-less calls at the hand-off,
before and after the change; every "after" call arrived as an `isSystem`
call.

| Position | Function | Doors | Door authorizes (where) | Gate fired |
Moved | Evidence (harness · dogfood subset) |
| :-- | :-- | :-- | :-- | :-- | :-- | :-- |
| `service-storage` `metadata-store.ts:373` |
`StorageMetadataStore.getFile` | upload commit
(`storage-routes.ts:453`), both download doors (`:799`, `:846`), and the
chunked completion through `updateFile` | yes. Commit and chunked
completion: session authentication (`requireUploadSession`, `:458`,
`:684`) before the read. Downloads: `authorizeDownload` (`:808`, `:855`)
after the read and before anything is disclosed, because its verdict
reads the row | no | yes | 5 → 0 · 111 → 0 |
| `metadata-store.ts:399` | `StorageMetadataStore.updateFile` | upload
commit (`:472`), chunked completion (`:720`) | yes. Session
authentication before the write; the session's organization scopes the
write | no | yes | 2 → 0 · 46 → 0 |
| `metadata-store.ts:434` | `StorageMetadataStore.deleteFile` | none. No
production caller in this repository; the class is exported | not
applicable, no door | no | yes | 1 → 0 (direct call) · not reached |
| `metadata-store.ts:502` | `StorageMetadataStore.getSession` | chunk
upload (`:593`), chunked completion (`:681`), progress (`:751`) | yes.
Session authentication before the read; at the chunk door the
resume-token check (`:617`) follows the read, because it reads the row's
token, and precedes every write | no | yes | 8 → 0 · 2 → 0 |
| `metadata-store.ts:529` | `StorageMetadataStore.updateSession` | chunk
upload (`:658`, expiry via `:623`), chunked completion (`:705`, `:725`,
expiry via `:694`, failure stamp via `:732`), progress (expiry via
`:770`) | yes. Session authentication before every write; the chunk door
also checks the resume token first | no | yes | 4 → 0 · 1 → 0 |
| `metadata-store.ts:562` | `StorageMetadataStore.deleteSession` | none.
No production caller in this repository | not applicable, no door | no |
yes | 1 → 0 (direct call) · not reached |
| `service-messaging` `sql-http-outbox.ts:468` |
`SqlHttpOutbox.redeliver` (two reads, one reset write) | `POST
/api/v1/webhooks/redeliver` (`plugin-webhooks`
`webhook-outbox-plugin.ts:397`) through `MessagingService.redeliverHttp`
| yes. An authenticated session or `401` before the call; the session's
active organization is the tenant; the producer's veto runs before the
write | no | yes | 3 → 0 · not reached |

Read scope, asked for by the claim: `getFile` and `getSession` read by
id with no organization scope before the move (no context at all, so no
`tenantId` reached the driver, and the middleware handed the call
through before any row or tenant filter) and after it (the middleware
short-circuits before the same filters, and still no `tenantId` reaches
the driver).

## What the opt-in would also have changed, and what holds it

The opt-in skips more than the six gates. Measured on the real engine,
per call:

- **The update-side `readonly` strip.** `updateFile` and `updateSession`
used to send the whole row read back, merged with the patch. Under the
strip, the engine took `organization_id`, `created_at`, `updated_at`,
`created_by` and `updated_by` out of that row on every call. Under the
opt-in the strip does not run, so the full row, `organization_id`
included and read without tenant scope, would have been written back.
**Fix inside the store:** the two updates now send the caller's patch
alone (`changedColumns`). Measured on SQLite through the real engine: on
the base the strip took those five columns; on the change it takes none,
and the stored rows are equal on every non-timestamp column, with
`updated_at` still stamped by the platform.
- **The tenant-audit fill-in.** For an `isSystem` write,
`ObjectQL.buildDriverOptions` fills in `bypassTenantAudit: true` when
the object is outside the platform tenancy inventory. `sys_file` and
`sys_upload_session` are in it as tenant-scoped, so nothing changes for
them (pinned). `sys_http_delivery` is not, so the opt-in would have
silenced the audit for a redelivery from a caller with no organization,
which is the one line `RedeliverOptions` keeps. **Fix inside the
outbox:** the reset write states `bypassTenantAudit: false`. The engine
never overwrites an explicit value, and the driver still audits.
- **Unchanged, measured or read:** row and field security, the masker
and the Layer 0 tenant wall are skipped by the hand-off and by the
opt-in alike. Read auditing records neither (no user id). No lookup
field exists on the three objects, so the referential-integrity skip
does not apply. Redelivery's bulk data event publishes without an
organization in both cases.

## Pins

- **Store, `tenant-audit-update-delete-half-repairs.test.ts`.**
- Every by-id read carries `{ context: { isSystem: true } }` and no
tenant.
- Every by-id write carries the opt-in beside the door's tenant, or the
opt-in alone with no tenant invented. The route-level pins are updated
to match.
- ⛔ An update payload never carries the provisioned columns of the row
read back.
  - The opt-in leaves these writes' tenant audit armed.
- ⛔ Negative, through the real `ObjectQL` over a real `SqlDriver` on
SQLite in the isolated posture: under the opt-in, a door tenant's
`updateFile`, `updateSession`, `deleteFile` and `deleteSession` on a row
stamped for another organization are refused
(`StorageMetadataStoreError` wrapping `RECORD_NOT_FOUND`) and leave the
row untouched. The still-works half shows the caller's own row and an
organization-less row are reached.
- **Outbox, `system-context.pin.test.ts`.** Both reads and the reset
write carry the opt-in. The caller's `tenantId` stays on every bag. The
reset states `bypassTenantAudit: false`, and a caller with no tenant
gets none invented.
- **Outbox, `delivery-update-tenant-audit.integration.test.ts`.**
- ⛔ Negative, on the real driver: a foreign row stays
`RESOURCE_NOT_FOUND` with zero writes under the opt-in, and the caller's
own row resets.
- The two existing audit assertions now read `false`, the value the
driver receives, where they read "absent".
- **The stage-1 pins stay green.** These are objectstack-ai#22025's insert pins and
objectstack-ai#22037's inbox pins, inside the full package suites.

**Ablations**, run at `0f6df0f306`. Each mutation went through
`scripts/ablation-replace.mjs`: the anchor hit, the blob changed, and
the restore was proved by blob equal to `HEAD` and an empty `git diff
HEAD`. The pins import from `src`, so no `dist` leg applies.

| # | Mutation | Result |
| :-- | :-- | :-- |
| A1 | by-id writes keep the opt-in but drop the door tenant | 13 of 28
red; the negative pins read "promise resolved … instead of rejecting"
(the foreign row was reached) |
| A3 | `updateFile` sends the merged row again | 1 of 28 red; the
payload carried `organization_id` and `created_by` |
| A4 | `redeliver`'s deciding read drops `tenantId` | 5 of 30 red; the
negative pin got `DELIVERY_NOT_ELIGIBLE` where it expects
`RESOURCE_NOT_FOUND` |
| A5 | the reset write's `bypassTenantAudit: false` removed | 4 of 21
red; the driver received `true` ("expected true to be false"), and the
tenant-less redelivery went silent |

## Measurement

The measurement used a local instrument in `plugin-security`'s
middleware, never committed. Its instrument file was reverted, and blob
`5b4ab28045af` equals `HEAD`. `plugin-security` was rebuilt, and
`ablation-dist-preflight --absent` passes; its positive control found
the marker in 2 built files while it was live.

For each call from the seven producers, the instrument recorded the
producer frame, whether the call was principal-less, and a dry run of
the six gates with the system flag cleared. Two runs used it:

- A scratch harness, deleted and not in the diff. It drove every door on
a booted stack: upload commit, both downloads, the chunk upload,
progress, chunked completion, progress on an expired session, and `POST
/api/v1/webhooks/redeliver`. It called `deleteFile` and `deleteSession`
directly.
- The 11-file dogfood subset named below.

Every door answered the same on the base and on the change (200, or 302
for the redirect). There were 0 gate firings before and after.

## Acceptance notes

- **Premise correction.** `updateFile` and `updateSession` already
accepted the optional organization context (`metadata-store.ts:399`,
`:529`), as `deleteFile` and `deleteSession` did. Only `getFile` and
`getSession` take none, and they still take none: the reads carry the
opt-in without a tenant. No public signature changed.
- **Door ordering, reported for the seat.** At both download doors the
read precedes `authorizeDownload`. At the chunk door the read precedes
the resume-token check. Each check reads the row it needs, and each
precedes any disclosure and any write. The read's reach is the same
before and after (unscoped by principal and by organization).
- **Doors without a door-level binding.** The chunked completion and
progress doors authorize by session authentication and check no resume
token. The commit door checks no ownership of the file id. The move
leaves all three unchanged, and owner checks are the question the ruling
sent to its own card (option C). Reported to the seat at class level.
- **`deleteFile` and `deleteSession` have no caller in this
repository.** They were moved as the ruling wires all seven. Their door
check is vacuous.
- **Files beyond the two named files, all in the same packages.**
- `outbox-dispatcher-scope.ts` declares `REDELIVER_SYSTEM_CONTEXT`
(module-internal) with its own warrant, and amends the two docblocks
that kept the outbox opt-ins off `redeliver`.
  - `messaging-service.ts` gets one sentence made true.
- `scripts/engine-double-contract.pinned.json` counts the storage test
file's second double, which `--write` grew.
- `plugin-audit`'s `audit-writers.test.ts` fixture prose still describes
`updateSession` writing the merged full record. That is test residue in
another package and is left alone.

## Verification (head `2665532dc9`)

Each command ran in the foreground of this worktree, and its exit code
was captured before any pipe.

- **Gates.** Running `node scripts/pm/dispatch-gates.mjs --commands
--repo objectstack-ai/objectstack` at `2665532dc9`, with no paths,
derived 73 commands. The dispatch-time 51 are a subset. All 73 ran and
all exited 0. The reconciliation (`--ran`) printed: "73 derived
famil(ies) accounted for — 73 run, 0 NOT-MEASURED (a DERIVED zero — all
73 recorded an exit code and none of them is 3)".
- On an earlier pass at `6f366adcb1`, `check:engine-double-contract`
exited 1. It had counted the new recording wrapper as a fake engine. The
wrapper now routes each verb through the engine's dispatch predicates,
and `--write` grew the ledger.
- `check:dual-build-cjs-loads` exited 3 (PREREQUISITE NOT MET: 8
packages outside the dogfood closure had no `dist/`). They were built,
and it then exited 0.
- **Suites at `2665532dc9`.** `@objectstack/service-storage`: 42 files,
659 tests passed. `@objectstack/service-messaging`: 48 files, 534
passed. `typecheck` passed for both, the storage test layer's
`check:test-typecheck` included. `--listFiles` confirms both programs
compile the edited test files. `@objectstack/plugin-webhooks`, which
mounts the redeliver door, passed at `0f6df0f306`: 15 files, 165 tests.
- **Dogfood.** The 11 files below passed, 100 passed and 1 skipped, on
both the base and the change. They ran against the change's built
`dist/`; the source is unchanged since `230ed9ea15`. The files:
`attachments-permission-matrix`, `attachments-public-read-acl`,
`attachments-unscoped-delete-gate`, `field-file-collection`,
`file-field-constraint-refusal`, `sys-file-metadata-write-refusal`,
`predicate-write-unreadable-not-matched`,
`write-door-unreadable-is-not-found`, `storage-growth`,
`temporal-storage-e2e`, `webhook-materialization`. None of these files
reaches the redeliver door; the scratch harness covered it.
- **Lint, a proven narrowing; CI runs the full `pnpm lint`.** The
population was read from `eslint.config.mjs`: the
`**/*.{ts,tsx,mts,cts,js,jsx,mjs,cjs}` block plus the `packages/**`
blocks. `eslint --no-inline-config --format json` over the 7 changed
`.ts` files reported 7 files, 0 errors and 0 warnings at `c4f10218af`.
The config enables no type-aware linting (no `parserOptions.project` and
no typed rules), so no untouched file's verdict can move.

## Changeset

`.changeset/21908-by-id-producers-opt-in.md` grades `patch` for
`@objectstack/service-storage` and `@objectstack/service-messaging`. It
names the opt-in, the patch-only update payload and the held tenant
audit. No exported type or entry symbol changed: the new constants and
the store helper are module-internal.

---
_Generated by [Claude
Code](https://claude.ai/code/session_01WMQprn46CND82KmY8sZWBu)_

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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